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ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Steven M. Parry 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129 
Telephone: (208) 334-88 15 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
ISB #2153 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., ) 
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN MCHUGH ) 
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C. j case NO. c Y- @d- d 3  a 
MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL 1 
MILLER, AND JOHN X. COMBO, 1 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, 1 
-vs- 1 COMPLAINT 
) 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED ) 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH ) 
INC. 
1 
COMES NOW the above-named Plaintiff, and for a cause of action colnplains and 
alleges as follows: 
COMI'LAINT - 1 
I. 
That the Defendant, CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP is the 
record owner in fee of the land sought to be condemned by Plaintiff. 
11. 
That the Defendant, Lazy J. Ranch Inc., may have an interest in the subject property by 
reason of a lease agreement between it and Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership. 
111. 
That the Idaho Transportation Department is a civil administrative department of 
government of the State of Idaho, and as such is lawfully empowered to lay out, build, construct, 
improve, alter, extend, and maintain state highways at any place within the State of Idaho, and 
has the power and duty to acquire the necessary land and property for rights-of-way, turnouts, 
fills, and excavations for state highway purposes by purchase, condemnation or otherwise, and it 
is the duty of the Plaintiff, among other things, to establish, construct, improve and maintain a 
system of state highways within the State of Idaho; that Charles L. Winder, Bruce Sweeney, 
Gary Blick, John McHugh, Monte C. McClure, Neil Miller, and John X. Combo now are the 
duly appointed and qualified acting Idaho Transportation Board of the State of Idaho. 
IV. 
That the tract or strip of land so sought to be condemned is to be used for a right-of-way 
for laying out, building, constructing, improving, altering, relocating, and extending one of the 
state highways of the State of Idaho; that said highway is a part and link of the established 
highway system of the State of Idaho known as US-93, Twin Falls Alternate Route, Stage 1, 
Project No. DHP-NH-F-2390(104), in Twin Falls County, Idaho; that said highway is to be used 
for travel by the general public; that the highway to be constructed upon said land is necessary 
COMPLArNT - 2 
for travel by the general public; that the highway to be constructed upon said land is necessary 
for the safety, convenience, and utility of the general public; that the same will be a state 
designated public highway, and the use thereof by the public will be a public use; that the land 
sought to be condemned herein is required for the laying out, construction, and maintenance of 
such highway for such public use, and the taking of the said land is necessary for such use. 
v. 
That the location and survey of said highway, as hereinafter described, was made by and 
under the direction of the Plaintiff herein, and the same is located in such manner as will be most 
compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury. 
VI. 
That the Plaintiff herein by its proper officers, prior to the commencement of this action, 
sought in good faith to purchase from said Defendants said strip or tract of land so sought to be 
taken by the Plaintiff for the right-of-way of such state highway to be constructed on, over, and 
across the same, and to settle with the Defendants for the damages which might result to their 
property by the taking thereof for said right-of-way, and that the Plaintiff was unable to make 
any bargain therefor, or to make any settlement therefor, or to make any settlement for the 
damage to the property of said Defendants. 
VII. 
That for the reasons aforesaid and for the purpose of laying out, building, constructing, 
improving, altering, extending, and maintaining the said state highway on and across the 
hereinafter described property, it is necessary for the Plaintiff herein to condemn any and all 
rights to the hereinafter described property designated as Parcel No. 41 in fec simple absolute, a 
permanent easement in Parcel No. 41 and obtain a temporary easement as to Parcel No. 41. 
That the property sought herein to be condemned is now surveyed, located and shown 
upon the official plat of US-93, Twin Falls alternate Route, Stage 1, Project No. DHP-NH-F- 
2390(104), Highway Survey on file in the office of the County Recorder of Twin Falls County, 
located in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, and is described as follows: 
That real property described in Exhibit "A" attached 
hereto and by this reference made a part hereof. 
That the property herein sought to be condemned is a part of a larger parcel of land. 
That access is to be limited to that shown on Exhibit "B. 
IX. 
That the general route of the highway for which the right-of-way is sought to be 
condemned herein is US-93, as is shown upon the official plat in the Idaho Transportation 
Department of the State of Idaho, as US-93, Twin Falls Alternate Route, State 1, Project No. 
DHP-NB-F-2390(104), a copy of which plat is attached hereto marked Exhibit "B, and by this 
reference made a part hereof. 
IIX. 
That the termini of the centerline of the highway for which the property herein described 
is sought to be condemned is Station 8231.1 1.091 to Station 825-f-68216 of the aforesaid US-93 
Twin Falls Alternate Route, Project No. DHP-NH-F-2390(104), Highway Suivey. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows: 
That the rights to the property hereinabove described a.s Parcel No. 41 be condemned in 
fee simple absolute, to obtain a permanent easement in Parcel 41 and obtain a temporary 
easement as to Parcel No. 41. 
COMPLAINT - 4 
That the damages accruing to the Defendants by reason of the condemnation of the real 
property described in this Complaint be assessed; that the rights of the parties hereto be fully 
determined; that a final order of condemnation and other appropriate orders and judgment be 
entered herein as provided by law; and that the Plaintiff have such other and fkther orders, 
judgment, and relief as to the Court may appear just and equitable in the premises. 
DATED this day of December, 2004. 
/steven M. Parry 
Deputy Attorney General 
State of Idaho 1 
: SS. 
County of Ada 1 
Steven M. Parry, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
I am one of the attorneys for the above-named Plaintiff, and I make this verification for 
and on behalf of said Plaintiff, a political body of the State of Idaho. I further say that I have 
read the above and foregoing Complaint, know the contents thereof and that the allegations of 
fact therein contained are true as I verily believe. 
4 
Steven M. Parry 
Deputy Attorney General 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this .:l.i: day of December, 2004. 
; '  kesiding at ./6d , 0. , , Idaho 
My ~ommiss ion~x~ i r e s :  .<yx7,~ ,(,.3[,~. V 
to the Right of Way Plat of Project No. DHP-NH- 
2390(104) filed for record in the office of the 
County Recorder of Twin Falls County, Idaho, on 
the gth day of August, 2004 under Instrument 
No.2004-017039: 
Being a portion of the N E V &  (Government Lot 3) of 
Section 4, Township 10 South, Range 17 East of Boise 
Meridian, Idaho, 
PE-NT EASEMENT 
Parcel No. 41, Parcel I.D. No. 0041481, according 
to the Right of Way Plat of Project No. DHP-NH-F- 
2390(104) filed for record in the office of the 
County Recorder of Twin Falls County, Idaho, on 
the gth day of August, 2004 under Instrument 
No.2004-017039: Being a portion of the NEt- 
(Government Lot 3)of Section 4, Township 10 
South, Range 17 East, Boise Meridian. 
For the purpose of a slope easement. 
TEMPORARY EASEMENT 
Ltemporary easement to go upon, occupy, and use a 
strip of land in a portion of the ( N E V W  Gov. Lot 
3)of Section 4, Township 10 South, Range 17 East, 
Boise Meridian, Twin Falls County, Idaho; on the 
southerly (Right) side of the above described parcel 
of land (Parcel No.41 /Parcel Id.No.0041481) and being 
68 meters (approximately 223 feet) wide lying between 
Stations 825100 Right to 825+20 Right and from 825+35 
Right to 825+55 Right of the Pole Line Road Survey as 
shown on the plans of said Highway Survey DHP-NH-F- 
2390(104), for the purpose of construction, together 
with the right and privilege of ingress and egress to 
and from said property for said purpose. 
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Attorneys at Law 
Washingloll Mutual Capitol Plaza 
199 North Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 600 
Post Office Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-3658 
Facsimile: (208) 386-9428 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership 
and Lazy J. Ranch, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE FIFTIH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
01; THE STATE OF IDAIIO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
'THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., 1 CASE NO. CV 04-6336 
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOI-IN MCHUGIH ) 
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C. 1 
MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL 
MILLER and JOHN X COMBO, 
IDAI-I0 TRANSPORTATION BOARD, ) TRIAL 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 
vs. 1 
1 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED ) 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J. RANCII, ) 
MC. 
Defendants. 
COME NOW the Defendants, Cnyon Vista Family Limited Partnership and Lazy J. 
Ranch, by and through its attorneys of record, Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox, and hereby 
answer Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint as follows: ORIGINAL 
ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1 5-4 , .i. 6 
I. 
Defendants admit the allegations set forth in Paragraphs I, 11,111, VI, VII and VIII of 
Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint. 
11. 
Defendants are without sufficient information to admit or deny paragraph IV, but 
affirmatively allege that the taking is for general highway purposes. 
111. 
Defendants are without sufficient information to admit or deny paragraphs IX and X and 
therefore deny the same. 
IV . 
It has been necessary for the Defendants to employ attorneys to represent them in this 
action and Defendants have agreed to pay their attorneys a reasonable fee for their services in 
defending the action brought against it by the State of Idaho. Plaintiff should be required to pay 
all of Defendants' attorneys fees in this matter. 
v. 
Defendants deny each and every allegation of Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint not 
specifically admitted herein. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants affirmatively allege that the Defendants' property is being condemned for 
general highway purposes, and that Defendants are entitled to recover its damages once and for 
all time, based on the most injurious use by the Idaho Transportation Department of the property 
sought to be condemned which is reasonably possible. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2 
In the alternative, Defendants affirmatively allege that its property is being condemned 
for the specific project depicted in the project plans which is referenced in the Amended 
Complaint, and that any changes in the use of the property taken and/or any changes in the 
project which give rise to additional damages to Defendants' remaining property will entitle 
Defendants or its successors to additional compensation. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants affirmatively allege that a permanent and temporary easement are sought to 
be take11 by Plaintiff and are limited to the specific uses described in Exhibit A to the Amended 
Complaint. Any additional uses of the easement areas will entitle Defendants to additional 
compensation. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants are informed and believe, and based upon that information and belief 
affirmatively allege, that portions of the prescriptive right of way are no longer being used for 
their historic use and Defendants are entitled to additional just compeiisatioii for those portions 
of its property which lie within a prescriptive right of way and which are not being used for their 
historic use. 
WHEREFOI-, Defendants respectfully request that the Court determine the amount of 
just compensation due the Defendants by reason of the condemnation of the subject property, and 
enter judgment against the Plaintiff for the fair market value of Defendants' propcrty and 
property rights taken and the severance damages to the remainder of Defendants' real property, 
together with Defendants' costs, attorncys' fees and such other and further relief as to the Court 
may seem just and reasonable. 
DEFENDANTS REQUEST A JURY TRIAL ON ALL ISSUES OF FACT PRESENTED 
HEREM. DEFENDANTS WILL NOT STIPULATE TO A JURY OF LESS THAN TWELVE. 
ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TIUAL - 3 
DATED this 6'" day of October, 2005. 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the GIh day of October, 2005, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following: 
Steven M. Parry d ~ . ~ .  MAIL 
Deputy Attorney General - Hand Delivery 
Idaho Transportation Department Facsimile Transmission 
331 1 West State Street ___ Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129 
ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 4 
7#/2005  19 31 FAX 2 0 8  342  3 1 5 8  DAVKSON & COPPLE 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEYGENERAL 
JOSEPH D. MALLET 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
33 1.1 West State Street 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129 
Telephone. (208) 334-88 15 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
ISB #58 17 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
IN THE DlSTRlCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF T W N  FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., ) 
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN MCHUGH ) 
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C. CV-04-6336 
MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL 
MILLER, AND JOHN X. COMBO, 
1 
) 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATLON BOARD, ) 
1 
Plainti@, 1 
) STIPULATION TO 
-vs- 1 AMEND COMPLAINT 
CANYON VISTA FAMJLY LIMITED ) 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH ) 
MC., ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
1T IS HEREBY STPULATED AND AGREED between the parties: 
That the Plaintiff, State of Idaho, i s  engaged in the constraction of a highway project 
designated as US-93, Twin Falls Alternate Route, Stage 1, Project no. DHP-NH-F-2390(104) in 
S'TLPULATION TO AMEND COMPLAm'T - I 
1 0 / 2 6 / 2 0 0 5  19 3 1  FAX 208 342  3 1 5 8  D A V l S O N  & COPPLE 
Twin Falls County, Idaho 
That the Defendants have previously stipulated to possession of the property to be taken 
by the State of Idaho as part of that project, and, pursuant to Court Order, the State has entered 
into possession of said property 
That following modification to the project plans, the Plaintiff and Defendants entered into 
negotiations regarding the amended project plans, and that the Defendants have stipulated to 
possession of the property as reflected on those amended plans. The changes include increasing 
the width of an access point and taking the bike path atea in fee, rather than the taking of a 
That the State has made certain changes in the project that are not reflected in the right- 
olr-way legal description originally filed as "Exhibit A" and the right-of-way plans origulally 
filed as "Exhibit B" with the Complaint in this matter. 
NOW THEREFORE, the parties hereto do hereby stipulate and agree that: 
The Plaintiff, State of Idaho, may amend their Complaint and the right-of-way legal 
description and the right-of-way plans by filing a new Complaint with new exhibits reflecting the 
above-stated chanees. 
- %?3 
DATED tiis a day of 2005 
Attorney for PI 9 
STIPULATION TO hVEND COMPLAINT - 2 
E DON COPPLE - ISB K 1085 
HEATHER A. CUNNINGHAM - ISB # 5480 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX 
Attorneys at Law 
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza 
199 North Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 600 
Post Office Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-3658 
Facsimile: (208) 386-9428 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership 
and Lazy J. Ranch, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., 1 CASE NO. CV 04-6336 
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN MCHUGH ) 
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C. ) 
MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL 1 
MILLER and JOHN X COMBO, 1 NOTICE OF SERVICE 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, ) 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 
Ys. j 
) 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED ) 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J. RANCH, ) 
INC. 1 
Defendants. 
NOTICE IS I-IEREBY GIVEN that on the 28Ih day of October, 2005, a true and correct 
NOTICE OF SERVICE - 1 
ORIGINAL,; 
copy of the Defendants' Answers and Responses to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories and 
Requests for Production of Documents, together with a copy of this Notice, was served upon the 
following: 
Joseph D. Mallett US Mail 
Deputy Attorney General Certified Mail 
Idaho Transportation Department Facsimile 
33 1 1 West State Street Hand Delivery 
PO Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129 
DATED this 28Ih day of October, 2005. 
By: 
Attorneys for Defendants 
NOTICE OF SERVICE - 2 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEYGENERAL 
JOSEPH D. MALLET 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
33 11 West State Street 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8815 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
ISB #5817 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., 
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN MCHUGH ) 
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C. 1 Case No. (3-04-6336 
MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL 1 
MILLER, AND JOHN X. COMBO, 1 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, 1 
) 
-VS- 1 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED ) 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW the above-named Plaintiff, and for a cause of action complains and 
alleges as follows: 
FlRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - I 
I. 
That the Defendant, CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSI-IIP is the 
record owner in fee of the land sought to be condemned by Plaintiff. 
11. 
That the Defendant, L,azy J. Ranch Inc., may have an interest in the sub,ject property by 
reason of a lease agreement between it and Canyon Vista Fanlily Liinited Partnership. 
111. 
That the Idaho Transportation Department is a civil administrative department of 
government of the State of Idaho, and as such is lawfully empowered to lay out, build, construct, 
improve, alter, extend, and ~naiiltaill state higllways at any place within the State of Idaho, and 
has tlie power and duty to acquire the necessary land and property for rights-of-way, turnouts, 
fills, and excavations for state highway purposes by purchase, conde~nnation or otherwise, and it 
is tile duty of tlie Plaintiff, a~noilg other things, to establish, construct, improve and maintain a 
systein of state highways within the State of Idaho; that Charles L. Winder, Bruce Sweeney, 
Gary Blick, John McHugh, Monte C. McClure, Neil Miller, and John X. Combo now are the 
duly ap?l,pointed and qualified acting Idaho Transpoitation Board of the State of Idaho. 
IV. 
'Tllal the tract or strip of land so sought to be condemned is to be used for a right-of-way 
o r  laying out, building, constructiiig, improving, altering, relocating, aud extending one of the 
state higlivi,ays of the State of Idaho; that said higliway is a part and li11k of the established 
highway system of the State of Idaho known as lJS-93, Twin Falls Alternate Route, Stage 1, 
Pro,jecl No. DHP-NH-F-2390(104), in Twin Falls County, Idaho; that said highway is to be used 
for travel by the general public; that the l~ighway to be constructed upon said land is necessary 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 2 
[or the safcty, convenience, and utility of the general public; that the same will be a state 
designated public highway, and the use thereof by thc public will be a public use; that the Iand 
sought to be condemned herein is required for the laying out, construction, and maintenance of 
such highway for s~icll public use, and the taking of the said land is necessary for such use. 
V. 
That the location and survcy of said highway, as hereinafter described, was made by and 
under the direction of the Plaintiff herein, and the same is located in such manncr as will be most 
compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury. 
VI. 
That the Plaintiff herein by its proper officers, prior to the commence~nent of this action, 
sought in good faith to purchase from said Defendants said strip or tract of land so sought to be 
talten by the Plaintiff for the right-of-way of such state highway to be constructed on, over, and 
across the same, and to settle with the Defendants for the damages which might result to their 
p~opcrty by the taking thereof for said right-of-way, and that the Plaintiff was unable to make 
any bargain therefor, or to make any settlement therefor, or to inaite any settlement for the 
damage to the property of said Defendants. 
VII. 
Thai for the reasons aforesaid and for the purpose of laying out, building, constructing, 
i~nproving, altering, extending, and maintaining the said state highway on and across the 
l~ereinalier described property, it is necessary for the Plaintiff herein to condemil any and all 
rights to the llereinafter described property designated as Parcel Nos. 41 and 41-1 in fee simple 
absolute, obtaiu a permanent easeinent as to Parcel No. 41, and obtain a temporary easement as 
to I'arcel No. 41. 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 3 
VIII. 
That the property sought herein to be condemned is now surveyed, located and shown 
up011 tlle o'ficial plat of US-93, Twin Falls alternate Route, Stage I, Project No. DIiP-NIi-F- 
2390(104), I-Iighway Survey on file in the office of the County Recorder of Twin Falls County, 
locatcd in 'Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, and is described as hllows: 
'Thai real property described in Exhibits "A" and "A-I" attached 
hereto and by this reference made a part hereof. 
Thai the property herein sought to be coildeiniled is a part of a larger parcel of land. 
That access is to be limited lo that show11 on Exhibit "B". 
IX. 
That the general route of the highway for which thc right-of-way is sought to be 
condelnned herein is US-93, as is shown upon the official plat in the Idaho Transportation 
Departinen1 of the State of Idaho, as US-93, Twin Falls Alternate Route, State 1, Project No. 
DKP-NH-F-2390(104), a copy of which plat is attached hereto marked Exhibit "B", and by this 
reference illade a part hereof. 
X. 
Tllat the termini of the centerline of the highway for which the property herein described 
is sought to be coildeinned is Station 823+11.091 to Station 825+68216 of the aforesaid US-93 
Twiis Falls Alternate Route, Project No. DHP-NH-F-2390(104), Highway Survey. 
WEEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgrnei~t as follows: 
That the rights to the property hereinabove described as Parcel Nos. 41 and 41-1 be 
condei~lned in fee. simple absolute, to obtain a perlnailent easement as to Parcel 41, and obtain a 
teiuporary case~nent as to Parcel No. 41. 
That the dairiages accruillg to the Defeildallts by reason of the co~ide~nnation of the real 
FIRST' AMI:NDED COMPLAINT - 4 
properly described in this Complaint be assessed; that the rights of the parties hereto be fully 
determined; that a final order of condemnation and other appropriate orders and judgment be 
entered herein as provided by law; and that the Plaintiff have such other and further orders, 
judgment, and relief as to the Court nlay appear just and equitable in the premises. 
DATED this &7-4ay of October, 2005. 
q@J&Q'h Josep D. M et fij-4 
Deputy Attorney General 
State of Idaho ) 
: SS 
Couuty of Ada 1 
Loren D. Thomas, being first d ~ d y  sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
I am the Acting Assistant Chief Engineer (Development) for the above-named Plaintiff, 
and I malte this verification for and on behalf of said Plaintiff, a political body of the State of 
Iclallo. I further say that I have read the above and foregoing Complaint, know the contents 
thereof and that the allegatioils of fact therein contained are true as I verily believe. 
LOREN D. THOMAS 
Acting Assistant Chief Eligineer (Development) 
Idaho Transportation Department 
AND SWORN to 
& 
before ille tliis -21 day ,2005. 
Residing at fl0 iSc , Idaho 
My Colninission Expires: +- 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 5 
EXHIBIT "A" 
REQUIREMENT 
Parcel No. 41, Parcel I.D. No. 0041481, according 
to the Right of Way Plat of Project No. DHP-NH- 
2390(104) filed for record in the office of the 
Countx Recorder of Twin Falls County, Idaho, on 
the 9' day of August, 2004 under Instrument No. 
2004-017039: Being a portion of the NEY4NW1h 
(Government Lot 3 )  of Section 4, Township 10 
South, Range 17 East of Boise Meridian, Idaho. 
Also including that property described in Exhibit 
"A-1" as Parcel No. 41-1. 
PERMANENT EASEMENT 
Parcel No. 41, Parcel I .D. No. 0041481, according 
to the Right of Way Plat of Project No. DHP-NH-F- 
2390(104) filed for record in the office of the 
Countl;: Recorder of Twin Falls County, Idaho, on 
the 9' day of August, 2004 under Instrument No. 
2004-017039: Being a portion of the NEY4NW1h 
(Government Lot 3) of Section 4, Township 10 
South, Range 17 East, Boise Meridian. 
For the purpose of a slope easement. 
Excepting out that property described in Exhibit 
"A-1" as Parcel No. 41-1. 
TEMPORARY EASEMXNT 
A temporary easement to go upon, occupy, and use a 
strip of land in a portion of the (NEY4Nwlh GOV. Lot 
3) of Section 4, Township 10 South, Range 17 East, 
Boise Meridian, Twin Falls County, Idaho; on the 
southerly (Right) side of the above described parcel 
of land (Parcel No. 41 / Parcel Id. No. 0041481) and 
being 68 meters (approximately 223 feet) wide lying 
between Stations 825+00 Right to 825+20 Right and 
from 825+35 Right to 825+55 Right of the Pole Line 
Road Survey as shown on the plans of said Highway 
Survey DHP-NH-F-2390(104), for the purpose of 
construction, together with the right and privilege 
of ingress and egress to and from said property for 
said purpose. 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JOSEPH D. MALLET 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
331 1 West State Street 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129 
Telephone: (208) 334-88 15 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
ISB #5817 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., 1 
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN MCHUGH ) 
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C. ) Case No. CV-04-6336 
MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL 
MILLER, AND JOHN X. COMBO, 
1 
1 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, j 
Plaintiff, 
) 
1 
-vs- 
j 
1 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
1 
CA3!YON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED ) 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH ) 
INC., j 
1 
Defendants. 1 
COMES NOW the above-named Plaintiff, and for a cause of action complains and 
alleges as follows: 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 1 
1. 
That the Defendant, CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP is the 
record owner in fee of the land sought to be condemned by Plaintiff. 
11. 
That the Defendant, Lazy J. Ranch Inc., may have an interest in the subject property by 
reason of a lease agreement between it and Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership. 
111. 
That the Idaho Transportation Department is a civil administrative department of 
government ofthe State of Idaho, and as such is lawf~~lly empowered to lay out, build, construct, 
improve, alter, extend, and maintain state highways at any place within the State of Idaho, and 
has the power and duty to acquire the necessary land and property for rights-of-way, turnouts, 
fills, and excavations for state highway purposes by purchase, condemnation or otherwise, and it 
is the duty of the Plaintiff, among other things, to establish, construct, improve and maintain a 
systenl of state higl~ways within the State of Idaho; that Charles L. Winder, Bruce Sweeney, 
Gary Bliclt, John McHugh, Monte C. McClure, Neil Miller, and John X. Combo now are the 
duly appointed and qualified acting Idaho Transportati~n Board of the State of Idaho. 
IV. 
That the tract or strip of land so sought to be condemned is to be used for a right-of-way 
for laying out, building, constructing, improving, altering, relocating, and extending one of the 
state l~ighways of the State of Idaho; that said highway is a part and link of the established 
highway system of the State of Idaho ltnown as US-93, Twin Falls Alternate Route, Stage 1, 
Project No. DHP-NH-F-2390(104), in Twin Falls County, Idaho; that said highway is to be used 
for travel by the general public; that the highway to be constructed upon said land is necessary 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 2 
for the safety, convenience, and utility of the general public; that the same will be a state 
designated public highway, and the use thereof by the public will be a public use; that the land 
sought to be condemned herein is required for the laying out, construction, and maintenance of 
such highway for such public use, and the taking ofthe said land is necessary for such use. 
v. 
That the location and survey of said highway, as hereinafter described, was made by and 
under the direction of the Plaintiff herein, and the same is located in such manner as will be most 
conlpatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury. 
VI. 
That the Plaintiff herein by its proper officers, prior to the commence~nent of this action, 
sought in good faith to purchase from said Defendants said strip or tract of  land so sought to be 
taken by the Plaintiff for the right-of-way of such state highway to be constructed on, over, and 
across tile same, and to settle with the Defendants for the damages which might result to their 
property by the taking thereof for said right-of-way, and that the Plaintiff was unable to make 
any bargain therefor, or to make any settlement therefor, or to make any settlement for the 
damage to the property of said Defendants. 
VII. 
That for the reasons aforesaid and for the purpose of laying out, building, constructing, 
inlproving, altering, extending, and maintaining the said state highway on and across the 
hereinafter described property, it is necessary for the Plaintiff herein to condemn any and all 
rights to the hereinafter described property designated as Parcel Nos. 41 and 41-1 in fee simple 
absolute, obtain a permanent easement as to Parcel No. 41, and obtain a temporary easement as 
to Parcel No. 4 1 .  
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 3 
VIII. 
That the property sought herein to be condemned is now surveyed, located and shown 
upon the official plat of US-93, Twin Falls alternate Route, Stage 1, Project No. DNP-NH-F- 
2390(104), Highway Survey on file in the uffice of the County Recorder of Twin Falls County, 
located in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, and is described as follows: 
That real property described in Exhibits "A" and "A-1'' attached 
hereto and by this reference made a part hereof. 
That the property herein sought to be condemned is a part of a larger parcel of land. 
That access is to bc limited to that shown on Exhibit "B". 
IX. 
That the general route of the highway for which the right-of-way is sought to be 
condenined herein is US-93, as is shown upon the offrcial plat in the Idaho Transportation 
Departnlent of the State of Idaho, as US-93, Twin Falls Alternate Route, State 1, Project No. 
DI-IP-NW-F-2390(104), a copy of which plat is attached hereto marked Exhibit " B  and by this 
reference made a part hereof. 
?ha1 the teriniili of the centerline of the highway for which the property herein described 
is sought to be condelnned is Station 823+11.091 to Station 8251-68216 of the aforesaid US-93 
Twill Falls Alternate Routc, Project No. DHP-NI-I-F-2390(104), Highway Survey. 
WHEREFORF,, Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows: 
That the rights to the property hereinabove described as Parcel Nos. 41 and 41-1 be 
condeinned in fee simple absolute, to obtain a permanent easement as to Parcel 41, and obtain a 
temporary easement as to Parcel No. 41. 
Thai the damages accruing to the Defendants by reason of the condemnation of the real 
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property described in this Complaint be assessed; that the rights of the parties hereto be fully 
determined; that a final order of condemnation and other appropriate orders and judgment be 
entered herein as provided by law; and that the Plaintiff have such other and further orders, 
judgment, and relief as to the Court may appear just and equitable in the premises. 
DATED this a % a y  of October, 2005. 
Deputy Attorney General 
State of Idaho 1 
: SS. 
County of Ada ) 
Lore11 D. Thomas, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
I an1 the Acting Assistant Chief Engineer (Development) for the above-named Plaintiff, 
and I make this verification for and on behalf of said Plaintiff, a political body of the State of 
Idaho. I further say that I have read the above and foregoing Complaint, know the contents 
thereof and that the allegations of fact therein contained are true as I verily believe. 
LOREN D. THOMAS 
Acting Assistant Chief Engineer (Development) 
Idaho Transportation Department 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this - day of ,2005. 
(SEAL) 
NOTARY PUBLIC for Idaho 
Residing at , Idaho 
My Commission Expires: 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JOSEPH D. MALLET 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
33 11 West State Street 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129 
Telephone: (208) 334-88 15 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
ISB #5817 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., 1 
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN MCHUGH ) 
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C. 1 Case No. CV-04-6336 
MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL 1 
MILLER, AND JOHN X. COMBO, ) 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, ) 
1 
Plaintiff, ) 
1 
-VS- ) FIRST AME?DED COMPLAINT 
1 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED ) 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH ) 
INC., ) 
1 
Defendants. 1 
COMES NOW the above-named Plaintiff, and for a cause of action complains and 
alleges as follows: 
FJRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - I 
I. 
That the Defendant, CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP is the 
record owner in fee of the land sought to be condemned by Plaintiff. 
11. 
That the Defendant, Lazy J. Ranch Inc., may have an interest in the subject property by 
reason of a lease agreement between it and Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership. 
111. 
'I'llat the Idaho Transportation Department is a civil administrative department of 
goverllluent of the State of Idaho, and as such is lawfully empowered to lay out, build, construct, 
improve, alter, extend, and maintain state highways at any place within the State of Idaho, and 
has the power and duty to acquire the necessary land and property for rights-of-way, turnouts, 
fills, and excavations for state highway purposes by purchase, condemnation or otherwise, and it 
is the duty oE the Plaintiff, among other things, to establish, construct, improve and maintain a 
system of state highways within the State of Idaho; that Charles L.. Winder, Bruce Sweeney, 
Gary Bliclc, John McHugh, Monte C. McClure, Neil Miller, and John X. Combo now are the 
duly appointed and qualified acting Idaho Transportation Board of the State of Idaho. 
IV . 
That the tract or strip of land so sought to be condemned is to be used for a right-of-way 
for laying out, building, constructing, improving, altering, relocating, and extending one of the 
state highways of the State of Idaho; that said highway is a part and link of the established 
highway system of the State of Idaho known as US-93, Twin Falls Alternate Route, Stage 1, 
Project No. DHP-NM-F-2390(104), in Twin Falls County, Idaho; that said highway is to be used 
for travel by the general public; that the highway to be constructed upon said land is necessary 
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for the safety, convenience, and utility of the general public; that the same will be a state 
designated public highway, and the use thereof by the public will be a public use; that the land 
sought to be condemned herein is required for the laying out, construction, and maintenance of 
such highway for such public use, and the taking of the said land is necessary for such use. 
v. 
That the location and survey of said highway, as hereinafter described, was made by and 
under the direction of the Plaintiff herein, and the same is located in such manner as will be most 
conjpatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury. 
VI. 
That the Plaintiff herein by its proper officers, prior to the commencement of this action, 
sought in good faith to purchase from said Defendants said strip or tract of  land so sought to be 
taken by the Plaintiff for the right-of-way of such state highway to be constructed on, over, and 
across the same, and to settle with the Defendants for the damages which might result to their 
property by the taking thereof for said right-or-way, and that the Plaintiff was unable to make 
any bal.gaii1 therefor, or to make any settlement therefor, or to make any settlement for the 
damage to the property of said Defendants. 
VII. 
That for thc reasons aforesaid and for the purpose of laying out, building, constructing, 
improving, altering, extending, and maintaining the said state highway on and across the 
hereinafter described property, it is necessary for the Plaintiff herein to condemn any and all 
rights to the llereinafter described property designated as Parcel Nos. 41 and 41-1 in fee simple 
absolute, obtain a perrnanent easement as to Parcel No. 41, and obtain a temporary casement as 
to Parcel No. 41. 
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VIII. 
That the property sought herein to be condemned is now surveyed, located and shown 
upon the official plat of US-93, Twin Falls alternate Route, Stage 1, Project No. DHP-NH-F- 
2390(104), Highway Survey on file in the office of the County Recorder of Twin Falls County, 
Iocatcd in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, and is described as follows: 
That real property described in Exhibits "A" and "A-1" attached 
hereto and by this reference made a part hereof. 
That the property herein sought to be condemned is a part of a larger parcel of land. 
That access is to be limited to that shown on Exhibit "B". 
IX . 
That the general route of the highway for which the right-of-way is sought to be 
condeillned herein is US-93, as is shown upon the official plat in the Idaho Transportation 
Department of the State of Idaho, as US-93, Twin Falls Alternate Route, State 1, Project No. 
DHP-NH-F-2390(104), a copy of which plat is attached hereto marked Exhibit " B ,  and by this 
reference made a part hereof. 
X. 
Tha? the termliii of the centerline of the highway for which the property herein described 
is sought to be condemned is Station 823+11.091 to Station 8251-68216 of the aforesaid US-93 
Twin Falls Alternate Route, Project No. DI-IP-NH-F-2390(104), Highway Survey. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows: 
That the rights to the property hereinabove described as Parcel Nos. 41 and 41-1 be 
coildemiied in fee simple absolute, to obtain a pernlanent easement as to Parcel 41, and obtain a 
temporary easement as to Parcel No. 41. 
That the damages accruing to the Defe'endants by reason of the condemnation of the real 
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property described in this Complaint be assessed; that the rights of the parties hereto be fully 
determined; that a final order of condemnation and other appropriate orders and judgment be 
entered herein as provided by law; and that the Plaintiff have such other and further orders, 
judgment, and relief as to the Courtmay appear just and equitable in the premises. 
DATED this a % a y  of October, 2005, 
~ e ~ u t ~  Attorney General 
State of Idaho 1 
: SS. 
County of Ada 1 
Loren D. Thomas, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
I all1 the Acting Assistant Chief Engineer (Development) for the above-named Plaintiff, 
and I make this verification for and on behalf of said Plaintiff, a political body of the State of 
Idaho. I further say that I have read the above and foregoing Complaint, know the contents 
thereof and that the allegations of fact therein contained are true as I verily believe. 
LOREN D. THOMAS 
Acting Assistant Chief Engineer (Development) 
Idaho Transportation Department 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ___ day of ,2005. 
(SEAL) 
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NOTARY PUBLIC for Idaho 
Residing at , Idaho 
My Colninission Expires: 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL. 
JOSEPH D. MALLET 
KARL D. VOGT 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
33 11 West State Street 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8815 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
ISB #5817 
ISB #5015 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTI-I JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF TI-IE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., 1 
DARRELL V. MANNING, R. JAMES 
COLEMAN, BRUCE SWEENY, MONTE C. ) 
McCLURE, GARY BLICIC, NEIL MILLER ) Case No. CV-04-6336 
and JOHN X. COMBO, IDAHO 
TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 1 
) PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
Plaintiff, ) MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE THE 
) TESTIMONY OF ROGER DUNLAP 
-VS- ) 
1 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH, 
INC. 
Defendaiits. 
Comes now the Plaintiff, State of Idaho, by and through its counsel of record, Joseph D. 
Mallet, Deputy Attorney General for the State of Idaho, and hereby submits this Memorandurn in 
support of its motion seeking to exclude certain evidence that is not admissible in a 
condernilation action. 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE THE TESTIMONY OF 
,' 1 -  
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ROGER DUNLAP - I 
1. 
INTRODUCTION 
This is an eminent domain case. The Plaintiff, State of Idaho (hereinafter, "ITD") has 
essentially talcen a "strip talte" fiom Defendants, Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership and 
Lazy J. Ranch (hereinafter, "Defendants") in conjunclion with phase one of the US 93 Twin 
Falls Alternate Route Project (hereinafter, "Project"). This Project will ultimately route US 93 
west on Pole Line Road, bypassing the core of the City of Twin Falls. 
The Defendants have disclosed the opinions of Roger Dunlap, an expert valuation 
witness. Because Mr. Dunlap arrived at his conclusion of just compensation by employing a 
valuation method that is not allowed in Idaho, ITD has filed a motion to strike Mr. Dunlap's 
opinions and testimony. 
11. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
The legal standard for a motion in liinine was set forth in Suiz Valley Potato Growers, 
Iizc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761,86 P.3d 475, (2004): 
Trial courts have broad discretion when ruling on inotions in 1imine. Appel v. 
LePage, 135 Idaho 133, 135, 15 P.3d 1141, 1143 (2000). A trial court's motion in 
li~nine ruling is reviewed under an abuse of discretion sta~ldard. Leavitt, 133 Idaho 
at 631, 991 P.2d at 356. This standard requires a three-pronged inquiry to 
determine whether the district courl (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently 
with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Leavitt, 133 Idaho at 63 1, 991 P.2d 
at 356; Sun Valley Shopping Cti*., Iizc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 
P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). Absent a clear showing of abuse, a district court's exercise 
of discretion will not be overturned. Appel, 135 Ida110 at 135, 15 P.3d at 1143. 
SZLIZ Valley Potato Gro~~ers ,  Inc. v. Texas Rejrzery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 767-8, 86 P.3d 475, 
481-2 (2004) 
Discussing the favorable policy behind using a lnotion in lirnine, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals stated: 
. . 
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It enables a judge to rule on evidence without first exposing it to the jury. It 
avoids juror bias occasioiially generated by objectio~is to evidence during trial. 
The court's ruling on the motion enables cou~isel on both sides to make strategic 
decisions before trial concerning the content and order of evidence to be 
presented. (Citations omitted). 
Davidsoiz v. Reco Corp., 112 Idaho 560, 733 P.2d 781 (Ct. App. 1986) (Overruled on other 
grounds) 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
The Defendants have disclosed Roger L. Dunlap as an expert valuation witness iii this 
case to offer ail opinion of just compensatio~l at trial. At the April 11, 2007 deposition of Mr 
Dunlap, it becane apparent to ITD that Mr. Dunlap arrived at his co~lclusion of just 
co~npensation by e~nploying a valuation  neth hod that is expressly forbidden in Idaho by City oj 
Culdwell v. Roark, 92 Idaho 99, 437 P.2d 615 (1968). On that basis, ITD is moving to exclude 
Mr. Dunlap's testirnorly and any reference or evidence relating to Mr. Dunlap's opinion. 
A. The Ronrli Case Rule. 
-
This motion to exclude principally relies on City ofCaldwel1 v. Roark, 92 Idaho 99, 437 
P.2d 615 (1968). The Roarlc case concerns the acquisition of part of a subdivision for an airport 
expansion. In that case, the prol~erty owner's whole parcel contained 80 lots, and Caldwell 
coiidernned a portion of that parcel containing 49 lots. At the date of the take, Roark's 
subdivision was platted and approved by the city and filed of record. The subdivision streets and 
alleys had been laid out, but the comers of the lots were not staked. Gas, electric power, and 
sewer were available to the property. Id. at 100,616. 
The relevant dispute in the Roai-k case arose when the property owners tried to arrive at 
just colnpensation by valuing the larger parcel through aggregating the individual value of the 
platted lots. The property owners deteiinined what value the total of the lots would bring if sold 
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iildividually to various buyers at various times, and used that value to arrive at just 
compensation. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's determination that this was an 
iniprol>er valuation method. The trial courthad instructed the jury that this was not the correct 
incthod of determining the fair market value in this case, but rather the value should be 
determined "with the whole parcel being sold in its then conditiorr in onc sale." Id. at 101, 617. 
The property owner challenged this jury instruction which was ultimately upheld in a 
ruling that said "The court correctly instructed the jury that the value should be fixed for the 
entire tract as one parcel." Id. The court .further explained the iuie as follows: 
This value cannot properly be determined by aggregating the individual sales 
value which separate lots may bring when sold to individual prospective home 
builders over a period of time in the future, for the reason that such a basis of 
valuation would peimit the jury to speculate upon future developments. 
Id. at 101-02; 617-18. 
The Roark cou1-t also quoted from a Utah case which held, "The valuation must be on the 
basis of what a willing purchaser would pay now and not what a number of purchasers might be 
induced to pay in the future for the land in slnaller parcels." Id. at 102, 61 8 (quoting Utalz Road 
Colizinissio~z v. Hansen, 383 P.2d 917, 920 (Utah 1963). This is consistent with IDJI 7.16 which 
reads "Just coinpensation is the difference between the market value of the entire property before 
the taking and the market value of the remainder after the acquisition, together with any special 
damages caused by the taking measured as of [date]." (IDJI 7.16). 
R. Rorer Dunlap's Valuation Method. 
In the case at bar, the defense valuation witness, Roger Dunlap, has einployed a method 
that violates both the rule and policy Goin the Rourlc case. At his deposition on April 11, 2007, 
Mr. Dunlap explained his approach to valuatioil in detail. 
ITD has pleaded a taking in fee of 1.8784 acres froin a larger 20.070-acre parcel owned 
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by Defendants. See First Amended Co~nplaint at Exhibit "B." Mr. Dunlap assumed the "larger 
parcel" in this case was the 20-acre parcel described in the Cotnplaint (See Deposition Transcript 
of Roger L. Dunlap, Exhibit "A" to Fourth Affidavit of Joseph D. Mallet, at p. 110, LL. 5- 
I ])(hereinafter "Duulap Tr.") with the highest and best use of mixed use coin~nercial and office. 
(Dunlap Tr. at p. 72, LL. 5-7,' and p. 163, LL. 7-9). Mr. Dunlap says the "larger parcel" 
determination is important because "you need to know what you are appraising. Once you come 
up with your larger parcel, that is your subject property. And that is what you appraise." 
(Dunlap Tr. at p. 1 10, LL 1-4). Dunlap valued the whole parcel at $5.50 per square foot. He felt 
that a purchaser of the whole larger parcel would have had to pay this price for the entire parcel. 
(DunlapTr. atp. 161,LL. 2-15, andp. 164,L. 25 top. 165, L. 4). 
However, Dunlap did not use this number to determine the value of the land taken. 
Instead, Dunlap valued the take at $9.50 per sq. ft., which is what he felt was the value of a 
subdivided pad site on the property. (Dunlap Tr. at p. 173, LL 4-9 and p. 174, LL. 10-15). Mr. 
Dunlap was very clear that in arriving at his value for the property taken, he calculated the price 
for a one-acre pad site fronting on Pole Line Road. (Dunlap Tr. at p. 165, LL. 13-14). In using 
the t e ~ m  "one-acre pad site," Dunlap referred to an "approximately one-acre site that is suitable 
for a user lo develop a building, as well as a parking lot." (Dunlap Tr. at p. 166, LL. 1-4). 
Mr. Dunlap explained that he determined that a one acre of undeveloped land, fronting 0x1 
Pole Line Road would sell for $9.50 per acre if the owner were to sever off and sell a piece of the 
front of that property to a purchaser. (Dunlap Tr. at p. 167, LL. 4-17). Although he admitted 
that no one-acre pad sites were platted at the date of the take (Dunlap Tr. at p.168, LL. 10-12), 
Dunlap still determined what a purchaser would pay for the non-existent pad site of this size and 
assigned that value to the land taken. (Dunlap Tr. at p. 168, L. 24 to p. 169, L. 3). Dunlap 
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hypothetically assumed a pad site was created, and assigned a value to the hypothetical pad site, 
discounting only a "little bit" for the lack of C-1 zoning at the date of the take. (Dwllap Tr, at p. 
169, L. 21 to p. 170, L. 2). Accordingly, the cornparables he used to determine value were pad 
site comparables for an acre along Pole Line kontage, not the whole larger parcel itself. (Dunlap 
Tr. at p. 170, LL. 3-19). 
Dunlap clarified at one point that he could have detennined just compensation using what 
a purchaser would have paid for the whole parcel, but chose not to do so. (Dunlap Tr. at p. 168, 
LL. 2-12). While Mr. Dulllap has performed several appraisals on this project and other cases 
for the Copple firin, lie does not recall ever having used illis particular approach in Idaho. 
(Dunlap Tr. at p. 156, LL. 18-2 1). He also ad~nitted that this method gives a higher value for the 
property owner than the other methods he has previously used ill Idaho. (Dunlap Tr. at p. 160, 
LL 18-23). In fact, in this case, Mr. Dunlap's choice to use the different approach increased his 
value for the property taken from $5.50 per square foot to $9.50 per square foot. (Id.). 
Comparing the different results, Dunlap's choice of applying this particular valuation method 
resulted in a 73% increase in his opinion of the value of the property taken. 
C. Dunlap Violated the Xonvk Rule. 
In a partial take, the rule from ille Real-/c case requires valuing the land taken by fixing 
the value of the entire tract as one parcel. Roark at 10 1-02,6 17- 18. Real-lc prohibits valuing the 
take by determining what a purchaser would pay in the future for the land in slnaller parcels. 
(1.). Dunlap explains that when he valued the take, he did not use the value of thc entire tract as 
one parcel, but instead delerrnined what a purchaser would pay for a srnaller piece of the 
property if it were severed into a'lpad site" and marketed and sold as such. This directly violates 
the Roarlc rule. Ronrlc prohibits looking to what a purchaser would pay for a slvaller part of the 
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whole property, and yet that is exactly what Dunlap had done. 
The stated policy behind Roarlc is that the court wants to avoid speculation as to future 
developlneilt of the property. (Id). Dunlap's inethod uses the exact type of speculatio~l that the 
Roarlc case found was improper. Although he felt the property subject to the taking was a 20- 
acre landholding, he valued the take at the value a one-acre pad site would have. Dunlap 
admitted that no one-acre pad sites existed at the date of the taking (Dunlap Tr. at p. 168, LL. 10- 
12), and yet he still used the non-existent pad sites to value the take. (Dunlap Tr. at p. 168, L. 24 
to p. 169, L. 3). Dunlap's value depends on speculating that a pad-site was possible, and then 
arrives at a value of the hypothetically assumed pad site, and uses that value to determine the 
value of the take. This violates both the rule and policy of Roarlc. 
It is very important to note that the facts of the Roark case concerned the taking of 49 of 
80 subdivision lots. In Roarlc, there actually was a platted subdivision with streets and alleys laid 
out and utilities stubbed to the site. Even where the lots actually existed, the court found that 
speculating on the value the individual lots would bring was improper. If the court required 
valuation of the whole parcel in that situation, it is even Inore clear in the case at bar, where no 
slnaller subdivided lot exists, that the value of the take must be determined by fixing the value of 
the entire parcel. 
Two things are clear about Mr. Dunlap's appraisal. First, he violated the rule in the 
Roarlc case by valuing the take as if it were a part of a fictitious pad site, not the whole 20 acre 
parcel. Secondly, he employed this method to generate higher damages that would be allowed 
by a per~nissible valuation approach. By valuing the take based on a non-existent pad site, he 
adillits that he arrived at a higher damage number for the land taken that he would have if he 
cornpared it to the whole parcel. (Dunlap Tr, at p. 160, LL 18-23). At the same time, when 
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considering severance damages, he no longer looked at the smaller non-existent pad site, but 
changed his analysis to the whole 20-acre parcel. He also admits that the effect of this shift on 
his severance damage figure is that it generates higher severance damages than if he stayed with 
the s~naller one-acre pad site he used to damage the take. (Dunlap Tr. at p. 163, LL. 10-18). As 
you can see, Mr. Dunlap conveniently switched his valuation reference with the effect of 
generating n~uch higher darnages than if he would have consistently applied a lawful valuation 
method. 
D. Exclusio~~ of Dunlap is the P r o ~ e r  Remedy. 
Because Mr. Dunlap violated the Roai.1~ rule, ITD is asking for exclusion of his opinions 
and testimony as well as any evidence referring to or based on the same. The property owners, 
though their legaI counsel, chose to call Mr. Dunlap to value the property using a method that is 
not legal in Idaho. They could have asked him to value the property the same way the other four 
valuation witnesses in this case have, and the way Mr. Dunlap has valued it every other tiine he 
has appraised property in Idaho. Instead, they let Mr. Dunlap appraise the property with an 
illegal method that generates higher damage nun~bers than the correct valuatioil method. In all 
fairness, the Defendants cannot complain now when his opinions are excluded. 
Additionally, under the scheduling order in this case, the Defendauts cannot have Mr. 
Dunlap generate a new opinion using correct methodology. The time to disclose expert opinions 
is long past and the trial is too close for ITD to have a fair opportunity to wait for, review, and 
prepare a response for any new opinions Mr. Dunlap would create. Further~nore, the addition of 
a third valuation witness is culnulative and would be a waste of tinie anyway. If Mr. Dunlap is 
excluded, both sides still have two valuation experts to present evidence to the jury. Any Inore 
valuation witnesses would be an unnecessary waste of court time. 
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IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above-stated reasons, ITD respectfully requests that the Court exclude any 
teslilnony froin Mr. Dunlap, as well as any reference to or evidence of his opinions in this case. 
DATED this day of May, 2007. 
- 
J O @ P & ~ .  MALLET 
~ e b u t ~  Attorney General 
Idaho Depart~nent of Transportation 
CERTIPlCATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the *day of May, 2007, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above to be served to: 
E Don Copple 0u.S. Mail 
Heather Cunningham m a n d  Delivered 
Davison Copple Copple & Cox novemight  Mail 
P.O. Box 1583 n ~ e i e c o p y  (Fax) 386-9428 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF 'THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., 
D A W L L  V. MANNING, R. JAMES 1 
COLEMAN, BRUCE SWEENY, MONTE C. ) 
McCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL MILLER ) Case No. CV-04-6336 
and JOHN X. COMBO, IDAHO 1 
TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 1 
) BRIEF IN SUPPORT O F  PLAINTIFF'S 
Plaintiff, ) SECOND MOTION IN LIMLNE 
-vs- 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED 1 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH, 
INC. 1 
Defendants. 1 
Comes now tile Plaintiff, State of Idaho (hereinafter "ITD), by and through its counsel 
of record, Joseph D. Mallet, Deputy Attorney General for the State of Idaho, and submits this 
Memorandum in support of its motion seeking to exclude certain evidence that is not admissib!~ 
in a condemnation action 
Defendants seek to introduce inadmissible evidence to support their basis of just 
BRIEF IN SUPPOIU OF PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION IN LIMINE - 1 t' " d (1 
compensation. The State requests that the Court exclude Defendants' evidence regarding issues 
that are not properly considered in the determination of just compensation in a condemnation 
action. 
This is an elnillent domain case. The Plaintiff, State of Idaho (hereinafter, " ITD) has 
essentially taken a "strip take" from Defendants, Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership and 
Lazy J. Ranch (hereinafter, "Defendants") in conjunction with phase one of the US 93 Twin 
Falls Alternate Route Project (hereinafter, "Project"). This Project will ultimately route US 93 
west on Pole Line Road, bypassing the core of the City of Twin Falls 
11. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
The legal standard for a motion in lilnine was set forth in Sun Valley Potato Growers, 
Inc. v. Texas Rejnery Corp., 139 Idaho 761,86 P.3d 475, (2004): 
Trial courts have broad discretion when ruling on motions in lirnine. Appel v. 
LePage, 135 Idaho 133, 135, 15 P.3d 1141, 1143 (2000). A trial court's motion in 
limine ruling is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Leavitt, 133 Idaho 
at 631, 991 P.2d at 356. TIlis standard requires a three-pronged inquiry to 
determine whether the district court (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently 
with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Leal&, 133 Idaho at 631, 991 P.2d 
at 356; Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 
P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). Absent a clear showing of abuse, a district court's exercise 
of discretion will not be overturned. Appel, 135 Idaho at 135, 15 P.3d at 1143. 
Id. at 7678,481-2 
Discussing the favorable policy behind using a motion in limine, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals stated: 
It enables a judge to rule on evidence without first exposing it to the jury. It 
avoids juror bias occasiollally generated by objections to evidence during trial. 
The court's ruling on the motion enables counsel on both sides to make strategic 
decisions before trial concerning the content and order of evidence to be 
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presented. (Citations omitted). 
Davidson v. Beco Cor.p., 112 Idaho 560, 733 P.2d 781 (Ct. App. 1986)(Overruled on other 
grounds) 
111. 
EVIDENCE AND STATEMENTS THAT RELATE TO THE ORDER OF 
CONDEMNATION SHOULD BE EXCLUDED 
Based upon multiple deposition questions and discovery propoulided by the Defendants' 
counsel in this case, it is apparent to the State that the Defendants' will reference the Order of 
Condemnation in this case when discussing the taking of access. However, the Order of 
Condemnation is not relevant to the issue of just compensation, and serves no purpose other than 
to mislead and prejudice the jury against the State. The State of Idaho, therefore, seeks an order 
from the Court excluding any evidence or argument relating to the Order of Condemnation. 
The Idaho Rule of Evidence exclude irrelevant evidence, providing: 
All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by these rules or 
by other rules applicable in the courts ofthis state. Evidence which is not relevant 
is not admissible. 
I.R.E. 402 (Emphasis Added). 
Furthermore, Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 excludes even relevant evidence if it is unfairly 
prejudicial or if it is colifusilig or misleading to the jury: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by consideratiolis of undue delay, waste of time, 
or lieedless presentation of culnulative evidence. 
I.R.E. 403. 
In the case of Ada County h-ighway Dist. v. Sharp, 135 Idalio 888,26 P.3d 1225 (2001), 
Idaho first addressed the issue of whether a civil cornplaint of condemnation supersedes an 
administrative order of a colidemliing authority for purposes of determining what property 
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interest is being condemned. Sharp dealt with an administrative order of condemnation that 
differed from the conlplaint as to the talting of access. The property owner unsuccessfully 
argued that the language in the Order of Condemnation suggesting access was taken had a legal 
effect on the scope of the talce. In rejecting this argument, the court ruled that the complaint, and 
not the order of condemnation, determines the scope of the take. Sharp, 135 Idaho 891,26 P.3d 
at 1228. 
In this case, the jury's sole task is to decide the issue of just compensation. Because 
Sharp ruled the order of condemllation language did not determine the scope of the taking, any 
evidence related to the administrative order of condemnation is irrelevant to the scope of the take 
and thus irrelevant to just compensation. Although it seems unlikely, even if the Defendants' 
can argue another basis of relevance, the Order of Condemnation would be confusing and 
unfairly prejudice the jury. To the extent it may differ with the language of the complaint, the 
order of condemnation would mislead the jury by suggesting compensation is due for property 
rights that have not actually been taken. The Order of Condemnation and any reference to that 
administrative document should be excluded. 
IV. 
EVIDENCE AND STATEMENTS THAT SUGGEST A DISPUTE EXISTS AS TO ANY 
ISSUE COVERED BY THE STIPULATION OF POSSESSION SHOULD BE 
EXCLUDED 
Through a Stipulation of Possession, filed on February 2, 2005, the parties agreed that the 
requirements of Section 7-721, Idaho Code, had been met, enabling Plaintiff to obtain possession 
of the subject property pending trial. The parties specifically stipulated that (a) Plaintiff has the 
right of eminent domain; (b) the use to which the subject properly is to be applied is a use 
a~rthorized by law; (c) the taitillg of the subject property is necessary for such use; and (d) 
Plaintiff has sought in good faith to purchase the subject property sought to be taken. (See 
Stipulation of Possession, attached hereto as Exhibit "A"). Thus, the main issue remaining in the 
r.; y j  
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present case is the amount of just compensation to which Defendants are entitled as a result of 
the talting. 
Because these matters have been conclusively resolved between tlie parties, any evidence 
suggesting a dispute exists as to any issue covered by the Stipulation of Possession should be 
excluded from the trial. By definition, to be relevant evidence, the evidence must relate to a fact 
of consequence to the determination of the action. (IRE 401). Since these issues have already 
been resolved, they no longer are of consequence to the determination of the action and are not 
releva~~t. Furthennore, even if disputed, these issues are not relevant to the jury's assessment of 
just compensation. The law is clear that the only issue for submission to the jury is the question 
oE the value of the property sought to be taken or the amount of compensation for the talting; 
other factual issues are to be resolved by the trial court. Flandro v. Seddon, 94 Idaho 940, 943, 
500 P.2d 841, 844 (1972). Referencing a dispute as to any of these issues would not assist the 
jury in determining just compensation but would tend to unfairly confuse and prejudice the jury 
against ITD. It should be excluded on this basis. 
V. 
ANY TESTIMONY FROM DEFENDANTS' WITNESS JAMES MACDONALD OR 
EVIDENCE OR REFERENCE TO HIS OPINIONS SIiOULD BE EXCLUDED 
The Defendants have listed James Macdonald, a University of Idaho College of Law 
professor, as a rebuttal witness. (See Third Affidavit of Joseph D. Mallet, at qj 3). Defendants 
disclosed Professor Macdoilald's expected opinions and testimony as relating to the law of 
exactions, the legal authority of city staff versus the city counsel, and his interpretation of the 
case law related to the city fro111 imposing requirements on properties in the county. A11 of these 
opinions require Professor Macdonald to explain his opinions of the applicable law and how they 
would apply to the facts of the case. 
It is generally recognized that this type of testimony is wholly improper. A leading legal 
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publication summarizes the rule as follows: 
As a general rule, at1 expert witness may not give his opinion on a question of 
domestic law or on matters which involve questions of law, and an expert witness 
cannot instruct the court with respect to the applicable law of the case, or infringe 
on the judge's role to instruct the jury on the law. So, an expert may not testify as 
to such questions of law as the interpretation of a statute, an ordinance or 
municipal code, administrative rules and regulations, or case law, or the meaning 
of terms in a statute, or ordinance, or a corporate charier, or the legality of 
conduct. 
(32 C.J.S. Evidence 9 634)(see also 31A Am. Jur. 2d Expert and Opinion Evidence 8 121) 
Specific courts have been upheld for excluding the testimony of a law professor who was 
to offer testimony on whether an agreement violated federal law (Casper v. SMG, 389 F. Supp. 
2d 618 (D.N.J. 2005)), and excluded an expert's opinion that the court felt was nothing more 
than a lecture on the law for the reason that such testimony usurps the duty of the trial court to 
instruct the jury on the law. (People v. Reynolds, 139 Cal. App. 4" 1 l l , 4 2  Cal. Rptr. 3d 761 (4"' 
Dist. 2006). 
The Idaho Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in Iioward v. Oregon Mut. Ins. Co., 
137 Idaho 214, 46 P.3d 510 (2002). In that case, the Court excluded testimony of a lillguistics 
expert called to testify that a contract was ambiguous. In Idaho, the identification and resolution 
of ambiguity in an insurance policy are matters of law. The Court excluded this testimony 
because the Idaho Rules of Evidence only provide that an expert may be allowed to testify as to 
his or her opinion if his or her "specialized howledge 'will assist the trier ofSact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a facl in issue.' I.R.E. 702." Howard at 219, 515 (emphasis in 
original). The Court collcluded that "Beca~~se the issues related to ambiguity before the trial 
judge were matters of law, the offered expert opinion was irrelevant, and there was no abuse of 
discretion in excluding the testimony." Howurd 137 Idaho at 219, 46 P.3d at 515 
Applying these rules to the proffered basis of Professor Macdonaid's testimony, it is clear 
that his testimony is not relevant and must be excluded. I-Ie will testify to his opinions of the law 
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of exactions, the legal a~~tliority of city staff versus the city counsel, and his interpretation of case 
law related to the city's right to impose requirements on properties in the county. Each issue on 
which he will testify relates to his explanation of a body of law and his application ofthat law to 
the facts of the case. As such, his testimony is irrelevant and exclusion is proper 
VT. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff respectfully moves this Court to enter its order in 
lilnine excluding and prohibiting any and all rderence to the following matters during ally stage 
of the trial in this matter, including voir dire, opening and ciosi~ig statements, and the 
presentatioii of evidence. In the alternative, the State requests the Court require that such matters 
be raised before the Court, outside of the presence of the jury, for a deternliilatioii of the 
admissibility and relevance of such matters before they are injected into the case: 
1. Any evidence, testimony or comment related to the Order of Condemnation 
relating to the subject property. 
2. Any evidence, testimony or comment attempting to suggest that a dispute exists 
as to any issue covered by the Stipulation of Possession between the parties in this case. 
3. Any testimony by Defendants' witness James Macdonald or evidence showing or 
referencing his opinions. 
I@ 
DATED this %-day of May, 2007. 
~ e p G t ~  Attorney General 
!daho Department of Trailsportation 
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CEItTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the pday of May, 2007, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above to be served to: 
E Don Copple ~ u . s .  Mail 
Heather Cu~iniiigham B a n d  Delivered 
Davison Copple Copple & Cox n o v a n i g h t  Mail 
P.O. Box 1583 z@?elecopy (Fax) 386-9428 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
~ e ~ u t $  Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Transportation 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEYGENERAL 
STEVEN M. PARRY 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
331 1 West State Streat 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129 
Telephone: (208) 334-88 15 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
ISB # 2153 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICM DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, cx =I., 1 
CHARLES L. WTNDER, JOHN MCHUGH ) 
BRUCE SWEEMEY, MONTE C. ) CmtNo. P&'- 0 Y' 63.336 
M C C L W ,  GARY BLICK, NEIL 
MILLER, AND JOHN X. COMBO, 
1 
) 
IDAHO TWSPORTATION BOARD, ) 
Plaintie 
1 
1 
-VS- 
) 
1 STIPULATION OF POSSESSION 
1 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LWIITED ) 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J W C H  ) 
INC. 1 
Defendants. 
1 
) 
COMES NOW che Plaintiff, the Idaho Tmmprtation Department, by and through 
its counsel of record, Steven M. Pany, Deputy Attorney General, and the Defiandants, 
Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership and Lazy J. Ranoh b., by and thmugh their 
STIPULATION OF POSSESSION - 1 -  
EXHIBIT NO. 
BOB - 
counsel of record, Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox, and hereby stipulate and agree that 
the wurt may enter an order encompmsing the following: 
1. The requirements of Idaho Code 47-721, enabling Plaintiff to obtain 
possession of the subject propty pending trial have been satisfied, in that (a) Plaintiff 
has the right of eminent domain; (b) the use to which the subject prom is to be applied 
is a use authorized by law; (c) the taldng of the subject p r o m  is necessary for such we; 
and (d) Plaintiff has sought in good faith to purchase the subject property sou@ to be 
taken. 
2. Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendants' etLomey in tmt for D e f e n h &  the sum 
of $327,000.00, together with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per amurn fkom the date 
of the summons. 
3. Upon paying the amounts identified in Pmgraph 2 hereof, P lh t i f f  $M1 be 
entitled to take possession and commence use of the pbopaty described on Exhi'bit A and 
incorporated herein by this refmce.  
4. Plaintiff and Defendants mutually agree not to have any contact or 
communications not authorized in advance by their respective a t t o m y  with mch other 
or their agents during the pendency of this action, rand if any contact should c~ccur, such 
unauthorized communications shall be deemed settlement negotiations and inadmissible 
in any proceeding in this matter relating to the amount of just cornpermalion to be paid. 
5. Plaintiff shall give notice to Defendants' counsel of any major ch- orders 
directly impacting the project adjacent to the Defendants' remaining property within 
fhirty (30) days of the chmge o&rL&ng issued. 
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6 .  Plaintiff shall accept financial responsibility for all real property taxes assessed 
on that portion of that property described in Exhibit A which is bkng condemned by 
Plaintiff from the date of possession until possession is retumed or judgment is entered. 
These taxes shall be calculated as follows: 
Land: sci. feet of take X taxes assessed on parcel X davs of ~ossession = ITD's 
portion 
total sq. tt. of parcel 365 days 
Nothing in this stipulation shall prevent Plaintiff From obtaining consent from the Twin 
Falls County Assessor to cease assessing taxes on the subject property being conaemned 
by Plaintiff, and thus terminating Plaintiffs financial responsibility to pay such taxes. 
7. The amount paid pmuant to Paragraph 2 of this stipulation shall be used as 
an offset against any judgment entered in this matter either by way of trial or negotiation. 
In no event shall Defendants be required to refimd any of the funds paid pmuant to this 
stipulation. 
8. At the time construction commences at or around Defendant's property the 
Plaintiff shall adequately stake or otherwise delineate the right of way between 
Defendant's property and the limits of the construction project. The Plaintiff shall make 
a good faith effort to keep the stakes or delineate in place during construction. The intent 
of this paragraph is to ensure that Plaintiffs contractor does not trespass on or in any way 
damage Defendant's property. 
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DATED this A day of January, 2005. 
Attorney for the Plaintiff, Idaho 
Transportation Department 
DATED this day of Jenuary, 2005. 
Copple, Copple, & Cox - Attorney for 
Canyon Vista Family & Lazy J. Ranch 
STIPULATION OF POSSESSWN 
EXHIBIT "A" 
Parcel No. 41, Parcel I.D. No. 0041481, according 
. . to the Right of Way Plat of Project No. DHP-NH- 
2390(104) filed for record in the office of the 
County Recorder of Twin Falls County, Idaho, on 
the gth day of August, 2004 under Instrument 
No.2004-017039: ', 
Being a portion of the NEW&?% (Government Lot 3) of 
Section 4, .Township 1 0  South, Range 17 East of Boise 
Meridian, Idaho. 
Parcel No. 41, Parcel I.D. No. 0041481, according 
to the Right of Way Plat of Project No. DWP-NH-F- 
2390(104) filed for record in the office of the 
County Recorder of Twin Falls County, Idaho, on 
the gth day of August, 2004 under Instrument 
No.2004-017039: Being a portion of the NE 
(Government Lot 3)of Section 4, Township 10 
South, Range 17 East, Boise Meridian. 
For the purpose of a slope easement, 
Astemporary easement to go upon, occupy, and use a 
strip of land in a portion of the (HE Gov. Lot 
3)of Section 4, Township 10 South, Range 17 East, 
Boise Meridian, Twin Falls County, Idahos on the 
southerly (Right) side of the above described parcel 
of land (Parcel No.41 /Parcel Id.No.0041481) and being 
68 meters (approximately 223 feet) wide lying between 
Stations 825+00 Right to 825+20 Right and from 825t35 
Right to 825c55 Right of the Pole Line Road Survey as 
shown on the plans of said Highway Survey DNP-1VH-F- 
2390(104), for the purpose of construction, together 
with the right and privilege of ingress and egress to 
and from said property for said punpose. 

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEYGENERAL 
JOSEPI-I D. MALLET 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
331 1 West State Street 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129 
Telephone: (208) 334-88 15 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
ISB fi5817 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTI-I JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, M AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., 
DARRELL V. MANNING, R. JAMES 
COLEMAN, BRUCE SWEENY, MONTE C. ) 
McCLURE, GARY BLlCIC, NEIL MILLER ) Case No. '3-04-6336 
and JOHN X. COMBO, IDAI-IO 1 
TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMIWE TO 
Plaintiff, ) EXCLUDE THE TESTIMONY OF 
) ROGER DUNEAP 
-vs- 1 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED 1 
PARTNERST-IIP AND LAZY J RANCH, 1 
INC. 
1 
Defendants. 1 
Comes now the Plaiiitiff, State of Idaho, by and through its counsel of record, Joseph D. 
Mallet, Deputy Attorney General for the State of Idaho, and hereby moves this Court to enter its 
order in lin~ine xcluding and prohibiting any and all testimony froin Roger Dunlap, or evidence 
related to the opinioi~s of Roger Dunlap including his opinion of just compensation, at any stage 
of the trial in this matter, including voir dire, opening and closing statements, and the 
PLAJNTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMNE TO EXCLUDE THE TESTIMONY OF ROGER DUNLAP - 1  >; 
presentation of evidence. 
This motion is based upon Idaho Rules of Evidence 402, 403, and other authorities, as 
further set forth in Plaintirs Brief in Support of Motion in Lilnine to Exclude the Testimony of 
Roger Dunlap and the Third A:ffidavit of Joseph Mallet, filed concurrently herewith, as well as 
the other pleadings and papers on file in this case. 
qBday ofMay, 2007 DATED this -
9, \ 
JOSE H D. ALLET 3
~ e p u t $  Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Trailsportation 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 9  I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of May, 2007, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above to be served to: 
E Don Copple 
Heather Cuilninghaln &c$i;ivered 
Davison Copple Copple & Cox UOvernight Mail 
P.O. Box 1583 n ~ e l e c o p ~  (Fax) 386-9428 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENElWL 
JOSEPH D. MALLET 
KARL D. VOGT 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
33 11 West State Street 
P.0. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129 
Telephone: (208) 334-88 15 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
ISB #5817 
ISB #SO15 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, Dl AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., 
DARRELL V. MANNING, R. JAMES 
COLEMAN, BRUCE SWEENY, MONTE C. 
McCLURE, GARY BLICIC, NEIL MILLER 
and JOHN X. COMBO, IDAHO 
TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
-VS- 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH, 
INC. 
Defendants . 
1 
1 
) Case No. CV-04-6336 
1 
1 
) PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION 
) INLIMINE 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Comes now the Plaintiff, State of Idaho, by and through its counsel of record, Joseph D. 
Mallet, Deputy Attorney General for the State of Idaho, and hereby nioves this Court to enter its 
order in lirnine excluding and prohibiting any and all reference to the following matters during 
any stage of the trial in this matter, including voir dire, opening and closing statements, and the 
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presentation of evidence. In the alternative, the State requests the Court require that such lnatters 
be raised before the Court, outside of the presence of the jury, for a determination of the 
admissibility and relevance of such matters before they are injected into the case: 
1. Any evidence, testimony or colninent related to the Order of Condemnation 
relating to the subject property. 
2. Any evidence, testinloily or cornrnent attempting to suggest that a dispute exists 
as to any issue covered by the Stipulation of Possession between the parties in this case. 
3. Any testimony by Defendants' witness James Macdonald or evidence showing or 
referencing his opinions. 
This rnotion is based upon Idaho Rules of Evidence 402, 403, and other authorities, as 
further set forth in the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Second Motion in Limine, filed 
concurrently herewith, as we11 as the other pleadings and papers on file in this case. 
DATED this day of May, 2007. 
~ k p u t ~  Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the - q?L day of May, 2007, 1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the above to be served to: 
E Don Copple U.S. Mail 
Heather Cunningha~n Hand Delivered 
Davison Copple Copple & Cox 
B 
movernight Mail 
P.O. Box 1583 jZITelecopy (Fax) 386-9428 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
I 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEYGENERAL 
JOSEPIH D. MALLET 
KARL D. VOGT 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
33 11 West State Street 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8815 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
ISB 115817 
ISB #5015 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
SN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAIHO. SN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
TIHE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., 
DARRELL V MANNING, R. JAMES 
COLEMAN, BRUCE SWEENEY, 
MONTE C. McCLUS,  GARY BLICK, 
NEIL MILLER and JOHN X. COMBO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
1 
) Case No. CV-04-6336 
1 
) 
) AMENDED 
) FOURTH AFFIDAVIT OF 
) JOSEPI-I D. MALLET 
) 
I 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH, 
INC. 
Defendants. 
State of Idaho 
)SS. 
County of Ada 
Joseph D. Mallet, being first duly sworn, states the following: 
1. I am the counsel of record for the Plaintiff, State of Idaho, in the above captioned 
AMENDED FOURTH AFFIDAVIT OF JOSEPI-I D. MALLET - 1 
case and make this Affidavit based on my personal knowledge, unless stated otherwise. 
2. On Wednesday, April 11,2007,I took a deposition in this case of the Defendants' 
valuation witness, Roger Dunlap. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by 
referetlce, is a true and accurate copy of relevant portions of the Depositioli Transcript of Mr. 
Dunlap from the April 1 1,2007 deposition. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" are true and accurate copies of two pages from 
Defendants' Fifth Supplemental Answers and Responses to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories 
and Requests for Production of Documents to Defendants. This is the portion of Defendants' 
discovery responses in which they disclose their intent to call Professor James Macdonald as an 
expert rebuttal witness at trial. These pages describe the substallce of the testimony that the 
Defendants expect Professor Macdonald will offer at trial. 
4. Further your affiant sayeth not. 
~Qd. DATED this day of May, 2007. 
~ e $ u t ~  Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Transportation 
"a SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this jL_ ay of May, 2007. 
Residing at gV ,.J- a Idaho 
My Commission expires 7 /'a/1.3' 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
*@" I HEREBY CERTIFY that on tbe & day of May. 2007, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above to be served to: 
E Don Copple C]U.S. Mail 
Heather Cunninghain DHand  Delivered 
Davison Copple Copple & Cox novernight  Mail 
P.O. Box 1583 4?elecopy (Fax) 386-9428 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
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1 determination? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. And you, it1 fact, undertook that 
4 atialysis in tliis case? 
5 A. Ycs. 
6 Q. In tlie before cotidition what right of 
7 access did you find or did yo11 feel tlint existccl 
8 to tlic west side ad,jacent property? 
9 A. Well, 1 want to rephrase a little bit. 
1 0  1 didn't find tliey liad a specific right of access 
11. in a specific place. I believe tliat upon 
1.2 rezotiing and secttritig entitletnents they would 
1.3 liiivc beeti erititlcd to a shared access, one or two 
1 4  other driveways, and a -- probably a public 
3. 5 street woi~ld liave gone tliroitgh tlie sul),ject 
1.6 property. 
1 7  Q. I'm going to ask you questions relative 
1.8 to each propetty line oS the sttl)ject propetly. 
1 9  So  1'111 going to start on tlie west side. Tlicy 
2 0  have a western boundary of the propetiy that 
21. abuts to tlie KLS&M property; does it not? 
2 2  A, Yes. 
I Q. (BY MR. MAL.L,E'T) Why don't you tell tiie 
2 what is confusing aboitt my question. I'm going 
3 to ask you about every propefly line so we can 
4 get tlirough this. 
5 A. I looked at this property as 20 acres 
6 of property that had a highest and bcst use for 
7 cotntiiercial and probably at1 office component. Anti 
8 1 think it could liwve a connection to Canyori 
9 Cresi Drive. A~id one or two other access points. 
1 0  Arid probably a shared driveway on tlie west 
1.1 property line in $1 before sititatioti. I gucss 1'1n 
1 2  a little concerned tliiit you are saying wliat (lid 
1.3 yoit tlctertiiine the access riglits to be at a 
1 4  certain location. 1'111 not saying it is goitig to 
15  be at this locatioti right here (itidicatitig). Or 
3.6 it is going lo be at this location right liere 
1 7  (indicating). My determination was a liille bit 
1 8  tiiore general. 
1.9 Q. Let's talk about tlie deteriiiirrrition that 
2 0  yoit made, ofcourse, it seetns like you are 
2 1  rererring to the boundary line, whicli would be 
2 2  the northern boundaly litie on Pole Line Road? 
1 A. I guess I'm getting hung up on your 
2 pllrase what access rights do they lrave at that 2 A. Yes. 
3 point. 
4 Q. Okay. We are in tlie before coridition. 
5 Is tliat clear? 
6 A.Riglit. 
7 Q. And we just talked about you coming in 
8 and looking at a piece of propet-ty and 
9 ascertaining the access rights that tile property 
1.0 has in the before condition. 1 0  trapped. But i tlii~rk we are on the sanic page. 
11 A. Okay. 1.1 Q. 1 appreciate you beitig ciiutious. But 
1.2 Q. iitid, in your opiriion, when yoit 1 2  truth be told, what you just told tiic is in the 
1.3 undertook that atialysis it1 this case, did yoit 1 3  before conditioti Canyon Crest Drive would liavc 
1 I dctermi~ie that tlicrc were ariy righis to access 1 4  bcen extended tlirougli the property; correct? 
15  across the westerti boutidary of the  sui?ject 1.5 A. Yes. 
1 6  property? 1 6  Q. Tliat's a public street access or 
1 7  A. I woitltl like you to rcplimsc it agaiti. 1 7  approach tliat the propetly woitld have etijoycd 011 
1 8  I'm sorry. 1 8  tliis northern boundary? 
1 9  MR. COI'P1,E: Are you asking him did 1.9 A. I believe so. 
2 1  property? Is that what you arc asking hiin? 
2 2  MR. MAL,I.,E'T: That is what I'm aslting. 2 2  A. To the soittli of Pole Line Road i t  does 
2 3 MR. COI'PLE: To say it tlifferetitly. 
C 
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2 3 Q. And I'm going to ask you specifically 
2 4  tibout your opinion of  access rights to tliat 
2 5  property boitndary. Does that tiiake sense? 
2 3  A. Yes. 
2 4 Q. You just mentioned several access 
2 5  points. Tliose are all on the northerti boundrrty -? 
B 
1 
1 A.  Well, you need to know wliat you are 
2 appraising. Once you come up with your larger 2 Q. Yott called it contiguity? 
3 parcel, that is your subject propet"ry. And that 
4 is wliat you appraise. 4 Q. Whether that's a word or not, 1 think I 
5 Q. Did you perFortn that analysis in this 5 know what yoit are mean. They are toi~cliing each 
6 case? 6 other. l'liey are next to each othcr. Right? 
7 A. Yes. 7 A. Tliat is a worcl. 
8 Q. Oltay. So you look at tlie Lazy J parcel 
9 at1 tlie east. And what we call the KI.,S&M parcel 
I. 1. go one tiiore fu~llier on the west. 
"flic DCMkW is not contiguous; is it? 
I. 3 A. 'To the subject; no. 
14 Q. But tlie rwo adjacent parcels that I 1.4 A. Well, tile iiighest and best usc is $1 
1 6  A~id therc are 110 otlicr contiguous parcels tliat 
1 7  are owtied by the same folks. I guess tliat's rhe 1.7 A. Yes. 
1 8  end of the analysis. 18 (2, So far so good. It looks liltc we liave 
1 9  Q. Okay. So you gave me three factors. 1 9  a larger parcel as of these two Fdcton; correcl'? 
2 0  And yoit applied those three factors. And the 2 0  A. Correct. 
2 1  result was the parcel that we've identifietl is 2 1. Q. We move down to the unity of title. 
2 2  tlie larger parcel? 
2 3  A. Yes. 2 3  Q. And tliet is tlic sole reason that you 
2 4 have determined the larger parcel to be oiily the 
1 was. 
2 Do yo11 believe that that is tile sanre 2 Q. And what was it h a t  made yo11 decitlc 
3 iiighest and best use i'or adjacent parcels oil both 3 tlierc wasn't sktficient unity of title? 
4 sidcs? 4 A .  There are different cornpatlies that own 
5 A, It's very similar. I cnii't recall 5 tliree different parcels. 
7 13t1t I tliirik i t  was really si~tiilar. 7 subject we lii~ve C:ttiyon Vista -- 
8 Q. I t  is your opinion, tlien, if not 8 A.LI.,C. 
9 identical, tiley are substantially the same? 
1.0 A. Yes. 
11 Q. So i n  the lhigiicst and best usc fiictor 1.1. A. I tliitik it's litnitcd liiibility conipaiiy. 
1 2  we accuslly got :I check mark. I itlean, that is 1 2  But I coi~ld be wrong. 
13  lireserit oti tliat one fiictor in your atialysis; 1.3 Q. Whiciicver the entity is. Wc've got 
L 4 correct? 1.4 thai cntity. And I,ezy J is ownetl by the l..szy J 
1 5  A.  Yes. 1 5  lla~ich Corporation? 
16 Q. You tioll't see tiny barricrs related to 1 6 A. Sotnetliiiig like that. 
1.7 tlie higliest and best use -- iiothing aboitt tile 17 Q. Because those two are diffcretit 
:I. 8 l~iglicst ant1 best usc of tlic iieighbori~ig ipal-cels 1.8 etitities, that is tlie basis of your dctcrtliitiatio~i 
1 9  wot~ld catisc you to tiialte a larger parcel 1.9 tliitt it~iity ortitle ditln't csist? 
2 0  tleterrninittiori tliaii whet you havc tionc'? 2 0  A. Yes. 
2 1  A. No. Yoo'rc correct. 21. Q. Atid bccatrsc ~tiiity of title didti't 
22  exist, for tliat sole rcasoti yoti lievc take11 the 
2 3 larger parcel only as the subjcct property? 
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1 the KLS&M property? 
2 A. I believe on tlie KLSBrM there was gad 
3 value. Wliicli I slid back iii the after situation. I 
4 1 was going to tnention tlitit earlier. Because 
! 5 they can, in fact, replace some of tlie higher 
; 6 value larid in the after situatioti. 
'7 Q. We talked about some of tlie criticisms 
8 ortliis as creating a windf>ill for tlie propcrty 
9 owner. 
I. 0 Did you resolve whether that was 
1 1  appropriate or not in the KI,S&M case? 
1 2  A. Well, it worked to tlic disadvantage of 
1 3  the property owtier. Is what I believe I did with 
1 4  KLSBrM. Because I took some of tlie valurtble larld 
15 that was being taketi and I said in the after 
1 6  situatioii you still have -- you can slide this 
1.7 trlore valuablc band baclt. So that decreased my 
1 8  scveralice daiiiage figure in the KLSBrM. So it 
1 9  would be the opposite of 11 wiiidfall, 
2 0  (1. What about the Lazy J casc? Did you 
2 1 iise -- which valuation approach, if eitlier of 
2 2  these, did you use in that case? 
2 3  A. I do not recall. 
2 4  Q. Tliis band of valuc iipproacli that you 
2 5  used in tliis case. do vou recall tising that ever 
['age 1 5 5  
1 ill thc Scnte of ldatio for any of tlie work that 
2 you have done? 
3 A. Otlier than tlie cascs we have talketl 
4 about just tiow? 
5 Q. Wcll, i t  looks like the batid oCva1rte 
6 al~proach maas only used in tlijs case. You tiilked 
'7 ilbout the slide back on the I<I,S&M. And you 
1 weren't surc on the l..azy J. 
9 MR. C0PPL.E: What about Target? I-lave 
I. 0 you looked at tl~at:} 
11 MR. M.ALLE'I': 1 couldn't tell whet, J 
1 2  Ioolted at that. 
13 Q. (BY MR. MAL,L.ET) It loolted like a slide 
1.4 back case to me. But I'm asking because I wasn't 
1.5 sure. 
1 6  A. None otl1er corne to tniiid. The 
I. 7 propcrties I'vc worlted on i n  Nanipa a1.e stnuller. 
1.8 And I don't think that any of those werc 
1.9 siisceptible to this kinti oi't~.cat~nciii. 
2 0  Q. l'vc got to ask. Wliy would this bc tlic 
2 1 only one you lhave used tliis atialysis on in all of 
2 2  the c a k s  you have done in i d ~ ~ h o ?  
2 3  A. Well, now, 1 don't remernbcr what I did 
2 4 in Billiar, either. 
2 5 Q. I've got a copy of yotir sutnrnal-y. Woitld 
,,, .~ ....,.,....,,. ,..-,',..,",-~..~ ,....", ....,. *.".., ..... %.s:, .,,., .................... ,,.,..,,... " ,~ 
l'oye 1 5 6  
1 tlirlt help you remember? Yotir cxec~~rivc su~nmary'? 
2 A. You know, the only -- I do~i't lhave a 
3 good explanation. What comes to rnitid is tliat tlic 
I proj'erty ow~iers reservetl this frontage oitt here 
5 for commercial purposes. Atitl I guess it was riiore 
6 clear to me on this case where tlie higher value 
7 zone would be. It's about 200 feet cleep. Atid 
8 it's pretty obvious pad sites. I probably siioulti 
9 li:l\,e (lolie tliat on tlie Hilliar case. I probably 
I. 0 ulrdcrstatcd severance tlamnge in that case. 
1. I. MR.  COPPLE: \Vhat a goy. Now you tell 
1 2  fnc. 
1 3  Q. (BY MR. MAL,LE'I') Does itsotind likcyou 
1 4  agree with tny ontlerstanding that you reitlly 
1 5  didn't use tliis approacli on Billiar? 
1 6  A. It doesn't looli like i t  froin Iookitig at 
1.7 that summary; no. 
3.8 Q. So as yoit sit licre today you can't 
1 9  tllitik ofaiiother casc in Idaho wliere you linve 
2 0  used this band O F Y R I U ~  approach? 
2 1  A. No. 
2 2  Q. I was looking at ;lie Target casc and 
2 3  that is riglit on tlie corner of Blue L.akcs 8t1d 
2 4  Pole 1,ine. Do pot1 recall thilt ciise? 
2 5  A. Yeah. I don't want to be techlhical. 
1 It is on tlie soitthwest c1iiadrant. The itntiiediate 
2 corners of it. Yes. 
3 Q. Some of that propetty fronted on Pole 
4 Line and some fronted on Blue Lalies? 
5 A. Right. 
6 Q. The actual corner itself belonged to 
7 sornebody else? 
8 A.RigRt. 
9 Q. I-lowever we icrm that. I recall you 
1.0 cotiiing up will1 $1 1.00 a square foot not using 
11 this method. Does that ring a bcll? 
1 2  A. Eleven dollars for the overall 
1 3  property? 
1 4  Q. My titiderstanding -- and, r~gaiti, I ' l l  be 
1.5 frank with you. I'jn tlot sure I uitdcrstood 
1.6 really -- 1 never took your deposition in that 
1.7 casc, 1'111 not s i~re  I really understand what you 
1 8  tliti in that case. I t  loolts to me like yoir diti 
1 9  not use tlie banti oi'valiie approach. Wl~atever 
2 0  approach you used kicked out an $I 1.00 per scjtlarc 
2 1  foot val~ie for the take. 
2 2 As yoti recall, tlierc was also an issue 
2 3  pad site illat was feasible in the before, 
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1. irrespective of the sevoaiice, to me, when I'm 
2 looking at that, you get $1 1 .OO a square Soot. 
3 Does that sound consistent with what you did'? 
4 A. 1 lioncstly can't re~neniber. I liad 
5 enough to do to get ready for this one. 
6 Q, I can appreciate that. My next 
'I qi~cstion was going to be. If you got $I 1 .OO a 
8 sqi~are foot on the T'arget case, does it sccln 
9 consistent that you get $9.50 down the road on 
1 0  tlie sub,ject properly? 
1 1 A.  1 would havc to loolc at that again. 
1 2  1'111 sorry, I can't recall as I sit liere wiiat I 
1. :3 did on that case. 
1.4 Q. Ifit were, in fiict, a $1.50 per square 
1 5  hot  dii'fere~ice between tile two cases, would tliat 
1 6  surprise you? 
1.7 A. I'm not sure whetlier the $1 1.00 was Tor 
:I8 the overall tztrget sites. And tlie $9.50 is just 
1 9  for the pad frontage on Pole Line. Which seeiiis 
2 0  to me has got to be tile case. But 1'1n not sure 
21. i f  wc are comparing apples to apples in tliis 
2 2  case. 1 wo~lld have to rcview that, 1 tliink I 
2 3  have been consistent tlirot~gliout my valuations in 
2 4 'Swin 1:alls. I havc tried to be. 
2 5 0. I tliink you sec my implicntion that I 
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1. don't see tlie consistency between -- you got 
2  Billiar at $6.00 in tlie before. And Target at 
3 $ I 1.00 in the before. And in the micldle yo11 get 
4 this $9.50. I t  just see~iis urijilstifiably l~,igli as 
5 compared to tile other work you havc done. 
6 A. Well, Dilliiir was $6.00 for the overall 
7 site of 71 acres. 'The $9.50 is jilst for tliose 
8 Li.ontage pads. The overall vali~e ofthis 
9 property I tliink is $5.50 a square foot, ~vliicli is 
1 0  consistetit with Billiar being srortli $6.00 at an 
11. ar-terial corner. A n d  you wo~ild expect 'I'arget to 
1 2  be significa~itly inore tlian citlicr Billiar or this 
1 3  property being at Blue laaltcs aiid Pole I.,ine. 
1.4 Q. Now, wllen yo11 valued your serics of 
15 strip rakes Sortlic City oI'Gleiidale, did yo11 use 
1 6  tliis blind o f v a l ~ ~ e  approacli in any ofthose 
1 7  cases, as far as yo11 can i.ccall'? 
18  A. No. 'They :ill Iiod tlic some higlicst ant1 
1.9 best use. 'l'hey were all one solf-contained 
2 0  little sinall porccl of land. 'fl~e only ti~ne that 
2 1  woltld conic iiito play is i f  you have soinetliing 
2 2  Iirrgc like this with signilicant depth that couitl 
2 3  be used for different things in tliffcrent hands. 
24 lryou lravc a one-acre com~ncrcial piece you are 
2 5 not going to havc different bands oTvalue. 
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I. Q. Is it fair for me to say that this band 
2  o f  value approach increases the value ofthe talte 
3 or the property value in Favor ofthe owner'! 
4 A. 1 don't think it increases it. I think 
5 it is fair to do i t  that way. If you did i t  
6 anoilier way i t  would decrease tlie compensation 
7 due to tlie owner. 
8 Q. In  all fairness, you said you didn't do 
9 this 011 the Billiar property. And that probably 
1.0 restilted in lower ~iutiibcrs'? 
11 A. Yes. 
1 2  Q. l'lie implication tlieii would be using 
1.3 this approach versus (he approach used on the 
1 4  l3iiliar kicks out a iiigher number? 
1 5  A. Well, I gr~css I don't like tlie way you 
1 6  art characterizing it as I did it this way to 
1 7  jaclc up the value. I tliink tliis is the 
1 8  appropriate way to do it. But it does give you a 
1 9  higller value tliali doing it -- ifyou say this 
2 0  lalid you are taking offof here, off of the 
2 1  frontage, is worth tlie exact same as this entire 
2 2  property, that \vould give you $5.50 per squarc 
2 3  foot. 
J 24 Q, Your band of val~ce approach, you only 2 5 use that in tlie before; correct? 
Page 1.61. 
1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Now, tliat doesn't really give you what 
3 a willing purchaser would pay for your larger 
4 parcel in the before; does it? 
5 A. Ifyou're buying this entire properly 1 
6 tliink a willing buyer would pay $5.50 a square 
7 foot fo~' the entire parcel. 
8 Q. Your larger parcel determination was 
9 tlic whole parcel; correct? 
1 0  A. Yes. 
1 1 Q. So if1 were Lo ask yoit what price 
1 2  would a willing pi~rcliaser pay for wlrat you iiave 
1.3 tlctermincd is a larger parcel, the answer \\'auld 
1. 4 be $5.50 a square hot?  
15 A. Yes. 
1 6  Q. Wily go throi~gli the Iargcr parccl tlsill 
1 7  at all if yo11 are only goirig to value tlie take ttt 
1 8  the band of value in tlie koiit'? 
1 9  A. I t  isjust requireti that you dcterniine 
2 0  wliat the larger parcel is i n  an eminent donlain 
2 1  action and value i t  before and alter to collie 111) 
22  \\,it11 scvelancc tlaniage. I-low else would you (lo 
I 2 3  that'? 
I 24 0. Let me ask this aiiothcr way. Wl~v / 2 5  ditin't yoti find tlie front band of value as being .
.,,, : ,,,.'..'*," .,*,,".,.,, ~ ~ .*,., *.*..~",* ,.., &.,s*c,.%.v~.*,b:,,,: ,.,... ~:.,.~*,.*...~,,," ., ,. . 
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1 2 5  band of anchor tenanis in the middle, and band 1 2 5  6 Now, we talked about your value of the 
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1 the larger parcel? 
2 A. I think that all of these comporients of  
3 this property liave synergy, wliich is good for all 
4 of tile other components of it. If you have acre 
5 retail in here, this will draw people into your 
6 development. And thc pad users will take some 
7 advantage from that. Tlie office users will like 
8 to have restaurants and services along the 
9 frontage. And shopping opportunities. And the 
1 0  office -- well, I've already said that. 
11 1 think that the center works 
1 2  together -- you could arguably cut off the 
13  frontage and call that the larger parcel. 
1 4  Q. It seemed like in your larger parcel 
1 5  detemiriatioii one of your kctors was highest and 
1 6  best use; was i t  !lot? 
1 7  A . Y e s .  
1 8  Q. And you'vc got three different highest 
1 9  atid best uses on what you have already called the 
2 0  large parcel; don't yoti? 
2 1  A. No. 1 think the highest and best use 
2 2  of the wliole property is a [nixed use develop6~ent. 
2 3  Q. Okay. That rnixcd use development 
2 4  co~isists of a band of nad sites on the front. a 
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1 of offices in tlie back? 
2 A . Y e s .  
3 Q. And if l were to ask you to explain to 
4 me why one of your bands, specifically tlie front 
5 band, didn't end up to be your larger parcel, 
6 what would your answer be? 
7 A. It's just 111y opinion that thc highest 
8 and best use of the subject is a mixed use 
9 property. 
3.0 Q. If your larger parcel was just the 
3.1. fioiit band that would reduce the amount of 
1 2  severarlce darnages you would deter~nine; wouldri't 
3.3 it? 
1 4  A. Well, that's another good reason to 
3.5 consider this all as one property. Because solne 
1 6  of these eiernents have access only through this 
1 7  band of value. So you kind of have to look at 
28 this as one larger parccl. That's a good point. 
1 9  Q. The reason I ask is because the way I 
20  scc this is timi when it cornes to severance 
2 3. darnages you have used the wliole parcel as the 
2 2  larger parcel, And that creates higher severance 
2 3  datnagcs for the Droperty owner than if you just 
Page : 
1 take you, in my mind, essentially, play it the 
2 other way. You have determined your larger 
3 parcel as smaller. Alid the effect, in my 
4 opinion, is, when it cornes to the larger parcel 
5 per severance damages, you have analyzed it in 
6 favor of the property owner. And when you 
7 have done the seine undertaking for the vali~e of 
8 the take, you have ignored it, and tlie result 
9 is in favor of the property owners. Call that 
1 0  an accusation o fmy  qiiestioning your process. 
11 blow do you answer that question? 
1 2  A, It was riot my intent to crertte anything 
3.3 artificial. I believe it's logical that the 
1 4  property owner should be paid for the band of 
1 5  value where he is, I think you also have to be 
1 6  accouritnble for the taking of all access from the 
1 7  entire property for Pole Line Road, because the 
1 8  taking has nuked the potential of  this back area. 
1 9  And if 1 had done it the other way, as you are 
2 0  suggesting woultl make a difference of about ten 
2 1  percent of the overall compensation, you can 
2 2  argue that that would be appropriate, But it 
2 3  wasn't my intent to pump up the value of the 
2 4 taking. 
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1 wliole parcel, If I were to buy this whole larger 
2 parcel at $5.50 a square foot in the before; 
3 correct? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Your $9.50 a square foot, isn't that 
6 essentially what a purchaser would pay for -- 1 
7 want to say a pad site on the front. Is that 
8 fair to say? If I were to buy a pad site on the 
9 front, or if I were to sever offsornetliirig in 
1 0  that band on thc front, sever off a pad sitc, I 
11 would pay $9.50 for that as a purchaser? 
1.2 A. Yeah. And let rne just clarify that. 
13  $9.50 contemplates selling off an acre of land 
1 4  with frontage on Pole Line. There is some 
15 confirsion in the rnarket and in our terminology 
1 6  when we talk about rcal estate. Sometimes pads 
1 7  inearl that you sell this area off to a potential 
1 8  user. And tlie parking lot has been installed. 
1 9  And all of tlie utilities beeii stubbed to tliis 
2 0  building. And the only thing that is tlicre is a 
21  little piece of dirt where they can drop iri  the 
2 2  building and everything is ready to go. That is 
2 3  not what I'm tiiinkinr! ofwhen I say nad sites. 
- . . .  . " 
24 liinited your larger parcel to the front bancl. 
2 5 I illso sce when it conies to valui~ig the 
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2 4 Q. I'm with you. Wliat are you describing 
2 5  in contrast to wl~at  you have just stated? i t i 
1 A. I'm thinking of'a pad site with il 
2 one-acre -- approximately one-acre site tliat is 
3 si~itable for a user to develop a building, as 
8 with. 8 Q. But you cliose not to? 
9 So if yoil've got a sliopping center that 
3.0 Q. Now, at tlie date of tlie take there was 1 0  is almost 90 percent built out. There may be $1 
I. 1 little sqtiarc of dirt up thcrc with a parking 
12 lot. Services stabbed oiit. Everything of that 
13 naturc. Atid so~iiehody is going to come by and 13 Q. 11 is still yoilr opinion tliat a market 
1 4  stick a coffee sliop, or a Jack i n  the i h s ,  or 1.4 existed for one of those at the date of tlie tukc? 
1.5 something on tliat square ofdirt. 15 A. Yes. 
1 6  'That is what some people refer to as a 2 6 Q. So yotr basically decide wliat a 
1 7  pad sitc; correct? 1 7  pt~rcl~ascr would pay in tlic futtrre for larid in one 
1 8  A.Yes .  1 8  of tlrose smaller pad sites and that is what yoii 
19 (2. My question was -- and 1 tliink it was 1 9  assign to tlie take? 
2 0  i n  lineorwhat you are thinlting. What do you 2 0  A. I n  the future? 
22  and you're contemplating the wliolc sitc that 2 %  Wotrld you like me to rephrase that? 
25 tlie parking lot and 
-
1 site tbr ilie sake of our discussion iiglii now to 1 of tl~ese smaller pad sites. And when you gct 
2 avoid confusioii? 2 that numbcr that is what yo11 assign Lo the rake? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Okiiy. Under that definition of a pad 4 Q. 1 know a lot of wlii~t you do is 
5 site, if l were LO c o ~ i ~ e  up with this piece of 5 specolatioir, 1 meair, it's yoirr opiniori. 
6 lxopcrty in thc before, and want one of those pad MR. COPPLE: Thcrc is a difference. 
7 sites, and I were to buy it, you are saying $9.50 MR. MALLET: I won't call i t  guessing 
8 a stluarc foot; right'? 8 until we arc ill front of the ju~y.  
9 A. I'm saying tiiat is the price for the MR. COI'PT..E: I would object to any 
:I0 dirt. 1.0 comincnts on gt~cssitig. 
3 .1  0, iiiglit. L 1 Q. (BY MR. MAI..I..ET) LiuL \\dliat you are doiiig 
L2 A, The one acre of dirt iintievelopcd. 3.2 lrere is yo11 are speciiiatitig bftsically what vioiilti 
1.3 Q. 'I'lie one acre of dirt i~ndevclopcd. So 1.3 happen i f  tlie 1)ropeily were broke into a pad 
1.4 that $9.50 a squirre fool eqiiutes to what you 1 4  site. And if there were a pi~rcliascr for thet pati 
1 5  would sell a piccc of -- scvc~. off and sell a 1 5  site. Corrcct? 
1 6  ~ i c c e  oi'thc front dirt to a p i~ l~hase r?  16 A. Well, I'm not speculatitiy too Iiel-d. 
1 7  A. Yes. 17 l3ccaiise there are tliree sales riglit rtcross tile 
1 8  Q. Yoti would call tliat the cconotiiy scale'? 1 8  street that have sold iii aliiiost the ideiitical 
2 0 tlic front lias a liiglier price than wliat n 2 0 niorc observing. 
2 2  of thc take, il'tliere were a pad site createtl, or 
2 3 platretl, or brokcn out, or subtlivided, anti i t  
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I, bit because the pacis weren't zoned on the dace of 3. impact on the itnprovemenls. It is stupid to go 
2 through an entire analysis like this. But in 
3 Q. So your comparablc salcs tlliit you used 
4 were cornparables that show you a pad site velue. 4 value, and severance damage, you llave to go 
5 tliroitgh this entire analysis. 5 Not thc value OF the wholc larger parcel. 
Is that correct? 
7 A. Yes. Docs yoilr copy show pagc five? 
9 A. Yes. 
1 4  yoilr just co~iipensation in this case? 
15 A. Yes. 
1.6 land sales chart. 1 6  Q. I don't rneat~ to belabor that point. I 
1 7  A. So  hose are the sales that I looked at 17 have never seen anybody do it this way. I aln 
1.8 to get tin idea of what yoit co~ild sell 
1 9  approximately an acre itlong Pole Line frontage. 
2 1 you can see I ~nade a ininits adjustment becoi~se 
1 site, And came up with an estimate of $9.50 per 1 spced with you. The trickery, if it exists, will 
2 squas'c foot for tliis land in its cunent 2 comc litter. 1'111 just trying to rnaltc sun I'tn 
3 playing catch-up at this point. 
So the value of tlic Pakc at  $9.50 il 
9 valuing the larger parcel as a wliole; correct? 9 A,. Correct. 
1.0 Q. We go up to the total value beforc. 
11 Q. Why even go through that drill i n  this 
. .. ....... 
15. -- h7 ikVd~~~yOf i -1 i i l~e  to come up will~ the 
I. 6 entire valuc oS the sitbjcct property ill a before 16 A. Yes. Cali I help you a little hit? 
1 7  Q. J would appreciate it. 1'7 sitoalion. 'Sake out the value oSthe take. 
18 A. This ~iulnber is extrapolated. What I 1 O Valuc the rclnainder before, remainder after, to 
2 0  to your. bottoni linc oScstimiit~t1 just 2 0  square foot. That is reflected by tliis nuilibcr 
2 1. (indicatitlg). And llien I valued the taking at 
22 $9.50 a square foot. Arld the ftontage, if i t  .is You can usc R strip take rnethod in somc 
4 4  (Pages 170 t o  1'73) 
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I. nitmber that gets you to tliat number. 
2 Q. So yoar $4,723,296. Do you see that 
3 niimber there? The total? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. If 1 take thal number, divide it by tlle 
6 square footage or tlie parcel site in tlie before 
7 co~idition, it comes out to $5.50:' 
8 A.  Yes. You rnay want to refer lo llie 
9 footnote. 
10 Q. I see that. So you got the value of' 
I I. the take at $9.50. You've got your pcrtiianent and 
1% tetnporary easemerits. And you gel your total 
3.3 vel~te of tlie take at that $9.30 a squa1.e foot 
1.4 value. 
3.5 A.  Yes. 
1 6  Q. Then we takc the before value, 
1 7  aggregate, less the value of the retnainder -- 
1 8  A. Wllicli gives yoct the value oftlie 
1 9  remainder in tlic before situation. 
2 0  Q. So you really didn't cotnc up with your 
2 1  after value using the income approach; tiid you'? 
2 2  Your after valuc is the bcfore value minus the 
2 3  take? 
2 4  A.  There is an nftcr value -- there's a 
2 5  value of the remainder before i~nd a value of the 
Page 1 7 6  
I Q. What do you thinlt a reasonable ti~nc to 
2 find a purchaser is in this case? 
3 A.  I:or the subject property? 
4 Q. Yes. 
5 A. Nine to 12 months. 
6 Q. So if this were to have listed -- 
7 "lhis" being the sub,ject prope~~y.  If it were to 
8 hilve been listed at lhc tlnte of the take i t  could 
9 lhave bee11 a year before a purcliascr was foitnd'? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Do you cver use a tinhe to develop 
1 2  adji~sirrient, as wcll? 
13 A. No. 
I. 4 Q. In this case there is an iritcrim use of 
1 5  a [nobile ho~ile park; right? 
1 6  A. Yes. 
i 7  Q. Did yo11 consider the fact that it might 
! 8 take a wliiie to wintl up the affairs of itie mobile 
1 9  home park and tlemolisl~ the mobile home park and 
2 0  gct this rcady to sell? 
2 1 A. IS could be sold with that use in 
2 2  place. 
2 3  Q. In order to develop, then, i t  would 
2 4  still tiike tinhe to wind up the afhirs of the 
25 mobile lhotne park atitl to prerjare this for 
Page 175  
I remainder after. 
2 Q. 7'he value of the remoiiider after is not 
3 calculated through the incofnc approacli on page 
4 nine; is id 
5 A. Yes, it is. That nrcniber comes Srom 
6 page eight. Wliicli is an income approach. 
7 Q. It j i~st so lhr~ppe~hs that that ecluals 
8 your vali~c of the before tninus the value of the 
9 talte? 
10 A. No. The value of the rc~naii~der aner 
13.  docs not equal i l~e viilue besore, mitii~s the -- 
1 2  MR. C:OI'I'LE: Let's talte a liinc-out. 
13  (A discussii~n was held off the record.) 
1 4  (Recess.) 
15 Q. (13Y MR. M A I L L E ~  Wearc baclc aner the 
1 G break. We are looking at your belore sales on 
1 7  page two and three. But before I ask yoi~ about 
1.8 that. 
3. 9 Do you make a distinction personally 
20 becweeri market value and morkct pvicc? Arc they 
2 I the same thing to you? Or are they different? 
2 2  A .  Yeah, I don't krlolv what ~nnrkct price 
2 3  is. 
2 4 (2. Market vall~e i s  what you dctermiilc'? 
1 devcloplnerit; would it not'! 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q, l-iow long do you think it \vouId take? 
4 A. I'm told that it would take about six 
7 take. I'robably a couple of months. 
8 Q. So if it look nine months to find a 
1 0  ready to develop? 
11. A. This estimate of market value 
3.2 anticipates a marketing time of nine to I2 
13 months. Alid tliat means that is what i t  would 
1 4  have  old for on the date oSvalue if it hod becn 
1 9  out. 13ut your estitnatc at inarkel valuc is as 
2 1  vt~luc atid it sells or1 that date. 
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to testify. Without waiving said objection, the following individuals may be called to testify on 
rebuttal: 
1. James Macdonald, University of Idaho Law School, I 1  85 Paradise Ridge Road, Moscow, 
ID 83843; 208-885-7947; Mr. Macdonaldmay testifyregarding the standards relating to imposition 
of exactions on the property if it were to apply for a plat or PUD development, the authority of staff 
vs. the City Council, and the authority cited to imposerequirements on properties inthecounty. Mr. 
Macdonald has given us the following opinion: 
(1) It is his opinion that the law of exactions (government conditions on development) has 
been established by the United States Supreme Court in the cases ofNollan v. California Coastal 
Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) ('Wollan") and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) 
("Dolan"). 
Nollan held that the police power allows government to put a condition on development if 
thecondition is rationally related topreventingor mitigatinghms caused by the development. The 
Court ruled that there must be a nexus between a legitimate governmental interest and the condition 
on development. More specifically, the condition must be related to and serve the same 
governmental interest as the underlying restriction on development. 
Nollan's "nexus" requirement was clarified in Dolan, where the Court said that the law 
required an evaluation of whether the exactions or conditions on development were "roughly 
proportionate"tothegovermnent'sjustifications forregulating(theso-called "roughpmportionali~' 
standard). The Court said that "[nlo precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must 
~ a k e  some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both innature 
and extent to the impact of the proposed development." 512 U.S. at 391. 
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(2) It is his further opinion that local government staff employees (such as planning, zoning 
and engineering personnel) do not have the final legal authority to impose exactions or conditions 
on development. Under KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577,582 (2003), such authority 
resides solely in the ultimate local government decision-making body, most typically the County 
Commissioners. Staffs legal function is to advise the ultimate decision-maker. Any staff 
recommendations are appealable to, and can be accepted or rejected by, the decision-making body, 
again most typically the County Commissioners. 
2. Michael Binham, 306 Valley Drive, Wimberley,TX 78676; (512)847-1213; Mr. Bingham 
is a former Corporate Real EstateManager of Wal-Mart and will testify to thehistory of Wal-Mart's 
efforts to obtain a location in Twin Falls, Idaho. He will testify that in his opinion the road project 
by the State of Idaho in this case did not create a demand for commercial development on Pole Line 
Road; but, that the recently expanded and increasingpopulation baseinTwinFalls County, and the 
surrounding market area which Twin Falls serves, creates the demand for additional commercial 
uses. Also, in his opinion, retailers do not prefer limited access to the store locations; and, that the 
highest and best use of the Canyon Vista property is for comrnerical purposes. Further, lhat 
assemblage would not be required to develop the same if it had reasonable access to the property 
&om an arterial road. 
3.' Pat Dobie, In addition to his work already disclosed, Mr. Dobie will respond to Mr. 
Funkhousers body of work in this case, will address the estimated development costs if the property 
developed in the before or aAer condition. Additional work done by Mr. Dobie is attached hereto 
as Exhibit A. 
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BY _ l.I.-.--.-.-.I CLERI< 
-,- ,--.__I-- DEPUTY 
IIN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DBSTRBCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWfN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex. rel., ) 
DARRELL V. MANNING, JAMES ) Case No. CV 2004-8636 b336 
COLEMAN, BRUCE SWEENEY, ) 
MONTE C. McCLURE, GARY BLICK, ) 
NEIL MILLER and JOHN X. COMBO, ) 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD ) 
) ORDER REGARDING 
Plaintiff, ) BOTH PLAINTIIFFSF AND 
1 DEFENDANTS' MOTlORlS 
vs. ) IN LfMlNE AND MOTIONS 
) TO EXCLUDE 
) 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED ) 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH, ) 
INC. ) 
1 
Defendants. 1 
1 
011 May 18,2007, Plaintiffs, State of Idaho, and Defendants, Canyon Vista 
Family Limited Partnership, presented various motions in limine and motions to 
exclude before the court. The Court having reviewed the written 
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memorandums, affidavits and relevant case law, as well as having heard oral 
argument of the parties, does hereby rule as follows: 
1. Defendants' Motion to Extend Time Setfor Trial is GRANTED; 
2. Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude all Evidence, Testimony and 
Argument Regarding Defendants' Knowledge of the State's Project is 
GRANTED; however, the State can attempt to show bad faith; 
3. Defendants' Motion in Limine to Allow into Evidence the Deposition Testimony 
of Clarence Pomroy is GWPLWITED per the requirements as illuminated by 
the Court at oral hearing; 
4. Defendants' Motion to Compel is DEWBllED; 
5. Defendants' Motion in Limine for an Order That a Partial Settlement in an 
Adjacent Project Cannot be Testified to by One ofthe State's Appraisers, John 
Dillman, is GRANTED; 
6. Defendants' Motion to Exclude all Evidence, Testimony and Argument 
Regarding the Development of Subject Property with Adjacent Properties is 
PARTIALLY GRANTED only to speculation; 
7. Defendants' Motion to Exclude all Evidence and Testimony Regarding Special 
Benefits is DENIED; 
8. Plaintiff's Motion to Bifurcate is DENIED; 
9. Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude References to Taxes, Taxpayers and 
Public Funds is GRANTED; 
10. Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Appraisal Reports is GRANTED; 
11. Plaintiff's Second Motion in Limine is DENlED if4 PdRT as to the Order 
of Condemnatioi~ and GRANTED EN PART' as it pertains to any 
statements made by Professor McDonald as to what the law is; 
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12. Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclzide any Evidence and Testimony 
Regarding the Cost to Cure Method is GRANT ED as to testimony 
concerning what the Twin Falls City Council would have required if an 
appIication would have been submitted to them by the property owners; 
13. Defendants Request to Tale Judicial Notice of This Courts File, Records in State 
v. KLSBM, L.P., et. al., State v. Lazy]. Ranch, Inc. and State v. BCMG.W 
Limited Partnership Purstiant to Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 201 is ILBENIIEIIP; 
14. Defendants' Motion in Limine to Allow Evidence and Testimony Regarding a 
Collateral Issue is GMMTED; 
15. Plaintiff's First Motion in Limine is GRANTED; 
16. Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Roger Dunlap is RESERVED 
to Trial. 
COMGLUSIBN 
Based upon the arguments presented, this court denies, grants and 
reserves rulings 011 the various pre-trial motions as outlined above. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
4. 
Dated this.& day of May, 2007 
/ / District Judge 
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I, Sharie Cooper, hereby certify that on the& day of May, 2007, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision and Order was mailed, 
postage paid, and/or hand-delivered to the following persons: 
Ms. Heather A. Cunningham Mr. Joseph D. Mallet 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & Deputy Attorney General 
COX Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 1583 P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83701 Boise, Idaho 83707-1129 
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E DON coPPLe - ISB if 1085 
HEATHER A. CUNNLNGI-IAM - ISB # 5480 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX 
Attorneys at Law 
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza 
199 North Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 600 
Post OfficeBox 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-3658 
Facsimile: (208) 386-9428 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership 
and Lazy J. Ranch, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE: STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., 
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN MCIKJGH 
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C. 
MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL. 
MILLER and JOHN X COMBO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
) CASE NO. CV 04-6336 
) 
1 DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S 
) PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
) 
) 
1 
) 
) 
1 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J. RANCH, 
1 
INC. 1 
1 
Defendants. 1 
* * * 
TO: THE HONORABLE JUDGE HIGER, District Judge: 
DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 1 
r) ,? 
i, J 
The Defendant, Canyon Vista, presents herewith instructions to the jury which they respectfully 
request that the Court include in the instructions to be given the jury in this case. Furnished herewithare 
the original requested instructions which are numbered. 
DATED this 25"' day of May, 2007. 
DAVISON. COPPLE. COPPLE & COX 
Attorneys for Defe;da@ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 25" day of May, 2007, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
was servedupon the following by the method indicated below: 
Joseph Mallet U.S. MAIL 
Deputy Attorney General x ~ a n d  Delivery 
Idaho Transportation Department - FacsimileTra~ismission 
331 1 West State Street Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129 
, 
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PRE VOlR DlRE INSTRUCTIONS 
DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 3 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. I 
You have been summoned as prospectivejurors in the lawsuit now beforeus. The first thing we 
do in a trial is to select 12 jurors and, perhaps, one or two alternate jurors from among you ladies and 
gentlemen. 
I am the judge in charge of the courtroom and this trial. The deputy clerk of court marks the trial 
exhibits and administers oaths to you jurors and the witnesses. The bailiff will assist me in maintaining 
courtrooln order and will arrange for your meals after this case bas been submitted to you for decision 
The cout  reporter will keep a verbatim account of all maters of record during the trial. 
To assist both you and the attorneys with this process of selection of a jury, I will introduce you to 
the pasties and attorneys and tell you in brief what this lawsuit is about. 
The party who brings a lawsuit is called the "plaintiff." In this suit the plaintiff is the Idaho 
Transportation Board. The plaintiffis represented by lawyers, Karl D. Voet and Joseph Mallet. Deputy_ 
Attorney General for the State of Idaho. The party against whom a lawsuit is brought is called the 
"defendant." In this suit the defendants are Canvon Vista, a Family Limited Partnership. Lazy J Ranch, 
Inc. has disclaimedany interest in this case The defendants are represented by legal counsel, 
Copple and Heather A. Cunningham of the firm Davison, Copple. Copple & Cox of Boise. Idaho. 
This is a civil case illvolving eminent domain "Eminent Domain" is a term which refers to the 
taking of private land bv the government for public use. In this case, the Defendants, own property located 
on Pole Line Road in Twin Falls, Idaho. The Plaintiff. the Idaho Transportation Board, filed this action on 
December 28,2004, to take a portion of Defendants' property. "Condenmation" is the lepal term for a 
taking by eminent domain 
A trial starts with the selectionof a fair, impartialjury. To that end the court and the lawyers will 
ask each of you questions lo discover whether you have any information concerning the case or any 
opinions or attitudes which either of the lawyers believe might cause you to favor or disfavor some part of 
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the evidence or one side or the other. The questions may probe deeply into your attitudes, beliefs, and 
experiences, but they are not intended to embarrass you. If you do not hear or understand a question, you 
should say so. If you do understand the question, you should answer it freely. The clerk of the court will 
now swear you for the jury examination. 
Previous D J I  1 
GWEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
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PRE EVIDENTIARY INSTRUCTIONS 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 
Ladies and gentlemen, we are about to begin the trial o f  a lawsuit. Some o f  you may be unfamiliar 
with the procedures in which you are about to participate; and I am going, therefore, to outline briefly for 
you how this trial will proceed. 
Now that the jury is selected and sworn, the court will read to you some o f  your instructions. 
Then, the attorneys will make opening statements; or t h e w  attoiney may, i f  he wishes, save his 
opening statement until later. In an eminent domain case such as this, the Defendants have the right to 
give its ooenine; statement first. The opening statement is intended to inform you about the party's case, 
and what they claim, and what evidence they intend to produce for you. The opening statemerd is not 
evidence, however. 
Then each side offers evidence to support his claim. The Defendants proceed first and offer all 
their evidence. Then the Plaintiff proceeck to offer all its evidence on its claims. 
After all o f  the evidence is in, I will read to you the rest o f  your instructions. In those instructions I 
will tell you what the law is and will tell you what you will have to decide. 
Then the trial concludes with the arguments o f  the lawyers for both side. 
Finally, you will be taken to a place where you can deliberate on your verdict in privacy. 
Slate v. McGill, 79 ID 467, 321 P2d 595 (1958) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
DEFENDANTS' MQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to this case. It is 
your duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these instructions to those facts, and in this 
way to decide the case. Your decision should be based upon a rational and objective assessment of the 
evideiice. It should not be based on sympathy or prejudice. 
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessaryto decide the case, and it is your duty to 
follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as a whole, not picking out one and 
disregarding others. The order in which these instructions are given or the manner in which they are 
numbered has no significance as to the importance of any of them. If you do not understand ail instructio~h 
you may send a note to me through the bailiff, and I will try to clarify or explain the point further. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This evidence 
consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and any stipulated or 
admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of attorneys may help you understand the evidence and 
apply the instructions, what they say is not evidence. If an attorney's argument or remark has no basis in 
the evidence, you should disregard it. 
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during the trial, I 
sustained an objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer it, or to an offered exhibit 
without receiving it into evidence. My rulings are legal matters, and are solely my responsibility. You 
must not speculate as to the reason for aiiy objection, which was made, or my ruling thereon, and in 
reaching your decision you may not consider such a question or exhibit or speculate as to what the aiiswer 
or exhibit would have shown. Remember, a question is not evidence and should be considered only as it 
gives meaning to the aiiswer. 
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course of the trial. As 
the solejudges of the facts, you much determine what evidence you believe and what weight you attach to 
it. In so doing, you bring with you to this courtroomall of the experience and background of your lives. 
There is no magical formula for evaluation testimony. In your everyday affairs, you determine for 
yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how much weight you attach to what you are told. 
The considerations you use in making the inore important decisions in your everyday dealings are the same 
considerations you should apply in your deliberations in this case. 
IDJI 1 .oo 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVEFED 
OTHER 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions concerning the 
law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into evidence and any notes taken by you 
in the course of the trial proceedings. 
If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not thereby diverted from the 
witness or his testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself and not show them to other persons or 
jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of the trial 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
There are certain things you must not do during this trial: 
1. You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of the attorneys or their 
employees, or any of the witnesses. 
2. You must not discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to discuss the case 
with you. If anyone attempts to discuss the case with you, or to influence your decision in the case, you 
must report it to me proinptly. 
3. You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you retire to the jury room to 
deliberate at the close of the entire case. 
4. You must not make up your mind until you have heard all the testimony and have 
receivedmy instructions as to the law that applies to the case. 
5. You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gain a greater 
understanding of the case. 
6. You must not go to the place where any alleged event occurred. 
IDJI 1.03 
GIVEN 
REI;USED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
Menibers of the jury, I remind you that you are not to discuss this case among yourselves or with 
anyone else, nor to form ally opinion as to the merits of the case, until after I finally submit the case to you. 
D3JI 1 .03.1 
GIVEN 
REFUSED - 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
This lawsuit is a condemnation action brought under the govenmental power of eminent domain. 
In this case, the State of Idaho. Departmenl of Trans~ortationhas been authorized to acquire a portion of 
tlie real property belonging to the defendants for the purpose of constructing a limited access highway on 
Pole Line Road in Twin Falls. In addition thereto, ail the right of access to. from and between the ~ub l i c  
right of way and all of the contipuous remaining aroperty of Canyon Vista has been extinguished and 
prohibited except ibr access, if any, as shown on the oroiect olans 
Under our law, no private property may be taken though the power of eminent domain without tile 
payment ofjust compensation. The sole issue for your determination is the amount to be paid to the 
property owner as just compensation. 
IDJI 7.01.1 (modified as noted). 
GWEN 
REFUSED 
MODLFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
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DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
Just compensation means the fair market value of the property taken, together with any direct 
damages suffered by the defendant, all measured as of December 28,2004. 
The guiding principle of just compensation is reimbursement to the defendant for the property 
interest taken. The defendant is entitled to be put in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had 
not been taken. He must be made whole but is not entitled to more. 
IDJI 7.05.5 (modified as noted). 
United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943) 
People ex rel. Pub. Wks. v. Lynbar, Inc. (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 870, 880 
Utah StateRoad Comm'n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 833 (Utah 1984) 
Lange v. State, 547 P.2d 282, Washington 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODPIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 14 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
In this case, the defendant has the burden of proving that the just compensation for the taking of its 
property exceeds the sum of $327,000, which is the highest amount forjust compensation presented in this 
trial by the plaintiff, Statc of Idallo. Since the condemning authority has conceded this value, your verdict 
should not be for an amount less than the amount of $327,000. 
JDJI 7.03 
GWEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED - 
COVEFCED 
OTHER 
DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 15 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression "if you 
find"" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably true than not 
true. 
IDJI 1.20.1 
GWEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED SIIRY INSTRUCTIONS - 16 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
WSTRUCTION NO. 11 
The term "fair market value" means the cash price at which a willing seller would sell and a willing 
buyer would buy the subject property, in an open marketplace free of restraints, taking into account the 
highest and most profitable use of the properly: 
It presumes that the seller is desirous oT selling, but is under no cornpulsio~l to do so, and that the 
buyer is desirous of buying, but is under no compulsion to do so. 
It presumes that both parlies are fully informed knowledgeable and fully aware of all the relevant 
market conditions and the highest and best potential use of the property, and are basing their decisions 
accordingly. 
It presumes that the market is open and competitive, and that the subject property has been 
exposed to the market for a reasonable time. 
IDJI 7.09 
GIVEN 
RBFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 17 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
The phrase "highest and best use" means the lughest and most profitable use for which the property is 
adaptable or needed in the reasonably near future. Highest and best use does not necessarily depend upon 
the uses to which the property is devoted; rather, all uses for which the property is suitable should be 
considered. 
State ex rel, Symms v. City of Mountain Home, 
94 ID 528,493 P.2d 387 (1972) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 18 
DEFEmANTS' REQUEST 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
If you find from the evidence that the fair market value of the property condemned in this case 
increased or decreased because of the prospect of condemnation, you should disregard any such influence 
and your award should be based on the value of the property as it would be at the timeofthe talcing if it 
had not been subjected lo the threat of condemnation. In other words, the just compensation that is due the 
owner for the taking of his or her property should be the value of the property as it would have beell at the 
time of the taking uninfluenced by the fact that it was to be taken in this proceeding. 
Florida Eminent Domain Jury Instruction 5 11.10 
Threat of Condemnation (Project Influence;) 
Langston v. City ofMiamiBeach, 242 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971); 
State Road Dept. v. Chicone, 158 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1963). 
City ofPhoenix v. Clauss, 177 Ariz. 566,568, 869 P.2d 1219, 1221 (App. 
1994) 
Town of Paradise Valley v. Young Financial Services, 
Inc., 177 Ariz. 388,868 P.2d 971 (Ct. App. 1993) 
City of Sparks v. Armstrong, 103 Nev. 619,748 P.2d 7 (1987) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 19 
DEFENDMTS' REQUEST 
INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
In the State of Idaho the law provides that any incorporated city or town may make and enforce, 
within its limits, all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with the general 
laws of the State. The power of a city only exists within its boundaries 
Idaho Constitution, Article XII, Sec 2 
Blaha v CilyofEagle, 134 ID 770,9 P.3d 1236 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODlFED 
COVERED - 
OTI-fER 
DEFENDANT CANYON VYSTPI'S PROPOSED JVRY INSTRUCTIONS - 20 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
Under Idaho Law a planned Unit Develop~nent is permitted in cities as follows: 
As part of or separate from the zoning ordinance, each governing board may provide, by ordinance for the 
processing of applications for planned unit development permits. A planned unit development may be 
defined as an area of land in which a variety of residential, commercial, industrial and other land uses are 
provided for under single ownership or control. Pla~u~ed unit development ordinances may include, but are 
not limited to, requirements for minirnwn area, pennitted uses, ownership, common open space, utilities, 
density, arrangements of land uses on a site and petmit processing. 
I.C. 67-6515 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED - 
COVERED 
OTHER 
DEFENDANT CANYON VZSTA'S PROPOSED JURY WSTRUCTIONS - 21 
DEFENDANTS' REQUEST 
INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
In determining the fair marketvalue of property, you may consider not only the opinions of the 
various witnesses who testified as to marltetvalue, but also all other evidence in the case which may aid in 
determining market value, such as location of the property, the surroundings and general enviromnent, any 
peculiar suitability of the property for particular uses, and the reasonable probabilities as to future potential 
uses, if any, for which the property is or would be suitable or physically adaptable, all as showll by the 
evidence in the case to have existed on December 28,2004. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY NSTRUCTIONS - 22 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
In determining what compensation should be paid for damages, if any, to the remainder of the 
property, you should take into coilsiderationthe uses for which the land is adaptable before and after the 
taking, the characterand quality of the property, the shape and condition in which the remaining property is 
left, the convenieilce of using the property before and after the taking, and such other factors as you find 
would affect the market value of the property. 
IDJT 7.16.1 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 23 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
The road construction involved in this case will result in what is known as a controlled or limited 
access facility Such facilityis a highway or road especially designed to expedite tlxough traffic, a highway 
or road which highway users and occupants of abutting property shall have only a controlled right of access. 
The right of access to and fro~n an existing highway is one of the incidents of ownership of the land 
abutting thereon. It may be regulated but not taken away without the payment of compe~~sation therefore 
The taking of such right of access is a factor that you should consider in determining the market value of the 
remainder. 
Pattern lnstnictions for Kansas 2d 11.1 3 
Smith v. State Highway Comm, 346 P.2d 259, 185 Kan. 445 (1959) 
Stale v. Fonberg, 80 ID 269,328 P.2d 60 
Ferris v. City of Twin Falls, 81 ID 583,586,347 P.2d 996, 998 
(1959) 
HadJeldv. State, 86 ID 561, 566,388 P.2d 397,702 (1958) 
Hughes v. State, 80 ID 286,295, 328 P.2d 397,402 (1958) 
Mabe v. State, 83 ID 222,227,360 P.2d 799, 801-802 (1961) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED - 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 24 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 19 
The measure of damages for the impairment of a right of access to a highway upon which the 
property of an owner abuts is the difference between the fair market value of the property immediately before 
the taking, and the fair market value of the same property immediately after the taking of the access. The 
basis of the damages awarded is not the value of the right of access to the highway, but rather the difference 
in the value of the property before and after the taking of the access, and this in turn is based upon the 
highest and best use to which the land involved is suitable before and after the taking. 
LobdeNv. State, 89 ID 559,407 P.2d 135 (1965). 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODPIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 25 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
DJSTRUCTION NO. 20 
Just compensation is the difference between the market value of the entire property before the taking 
and the market value of the remainder after the acquisitio~& together with any special damages caused by the 
taking, measured as of December 28,2004. 
IDJI 7.16 
GWEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 26 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 21 
Severance damages may arise where the property being taken is only part of a larger parcel 
belonging to the defendant. Severance darnageconsists of either or both of the following. 
a. A diminution in the value of the remainder caused by the taking or severance of the parcel 
taken from the remainder. 
b. A diminution in the value of the reminder caused by the construction upon and use put to 
the property taken. 
Severance damages are calculated by ascertaining the fair market value of the remainder immediately 
before the taking, and deducting from this value of the fair market value which results after the severance of 
the part taken and after the construction of the project in the manner proposed by the plaintiff. 
IDJI 7.16.5 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTI-IER 
DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 27 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 22 
In this case there is evidence of damage and a decrease in the market value of the Defendant's 
remaining land which has occurred as a result ofthe taking and the use lo which the Idaho Deparlment of 
Transportation intends to put the property. 
Market value adjusts to consider the possibility of restoring the damaged property lo the same 
relative position in which it stood before the taking and evidence of the cost to cure the damage to the 
remaining property may be considered. However, any proposed evidence to restorethe property must be 
limited to that which can be done within the existing boundaries of the property. 
The measure of damage adopted should be the one that produces the lesser damage amount. 
State v. Dunclick, 77 Idaho 45, 286 P.2d 11 12 (1955) 
St. Patrick's Church v. State, 294 N.Y.S.2d 275 (1968) 
Department of Highways v. Intermountain Term Co., 435 P.2d 391, 
Colorado, (1968) 
Utah Department of Transportation v. Rayco, 599 P2d 481, Utah 
Mulkey v. State ofFlo,ida, 338 S.2d 1062, Florida, (1984) 
Gluckman v. State ofN.Y., 325 N.Y.S.2d 99, (1971) 
5 Nichols on Eminent Domain #I 8.1 8 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 28 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCITON NO. 23 
Damages to the Defendants remaining property is to be assessed once and for all time. You may 
consider all uses to which the property taken may reasonably he put by the State of Idaho. You may assume 
the worst possible effect on the remainder of the property that the full extent of the legal rights acquired 
would apply, 
Crane v. City ofHavrison, 40 ID 229,234,232 Pac. 578. (1925) 
Powell v. McKelvey, 56 ID 291, 53 P.2d 626 (1935) 
Reisenauer v. State Dept. ofHighw., 120 ID 36, 813 P.2d 375 (1991) 
Idaho Etc. Ry. Co. v. Columbia Etc. Synod., 20 ID 568, 119 Pac. 60 (191 1) 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTI-IER 
DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 29 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 24 
You were taken out to view the premises involved in tics case. What you observed there is not to be 
considered evidence. You should consider your view of the premises only as a means of understanding and 
applying the evidence produced here in trial. . 
ID51 1.26.2 
GWEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED - 
OTHER 
DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JVRY INSTRUCTIONS - 30 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 25 
In deciding this casc, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or decide ay question by 
chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. In determininp the amount of iust com~ensali& 
be awarded or, you may not agree in advance to average the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the 
method of determining the amount of the just com~ensation award. 
IDJI 1.09 (modified as noted) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 31 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 26 
If it becomes necessaryduring your deliberations to communicate with me, you may send a note 
signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate with me by any means other 
than such a note. 
During your deliberatio~ls, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on any of the 
questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by me. 
IDJI 1.11 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTI-IER 
DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 32 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 27 
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you regarding matters that 
you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few miiiutes counsel will present 
their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to the jury room for your deliberations. 
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the attitude and 
conduct ofjurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the outset of deliberations, it is 
rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of opinion on the case or to stat how he or she 
intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, one's sense of pride may be aroused and there may be 
reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or 
advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment and 
declaration of the truth. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the objective of reaching an 
agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of you must decide this case 
for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and consideration of the case with your fellow 
jurors. 
IDJI 1.13 
GIVEN - 
REFUSED - 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 33 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 28 
Members of the July: In order to return a verdict, it is necessarythat at least time-fourths of the jury 
agree. Your verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror agreeing to it. 
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an 
ageement, if you can do so without violence to individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case for 
yourself, but do so only after an impartial considerationof the evidence with your fellowjurors. In the course 
of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if convinced it is 
erroneous. But do not surrender your honest convictionas to the weight or effect of evidence solely because 
of the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. 
You are not partisans. You are judges - judges of the facts. Your sole interest is to ascertain the 
truth from the evidence in the case. 
IDJI 1.13.1 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
DEFEiWANT CANYON VISTA'S'PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 34 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 29 
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who will preside over your 
deliberations. Appropriate ibrrns of verdict will be submitted to you with any instrnctioils. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon as nine or lnore 
of you shall have agreed upon a verdict, fill it out and have it signed. If your verdict is unanimous, your 
foreman alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the entire jury, agree, tlle~l those so agreeing will 
sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict, notify the bailiff, who will then return you 
into open court. 
IDJI 1.15.1 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 35 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 30 
The bailiffis now going lo escort you to the premises involved in this case. At the premises, you are 
not to malceany measurenients, perform any tests, or conduct any demonstrations. The view is not to be 
considered as evidence in this case, but is provided only to help you understand the evidence. 
lDJl 1.26.1 
GrVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JVRY INSTRUCTIONS - 36 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JOSEPH D. MALLET 
KARL D. VOGT 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
33 11 West State Street 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8815 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
ISB #5817 
ISB #5015 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWTN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., 1 
DARRELL V MANNING, R. JAMES 
COLEMAN, BRUCE S WEENEY, 
MONTE C. McCLURE, GARY BLICK, ) Case No. CV-04-6336 
NEIL MILLER and JOIHN X. COMBO, 1 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 1 
1 
Plaintiff, j 
) PLAINTIFFS' PRELIMINARY JURY 
-vS- j INSTRUCTIONS AND JURY VERDICT 
) FORM 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCI-I, 
INC. 1 
Defendants. 1 
The Plaintiff, State of Idaho, by and through its attorneys of record, submits to the Court 
m ,  its proposed instructions to the jury and jury verdict form. Plaintiff respectfully requests that the 
3- I Court include these instructions and form in its instructions to be given to the jury in this case. 
1 ;. r PLAINTIFFS' PRELIMINARY JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND JURY VERDICT FORM - 1 .  a, , , ,.> 
Attached are the original instructions and a copy of an email sent to Mr. Loren Anderson, 
Judges' Law Clerk, relaying a numbered set of proposed jury instructions, with citation 
references and an un-numbered clean copy set for his use. 
DATED this s y d a y  ofMay, 2007. 
~ k p u t ~  Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of May, 2007, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
E. Don Copple ~ u . s .  Mail 
Heather A. Cunningham nI-Iand Delivered 
Davison, Copple, Copple, & Cox movernight Mail 
PO Box 1583 BTelecopy (Fax) 
Boise ID 83701 
QJ J o s B H  MALLET b.~~w 
~ e & t ~  Attorney General 
PLAINTIFFS' PRELIMINARY JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND JURY VERDICT FORM - 2 
.i :" 6 
JUDGE'S STOCK 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to this case. 
It is your duty to determine the facts, to apply the Iaw set forth in these instructions to lhose facts, 
and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be based upon a rational and objective 
assessment of the evidence. It should not be based on sympathy or prejudice. 
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, and it is your 
duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as a whole, not picking 
out one and disregarding others. The order in which these instructions are given or the inanner in 
which they are nunbered has no significance as to tl~e importance of any of them. If you do 1101 
understand an instruction, you may send a note to me through the bailiff, and I will try to clarify or 
explain the point further. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This 
evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and any 
stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of the attorneys may help you 
understand the evidence and apply the instn~ctions, what they say is not evidence. If an attorney's 
argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, you should disregard it. 
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during the trial, I 
sustained ail objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer it, or to an offered 
exhibit without receiving it into evidence. My rulings are legal matters, and are solely nly 
responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any objection, which was made, or my 
ruliilg thereon, and in reaching your decision you may not consider such a question or exhibit or 
speculate as to what the answer or exhibit would have shown. Remember, a question is not 
evidence and sliould be considered only as it gives meaning to the answer. 
[There were occasions where an objection was made after an answer was given or the 
remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection I instructed that the answer or remark be 
stricken, or directed that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it from your minds. In 
your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, but must treat it. as though you 
had never heard it.] 
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course of the 
trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must detennine what evidence you believe and what 
weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this coutrooln all of the experience and 
background of your lives. There is no magical formula for evaluating testimony. In your everyday 
affairs, you detennine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how much weight 
you attach to what you are told. The considerations you use in making the more important decisions 
in your everyday dealings are the same considerations you should apply in your deliberations in this 
case. 
IDJI2d 1.00 -Introductory iilstruction to jury 
Comment: 
This instruction is a revision of IDJI2d 100, to clarify the language and eliminate 
unnecessary verbiage. It also supersedes and replaces IDJ12d 120 and 121. 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
JUDGE'S STOCK 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions 
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into evidence 
and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings. 
IDJ12d 1.01 -Deliberation procedures (modified) 
Comments: 
See "Note" instruction as second part of this IDJI. 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
JUDGE'S STOCK 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. - 
If you wish, you may take notes to help you remember what witnesses said. If you do 
take notes, please keep them to yourself until you and your fellow jurors go to the jury room to 
decide the case. You should not let note-taking distract you so that you do not hear other 
answers by witnesses. When you leave at night, please leave your notes in the jury room. 
If you do not take notes, you should rely on your own memory of what was said and not 
be overly influenced by the notes of other jurors. In addition, you cannot. assign to one person 
the duty of taking notes for all of you. 
IDJ12d 1 .O1 - Deliberation procedures (modified) 
Comments: 
Continuation of part of 1.0 1 extra. 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
JUDGE'S STOCK 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. - 
There are certain things you must not do during this trial: 
1. You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of the attorneys or their 
employees, or any of the witnesses. 
2 You must not discuss the case with anyone, or perinit anyone to discuss the case 
with you. If anyone attempts to discuss the case with you, or to influence your decision in the case, 
you rnust report it to me promptly. 
3. You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you retire to the jury rooin to 
deliberate at the close of the entire case. 
4. You must not make up your mind until you have heard all of the testimony and have 
received my instructions as to the law that applies to the case. 
5. You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gain a greater understanding 
of the case. 
6. You must not go to the place where any alleged event occurred. 
IDJI2d 1.03 -Admonition to jury 
Comment: 
This instruction is an outline of the ele~nents ofLen stated to jurors at the beginning of a trial. 
See, IRCP 47(n). It is perhaps preferable to use the elements of this iilstruction as a guide for a Inore 
inforinal explanation to the jury of the necessary conduct expected of them, including reasons and 
exa~nples as appropriate. 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
JUDGE'S STOCK 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. - 
Any statement by me identifying a claim of a party is not evidence in this case. I have 
advised you ofthe claims of the parties merely to acquaint you with the issues to be decided. 
IDJI2d 1.05 - Statement of claims not evidence 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED 
JUDGE'S STOCK 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. - 
The following facts are not in dispute: 
I) Through the exercise of eminent domain, the State of Idaho has acquired the following 
property from the Defendants: 
a. A fee interest in 1.8784 acres of land (81,823 sq. ft.) for highway right-of-way and 
also a bike path under the Perrine Coulee Bridge. 
b. A permaneilt ilrigatior! and slope easement over 0.3207 acres of land (13,970 sq. fir 
c. A temporary construction easement over 0.2145 acres of land 19,344 so. ft.). 
2) The State of Idaho has the right of eminent domain. 
3) The use to which the subiect property is to be applied is a use authorized by law. 
4) The taking of the subiect propem is necessarv for such use. 
5) The State of Idaho has s o u ~ h t  in good faith to purchase the subiect wopertv sou~ht  o be 
IDJI2d 1.07 -Facts not in dispute (modified as noted) 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
JUDGE'S STOCK 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. - 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. The law makes no distinction between 
direct and circumstantial evidence. Each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is 
respected for such convincing force as it may carry. 
IDJI2d 1.24.1- Circu~nstailtial evidence without definition 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
JUDGE'S STOCK 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
A witness who has special Itnowledge, in a particular matter may give his or her opinion 
on that matter. 111 determining the weight to he given such opinion, you should consider the 
qualifications and credibility of the witness and the reasons given for his or her opinion. You are 
not bound by such opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it entitled. 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
JUDGE'S STOCK 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. - 
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression "if 
you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded, that the proposition is Inore probably 
true than not tlue 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
-- 
District Judge 
JUDGE'S STOCK 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
If during the trial I may say or do anything which suggests to you that I am included to favor 
the claims or position of any party, you will not permit yourself to be influenced by any such 
suggestion. I will not express nor intend to express, nor will I intend to intimate, any opinion as to 
wl~ich witnesses are or are not worthy of belief, what facts are or are not establisl~ed; or what 
inferences should be drawn &om the evidence. If any expression of mine seems to indicate as 
opinion relating to any of these matters, I instruct you to disregard it. 
Give11 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
JUDGE'S STOCK 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. - 
It is highly probable that during the course of this trial, it will be necessary for me to excuse 
you and ask that you wait in the jury room while counsel for the parties and I discuss and try to 
resolve disputes over the admissibility of evidence, the propriety of proposed juiy instructions, or 
other important legal issues that may affect the trial. On occasion, I may declare an early recess, or 
have you come in later than nonnal in order not to keep you waiting while we do this. 
Let me assure you that while you are waiting, we are workii~g. Let me also assure you that 
both the attorneys and I know that your time is valuable, and understand that delays which keep you 
waiting can be frustrating. Both they and I will do everything reasonably possible to expedite the 
presentation of evidence so that you can complete your duties and return to your normal lives as 
soon as possible. I know that you understand that these proceedings are extremely important to the 
parties, and your patience will help ensure that the final outcome is just and legally correct. 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
JUDGE'S STOCK 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
You were advised earlier that twelve (12) members of this panel will decide this case. The 
one among you who& the a l t e r n a t e d  will be selected by lot and will be notified after the final 
-
arguments are presented in the case. At the time the alternate w r  will be excused, subject to recall 
if necessary 
(modified as noted) 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. - 
The involved in this case is entitled to the same fair and unprejudiced treatment that an 
individual would be under lilte circumstances. You should decide this case with the same 
impartiality that you would use in deciding a case between individuals 
IDJ12d 1.02 Corporate parties (modified as noted) 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. - 
In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or decide any 
question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If money damages are to be 
awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may not agree in advance to average the sum 
of each individual juror's estimate as the method of determining the amount of the damage award or 
percentage of negligence. 
IDJI2d 1.09 - Quotient verdicts 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. - 
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you regarding 
matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few minutes 
counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to tihe jury room for your 
deliberations. 
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the attitude 
and co~lduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the outset of 
deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of opinion on the 
case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, one's sense of 
pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it is 
wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for me, 
there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the objective of 
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of you 
must decide this case for yourselc but you should do so only after a discussion and co~~sideration of
the case with your fellow jurors 
IDJI2d 1.13 - Collcluding remarks 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who will preside over 
your deliberations. 
Appropriate forms of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Use only the 
oncs conforming to your coi~clusions and return the others unused. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. If your verdict is 
unanimous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than thc cntire jury, agree, 
then those so agreeing will sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict, you will notify the bailiff, who will 
then return yon into open court. 
IDJI 1.15.1 Completion of verdict iorm - general verdict 
Given 
Refused 
Modkfied 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. - 
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who will preside over 
your deliberations. 
An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Follow the 
directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of you by the instructions on 
the verdict form. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon as nine 
or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in the verdict, you should fill 
it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary that the same nine agree on each question. 
If your verdict is unanimous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the 
entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the bailiff, who will 
then return you into open court. 
IDJ12d 1.15.2 - Completion of verdict fonn on special interrogatories 
Comment: 
Two forms are set forth, one for use with a general verdict and one for use with special 
interrogatories. There are still some ambiguities, such as exactly who signs the final verdict 
when the same jurors do not agree to each question. I-Iowever, pattern instructions drafted to fit 
every circumstance became too cumbersome. The committee determined that the above 
instruction was sufficient to meet the general case; that if an ambiguous circumstance arose 
which the jury could not work out for themselves, they could request further instructions from 
the court. 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. - 
You have now completed your duties as jurors in this case and are discharged with the 
sincere thanks of this Court. You inay now discuss this case with the attorneys or with anyone else. 
For your guidance, I instruct you that whether you talk to the attorneys, or to anyone else, is entirely 
your own decision. It is proper for you to discuss this case, if you want to, but you are not required 
to do so, and you may choose not to discuss the case with anyone at all. If you choose to talk to 
someone about this case, you inay tell them as much or as little as you like about your deliberations 
or the facts that influenced your decisions. If anyone persists in discussing the case over your 
objection, or becomes critical of your service, either before or after any discussion has begun, you 
may report it to me. 
IDJ12d 1.17 -Post verdict jury instruction 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
JUDGE'S STOCK 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. - 
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the 
expression "if you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the 
proposition is more probably true than not true. 
IDJI 1.20.1 - Burden of proof - preponderance of evidence 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. - 
Tlie bailiff is now going to escoil you to the premises involved in this case. At the premises, 
you are not to make any measurements, perform any tests, or conduct any demonstrations. The 
view is iiot to be considered as evidence in this case, but is provided only to help you understand the 
evidence. 
IDJI 1.26.1 -View of tlie premises, preliminary instruction 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
-- 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
JURY ENSTRUCTION NO. - 
You were taken out to view the premises involved in this case. What you observed there is 
not to be considered evidence. You should consider your view of the premises only as a means of 
understanding and applying the evidence produced here in trial. 
IDJI 1.26.2 - View of the premises, final instruction 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. - 
This lawsuit is a condemnation action brought under the governmental power of eminent 
domain. In this case, the State of Idaho has been authorized to acquire a certain strio of land along 
Pole Line Road, Twin Falls, Idaho belonging to the defendants, Canyon Vista Family Limited 
Partnershiu and Lazy J Ranch, Inc., for the purpose of building a divided four-lane highway, U.S. 
Highway 93, Twin Falls Alternate Route. Stage 1. 
Under our law, no private property may be taken through the power of eminent domain 
without the payment of just compensation. The sole issue for your determination is the just 
compensation to be paid to the defendants, Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership and Lazy J 
Ranch, Inc., by the plaintiff, State of Idaho. 
IDJI 7.01.1 - Explanation of eminent domain (modified as noted.) 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. - 
In this case, the defendants have the burden of proving that the just compensation for the 
taking of their property exceeds the sum of $263,800, which is the amount for just compensation 
presented in this trial by the State of Idaho. Since the condeliniing authority has conceded this 
value, your verdict should not be for an amount less than the amount of $263,800. 
IDJI 7.03 -Burden of proof (modified as noted) 
Comments: 
State ex re1 Moore v. Bastain, 87 Idaho 444 (1976); State v. McGill, 79 Idaho 467 (1958); 
State v. Dunclick, 77 Idaho 45 (1955) and Village of Lapwai v. Allieier, 69 Idaho 397(1949), hold 
that the condemnee (defendant) has the burden of proof. There should be no distinction between a 
direct condemnation and an indirect or inverse condemnation case, as in both cases the question of 
whether there has been a "talting" is an issue for the court, not the jury, thus in both cases the sole 
issue for the jury is that of just compensation. Further, in any issue tried in a couri, legal principle 
requires that someone have the "burden of proof." In a condemnation action, the burden oF proof 
should be on the defendant to prove that the just compensation is an amount greater than that 
offered or conceded by the state. 
In an inverse condem~lation case, the standard burden of proof instruction is appropriate, as 
there may be no concession of value by the condemning authority. 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. - 
Your sole task in this trial is to determine the amount of Just Comaensation due to the 
propei-ty owners. 
Just compensation means the fair market value o r  the property taken, measured as of 
December 28,2004 
In deciding Just Compensation, you are not to consider any interest that may be due, the 
amount of any party's attorney fees, exoert witness fees, or any other costs of litigation. The Judge 
will decide compensation for these items at the end of the trial and they are not be considered at all 
by you in your deliberations. 
IDJI 7.05 -Definition of "just conipensation" (modified as noted OR see separate 
jury instruction on fees and costs) 
Comments: 
This instruction applies to a total take with no elelnetit of severance damage. 
[Note: In a direct cotidelnnatio~i action, the date inserted in the instruction will be the date of 
issuance of tlie surnmons -- I.C. 5 7-712. In ail inverse condernnatio~i case, tlie date will be the actual date 
of taking as deterniined by the court.] 
The only issue for submission to the iury is the question of the value of tlie propertv sought to be 
taken or the alnoulit of compensation for tlie taking: all other factual issues are to be resolved bv the trial 
court. Flandro v. Seddon, 94 Idaho 94.0.943.500 P.2d 841. 844 (1972) 
"Since we (Supreme Court'l have held that an award of attorneys' fees and costs to a condetnnee 
in a conde~nnatioti proceeditig lies within tlie discretioti of the trial court. it is appropriate that we 
delineate some factors which the trial court should consider in exercising that discretion. Hence, we 
(Supreme Court) would deem that in considerinv tlie award of attorneys' fees to a condetnnee, a 
condemnor should have reasonably made a tilnely offer of settletnent of at least 90 per cent of the 
ultimate jury verdict." Ada Counfv Highway District v. Acarreazti. 105 Idaho 873, 673, P.2d 1067 (1983) 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. - 
In determining the fair market value of property, you may consider not only the opiniolls of 
the various witnesses who testified as to market value, but also all other evidence in the case which 
may aid in deter~liinillg market value, such as location of the property, the surroundings and general 
environment, ally peculiar suitability of the property for particular uses, and the reasonable 
probabilities as to future potential uses, if any, for which the property is or would be suitable or 
physically adaptable, all as shown by the evidence in the case to have existed on December 28, 
2004. 
IDJI 7.07 - Fair market value - factors to be considered (modified as noted) 
Comment: 
In a direct condemnatioll action, the date inserted in the instruction will be the date of 
issuance of the surnnlons -- I.C. 5 7-712; in an inverse condemnation case, the date will be the 
date of taking as determined by the court. City o f  Caldwell v. Roark, 92 Idaho 99 (1968), 
City of Mt. I-Iome, 94 Idaho 528 (1972) and Eagle Sewer Dist. v. Hormaechea, 109 Idaho 418 (App. 
1985). 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. - 
The term "fair market value" means the cash price at which a willing seller would sell and a 
willing buyer would buy the subject property, in an open marketplace free of restraints, taking into 
account the highest and most profitable use of the property. 
It presumes that the seller is desirous of selling, but is under no coinpulsion to do so, and 
that the buyer is desirous of buying, but is under no compulsion to do so. 
It presumes that both parties are hlly informed, knowledgeable and aware of all relevant 
market conditiolls and of the highest and best use potential of the property, and are basing their 
decisions accordingly. 
It presumes that the market is open and competitive, and that the subject property has been 
exposed to the market for a reasonable time. 
IDJI 7.09 -Definition of fair market value 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. - 
You may consider the owner's particular plan for developinent and use of the property only 
for tile purpose of determining uses for which the property is adaptable. 
IDJI 7.14 - Owner's development plan 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
In determining what compensation should be paid for damages, if any, to the remainder of 
the property, you should take into consideration the uses for which tlle land is adaptable before and 
after the taking, the character and quality of the property, the shape and condition in which the 
remaining property is left, t11e convenience of using the property before and after the taking, and 
such other factors as you find would affect the market value of the propeay 
IDJI 7.16.1 - Factors to be considered, partial take - severance da~nages 
Comments: 
This instruction is somewhat redundant to IDJI 7.07. Where there is no benefit claimed 
to the remainder, the approach of State v. Dunclick, Inc., 77 Idaho 45 (1955), of determining just 
compensation by subtracting the fair marltet value of the remainder from the fair marltet value of 
the whole before the take would eliminate t l~e  necessity for this instruction. Where, however, the 
parcel taken and the parcel remaining are separately valued, this instruction might be useful. 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. - 
In this case, you should detennine the just colnpensation as follows: 
First, determine the fair market value of the parcel being taken for the project, including all 
improvelnents thereon, as of December 28,2004. 
Next, determine the fair lnarket value of the remaining portion as it existed immediately 
before the take, and the fair lnarket value of this parcel as it will exist immediately after the talte, 
determined as of December 28.2004. In determining these values, you inay not consider the impact 
of the project in determining the value before the take, hut you should consider the impact of the . .  
project and any special benefits which will result from the construction of the improveinents in the ... 
manner proposed by the plaintiff after the take, in determining the value of the remainder of the 
property after the take. 
If you detennine that the fair market value of the remainder after the take is less than the fair 
, . 
. . 
market value of the remainder before the take, and that the dilninution of value is because of the 
take, the difference is considered severance damage and the properly owner is entitled to this 
difference as part of the just compensation. 
. . 
. .. 
If you detennine that the fair value of the remainder after the take is greater than the value 
before the talte, because of benefits conferred upon the property by the project or because of the 
construction of the improvements in the manner proposed by the plaintiff, then there are no 
severance darnages and no other adjustment to value. Do not offset any excess in value applicable 
to the remainder, or property not taken, against the value of the property taken. 
Finally, determine whether the defendants have incurred any special danlages or costs on 
account of the taking, and the amounts thereof. 
Combine the amounts you find under each of the elements in this instruction to find the 
amount ofjust coinpensation that is due from the plaintiffto the defendants in this case. 
IDJI 7.18 - Partial take with severance damage and a benefit to the remainder (modified as 
noted) 
Comment: 
Idaho Code § 7-71 1; State v. Collier, 93 Idaho 19 (1969); Orofino v. Swayne, 95 Idaho 
125 (1972). 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. - 
You have heard testimony related to both city ordinances and provisions of a city 
coinprehensive plan. I11 your deliberations, when considering the oroper weight to give these 
provisions, you must rcmernber that only the city ordinance has the force and effect of law. In 
contrast, a city's colnprehensive plan does not operate a zoning law, but rather serves to guide 
a n d o v e r m n e n t a l  agencies responsible for inaltiiig zoning decisions. The purpose of 
a coinprehensive plan is to reflect the desirable goals and obiectives or desirable future situations 
for the land within a iurisdiction. 
Comments: 
"Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its limits, all 
such local ~ol ice ,  sanitary and other regulatiol~s as are not in conflict with its charter or with the 
general laws." Idaho Const. Art. XII, 6 2 
"Cities shall make all such ordinances, bylaws, rules, regulations and resolutions not 
inconsistent with the laws of the state of Idaho as inay be expedient, in addition to the special 
powers in this act granted, to maintain the peace, good government and welfare of the 
corporation and its trade, commerce and industry." I.C. 6 50-302(1) 
"A comprehensive olan reflects the "desirable goals and objectives, or desirable future 
situations" for the land within a jurisdiction. I.C. 6 67-6508. This Court has held that a 
comorehensive plan does not operate as legally controlling zoning law. but rather serves to guide 
and advise the governmental agencies responsible for making zoning decisions." Urrutia v. 
Blaine Co., 134 Idaho 353,357-58,2 P.3d 738,742-43 (2000) 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. - 
Your sole task in this trial is to determine the a~nouilt of Just Colnpensation due to the 
property owners. 
In deciding Just Compensation, you are not to consider any interest that may be due, the 
amount of any party's attorney fees, expert witness fees, or any other costs of litigation. The Judge 
will decide compensation for these items at the end of the trial and they are not be considered at a11 
by you in your deliberations. 
Comments: 
mote: This is intended to be used should the Court want IDJI2d 7.05 to remain 
unanended and give a fee and cost instruction separately.] 
The only issue for submission to the iury is the question of the value of the prooert~ 
sought lo be taken or thc amount of compensation for the taking: all other factual issucs are to be 
resolved by the trial court. Flandro v. Seddon, 94 Idaho 940,943,500 P.2d 841,844 11972) 
"Since we (Supreme CourQ have held that an award of attorneys' fees and costs to a 
condemnee in a condemnation proceeding lies within the discretion of the trial court, it is 
apuropriate that we delineate some factors which the trial court should consider in exercising that 
discretion. Hence, we (Supreme Court) would deem that in considerillv the award of attorneys' 
fees to a condemnee, a condemnor should have reasonably made a timely offer of settlement of 
at least 90 per cent of the ultimate iury verdict." Ada Counw Hi~hway  District v. Acarreaui, 
105 Idaho 873,673, P.2d 1067 (19831 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. - 
The compensatioll which must be paid for orouerty talcen by eminent domain does not 
necessarily depend upon the uses to which it is devoted at the time of the taking or on the 
planned use by the property owner; rather, all the uses for which the property is suitable should 
be considered in determining market value. It is the "highest and best use" of the property that 
you should consider when determining just compensation. 
The ''highest and best use" of a property is the reasonably orobable and legal use which is 
physically possible, appropriately supported, financially feasible. and that results in the h i M  
value. A potential highest and best use should be considered to the full extent that the prosoect 
of demand for such use affects the market value of the proverty. 
Comments: 
"Highest and best use. The reasonably orohable and legal use of vacant land or an 
improved propertL which is ahysically possible, appropriately supported, financially feasible, 
and that results in the highest value. The four criteria the highest and best use must meet are 
legal permissibility, physical possibility. financial feasibility, and maximum productivity." The 
Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal, 4"' 
"The compensation which must be paid for property taken by eminent domain does not 
necessarily dep-on the uses to which it is devoted at the time of the taking: rather, all the 
uses for which the property is suitable should he considered in determining lnarket value. 
"The highest and best use for which the property is adaptable and needed or likely to be 
needed in the reasonably near future is to be considered, not ilecessarily as a measure of value, 
but to the full extent that the prospect of demand for such use affects the lnarket value of the 
p r o p e r t v . . . I t r o p e r t y  is claisned to be adaptable is 
reasonably probable." Svmnzs v Cily ofMountain Home, 94 Idaho 528, 531, 493 P.2d 387, 389 
(1972)(internal citations omitted)). 
"It is the effect, if any, upon the fair market value on the date of taking which makes 
relevant the evidence of a possible rezoning of the property.. . . a prospect of rezonin~ which may 
aooear to be somewhat remote should, nevertheless, be considered by the court if it affects the 
fair market value of the property on the date of the taking. (citations omitted). It is this standard 
of relevance and nlateriality which the trial judge should employ in exercising his discretion to 
admit or exclude evidence offered to show ~ossible zoniilr, change." Ada CounO, Highway 
Distvict v. Mapwive, 104 Idaho 656, 659,662 P.2d 237,240 (1983) (citation omitted). 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. - 
In deciding whether a right to acccss was taken from the property owner, you must first 
find that the property had a right of direct access to Pole Line Road in the before condition. If 
you find it did not, no right to access has been taken and the owners are not cntitled to any 
compensation for a taking of access. 
If you find that the property owner had a riglit of direct access to Pole Line Road in the 
before condition. you then have to determine whether or not the remaining vehicular access to 
&roper@ is reasonable. If all rights to access the property wcre destroyed, or if the property 
was not left wit11 reasonable access afler the taking. then there was a talcilig of access which 
would entitle the property owner to compensation. Only then may you determine iust 
colnpensatioli for the taking of that access. 
"The condemnee never having had access to the new highway there is no easement or 
access taken in this proceeding. There can only be compensable damages for an existing 
easement, and when one does not exist, there is none to take. 
"Private rights relative to the use and entry of hi~hways may be regulated many ways. 
Where a property owner has no right of direct access to a highway, ilothin~ is talceii from him by 
the failure to give him such a right when the highway is constructed. (Cites Omitted)." State ex 
e i 9 5 8 ~  
"'We agree, however, with those courts which hold that where the property fronts on 
inore than one street, access may be denied, under particular circumstances, at one of the streets 
if adequate ineans of access remain to tlie owner at the otl~er street or streets. To us this seems a 
reasonable exercise of the power of the city to urovide for the public safety, co~~venie~ice and 
welfare under the conditions created by modern motorized traffic in a large city.' Schrunk,% 
Or. 63,408 P.2d 89.93 (19651." 
"In tlie instant case, there having beexi no destruction of vehicular access to the Merritt 
property, and the remaining vehicular access being reasonable, there was no taking of the 
Merritt's prowcrty which would entitle him to compensation." Mevritt v. State, 113 Idaho 142, 
145,742 P.2d 397,399-400 (1986). 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TI-IE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAI-10, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., 
DARRELL V MANNING, R. JAMES 1 
COLEMAN, BRUCE SWEENEY, 1 
MONTE C. McCLURE, GARY BLICIC, ) Case No. CV-04-6336 
NEIL MILLER and JOI3N X. COMBO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
) SPECIAL VERDICT 
Plaintiff, 
-VS- 
1 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH, ) 
INC. 1 
1 
Defendants. 1 
We the jury, find the amount of just compensation payable by the Plaintiff to the 
Defendants in the above-entitled matter to be as follows: 
Fair Market Value of the Entire Property 
Before the Highway Project: $ 
LESS 
Fair Marlcet Value of the Remainder of 
Property After the Highway Project: 
EQUALS FAIR MARKET VALUE of 
Real Property acquired: 
PLUS 
Severance Damages to the Remainder, 
if any: 
SPECIAL VERDICT - 1 
LESS 
Value of Special Benefits to the 
Remainder, if any: 
EQUALS 
Total Amount of Just Compensation: 
DATED this day of June, 2007. 
JURORS: 
Presiding Juror 
SPECIAI, VERDICT - 2 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JOSEPH D. MALLET 
KARI[, D. VOGT 
Depm ACtorpey General 
Idaho Transportation Depmen t  
33 11 Wesf Sfate Street 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8815 
Facsimile: (@8) 334-4498 
ISB #5817 
ISB 85015 
may Z Y  Z U U I  I Z : Z Y  
Counsel for Plaintiff 
IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OF ;THE FlFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF TEE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE C O W  OF TWIN FALLS 
TEE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., 
DAFSYEZX, v~UNNING, R. JAMBS 
) 
C O L E W ,  BRUCE SWEENEY, 
1 
MONTE C. McCLURE, GARY BLICK, 
1 ) Case No. CV-04-6336 
NEIL MLLBR and JOHN X. COMBO, 1 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 1 
) AMENDED PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED 
Plainti@ ) sURY lNSTRUCTION @IJX 7.03) 
' Defendants. 1 
The Plriintiff, State of Idaho, by and through its attorneys of rewrd, submits to the Court 
an Amended Proposed Jury Instruction (ID31 7.03). Plalnliff respectfully requests that the Court 
replace ID31 7.03 filed on May 25,2007 with Exhibit A attached hereto. The original instruction 
AMENDED PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION (CDJE 7.03) - 1 
. . . .  . 
t a X : Z U U J J 4 4 4 Y U  n a y  r u  LUUI i r : r u  
has a numeric typographical error and Plaintiff's respectiidly request this Instruction to be given 
to the jury in @is case. 
DATED this ~ 2 ,  of May  2067, 
~ & t y  Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Transportation 
4 I  BY CERTIFY that on the a day of May, 2007, I caused a true and conect 
copy of the above to be served to: 
E Don Copple ~ u , s :  Mail 
Heather Cwmhgham n ~ a n d  Delivered 
Davison Copple Copple & Cox Clovemight Mail 
P.O. Box 1583' m~elecopy (Fax) 386-9428 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
~ e ~ d t y  Attorney General 
Idabo Department of Transportation 
MNDEDPCAINTIFF'S . . ., . . PROPOSED JURY ,INSTRUCTION (IDJI 7.03) - 2 
may LY L U U I  ir:Ly 
PLAINTIFF'S RJIQUESWD 
... 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. - 
In this case, the defendants have the burden of proving that the just compensation for rhe 
taking of theii;property exceeds the sum of$202.230.00, which is the amouat for just compensation 
.. . 
presented in '&s tlial by the state of Idaho. Since the condemning authority has conceded this 
value; your vetdict should not be for an amomt less than the amount of $202.230.00. 
. . 
ID31 7.03 -Burden ofpro~f  (modified as noted) 
Cottunents: 
State ex re1 Moore v. Bastain, 87 Idaho 444 (1976); Slate v. McGill, 79 Idaho 467 (1958); 
State v. Dunclick, 77 Idaho 45 (1955) and ~ i l l a i e  of Lawwai v. AIligier, 69 Idaho 397(1949), hold 
that the condeignee (defendant) has the burden of proof. There should be no distinction between.a 
direct coniledation &id in i n k t  or inverse condemmtion case, as in both cases the question of 
whether thkre bas been a "taking" is an issue for the court, not the jury, thus in both cases the sole 
issue for the jiky js tbat ofjust compensation Further, in any issue kied in a court, legal principle 
requires that soheone have Zhe "burden of proof." In a condemnation action, the burden of proof 
should be onthe defendant to prove that the just compensation is an amount greater than that 
offered or corx~ded by the stab. 
l[n an iriverse condemnation case, the standard burden of proof instruction is appropriate, as 
there may be no concession of value by the condemning authority. 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
PLAIETTIFF'S REQUESTED 
... JURY ~ & T R U C T ~ O N  NO. - 
. . 
In this case, the defendants have the burden of that the just compensation for the 
taking of thejx property exceeds the sum of $202,230.00, which is the amount for just  omp pens at ion 
presented j.n:&his !+a1 by t$e State of Idaho. Since the condemning authority has conceded this 
value, your virdict should not be for an amount less than the amount of $202,230.00. 
w-=-""-- W-.---."I-~- elelk 
~- -~~ .~ - - . - - - - - - - - " -  Deputy ClQik 
IN THE D118TRICT COURT OF THE FlFPH JUDICDWL DiSTWBCT 8 5  THE 
STATE OF IIDAHO, IN AND FOR THE CBUBRI'PPT 0 5  TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex. rel., ) 
DARRELL V. MANNING, JAMES ) Case No. CV 2004-6336 
COLEMAN, BRUCE SWEENEY, 1 
MONTE C. McCLURE, GARY BLICK, ) 
NEIL MILLER and JOHN X. COMBO, ) 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD ) 
1 
Plaintiff, ) 
1 PRELIMUNABV 
VS. 1 JURY BNSTRlLICTllONS 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED ) 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH, ) 
INC. ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
i 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: I will now give you the preliminary instructions in 
this case. Individual copies of these Preliminary Instructions are being provided to each 
of you. T11ese copies are yours to use throughout the trial. When the evidence is closed, 
I will give you the final instructions in this case. 
BNSTRUCTION NO. 'i 
Ladies and gentleme~i, we are about to begin the trial of a lawsuit. Some of you 
may be unfamiliar with the procedures in which you are about to participate; and I am 
going, therefore, to outline briefly for you how this trial will proceed. 
Now that the jury is selected and sworn, the court will read to you some of your 
instructions. Then, the attorneys will maice opening statements; or the State's attorney 
may, if he wishes, save his opening statement until later. In an eminent domain case 
such as this, the Defendants have the right to give its opening statement first. The 
opening statement is intended to inform you about the party's case, and what they 
claim, and what evidence they intend to produce for you. The opening statement is not 
evidence, however. 
Then each side offers evidence to support his claim. The Defendants proceed 
first and offer all their evidence. Then the Plaintiff proceeds to offer all its evidence on 
its claims. 
After all of the evidence is in, I will read to you the rest of your instructions. In 
those instructions I will tell you what the law is and will tell you what you will have to 
decide. 
Then the trial concludes with arguments of the lawyers for both sides. 
Finally, you will be taken to a place where you can deliberate on your verdict in 
privacy. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 
These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to 
this case. It is your duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these 
instructions to those facts, and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be 
based upon a rational and objective assessment of the evidence. It should not be based 
on sympathy or prejudice. 
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, 
and it is your duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions 
as a whole, not picking out one and disregarding others. The order in which these 
instructions are given or the manner in which they are numbered has no significance as 
to the importance of any of them. If you do not understand an instruction, you may 
send a note to me through the bailiff, and I will try to clarify or explain the point 
further. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this 
trial. This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into 
evidence, and any stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of 
attorneys inay help you understand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they 
say is not evidence. If an attorney's argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, 
you should disregard it. 
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during 
the trial, I may sustain an objection to a question without permitting the witness to 
answer it, or to an offered exhibit without receiving it into evidence. My rulings are 
legal matters, and are solely my responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason 
for any objection, which was made, or my ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision 
you may not consider such a question or exhibit or speculate as to what the answer or 
exhibit would have shown. Remember, a question is not evidence and should be 
considered only as it gives meaning to the answer. 
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course 
of the trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you much determine what evidence you 
believe and what weight you attach to it. 111 SO doing, you bring with you to this 
courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. 
There is no magical formula for evaluating testimony. In your everyday affairs, 
you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how much 
weight you attach to what you are told. The considerations you use in making the more 
important decisions in your everyday dealings are the same considerations you should 
apply in your deliberations in this case. 
INSTRUCTPION NO. 3 
If you wish, you may talce notes to help you remember what witnesses said. If you 
do take notes, please keep them to yourself until you and your fellow jurors go to the jury 
room to decide the case. You should not let note-taking distract you so that you do not 
hear other answers by witnesses. When you leave at night, please leave your notes in the 
jury room. 
If you do not talce notes, you should rely on your own memory of what was said 
and not be overly influenced by the notes of other jurors. In addition, you cannot assign to 
one person the duty of taking notes for all of you. 
lNSTRLd6TUQN NO. 4 
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions 
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into 
evidence and any notes talcen by you in the course of the trial proceedings. 
Pursuant to rules adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court, trial courts like this one 
have been given discretion to permit jurors in civil cases to submit questions to witnesses 
who are called to testify during a trial. I am exercising my discretion to allow you to 
submit questions in this case. 
The limitations and procedures that will apply to questioi~s ubmitted by the jury 
are as follows: 
1. Once counsel for both parties have concluded their questioning, I will advise 
that it is time for questions from the jury. 
2. Each of you will be permitted to ask one question of each witness who testifies 
during the trial. 
3. Each of you will be issued a noteboolc and a pencil. When I announce that it is 
time for juror questions, each of you should tear a sheet of paper out of your 
notebook, whether you plan to ask a question or not. If you have no question, 
simply write "No question" on your sheet, fold it and pass it to the bailiff. If 
you do have a question, write it down, fold the piece of paper and pass it to the 
bailiff. As a result of this process, no one but you will lcnow whicl~ juror posed 
whicl~ particular question. 
4. T11e bailiff will deliver the folded sheets of paper to me, and will ask counsel for 
the parties to come to the bench and review the questions. If either party has an 
objection to any of the proposed questions, I will have the bailiff escort you to 
the jury room while we resolve the objections. 
5. Once any objections have been resolved, I will read the juror questions to the 
witrress, and the witness will respond. 
6. If you submit a q~~estion a d that specific question is not asked, it may be 
because your question duplicates that of another juror, or it was evident to me 
that the question called for information that would be inadmissible. I will try to 
ask as many of the questions as possible, exactly as written, but do not be 
disturbed if your question is not asked. Please understand that if the question 
was omitted, there was a good legal reason for doing so. 
7. Once I have put the juror questions to the witness, I will give counsel for each 
of the parties a chance to follow up with questions of their own. 
8. In order to expedite matters, please try to hold your questions to one per 
witness. Also, if you decided what you will want to aslc before that witness 
finished testifying, go ahead and write your question down rather than waiting 
until the witness finishes. 
There are certain things you must not do during this trial: 
1. You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of the attorneys or 
their employees, or any of the witnesses. 
2. You must not discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to discuss 
the case with you. If anyone attempts to discuss the case with you, or to 
influence your decision in the case, you must report it to me promptly. 
3. You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you retire to the jury 
room to deliberate at the close of the entire case. 
4. You must not maice up your mind until you have heard all the testimony 
and have received my instructions as to the law that applies to the case. 
5. You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gain a greater 
understanding of the case. 
6. You must not go to the place where any alleged event occurred. 
IMSTRUCTBORB NO. 7 
If during the trial I may say or do anything which suggests to you that I am included 
to favor the claims or position of any party, you will not permit yourself to be influenced by 
any such suggestion. I will not express nor intend to express, nor will I intend to intimate, 
any opinion as to which witnesses are or are not worthy of belief, what facts are or are not 
established; or what inferences should be drawn from the evidence. If any expression of 
mine seems to indicate as opinion relating to any of these matters, I instruct you to disregard 
it. 
PNSTRUGBIIOMI MO. 8 
It is highly probable that during the course of this trial, it will be necessary for me to 
excuse you and aslc that you wait in the jury room while counsel for the parties and I discuss 
and try to resolve disputes over the admissibility of evidence, the propriety of proposed jury 
instructions, or other important legal issues that may affect the trial. On occasion, I may 
declare an early recess, or have you come UI later than normal in order not to lceep you 
waiting while we do this. 
Let me assure you that while you are waiting, we are working. Let me also assure you 
that both the attorneys and I know that your time is valuable, and understand that delays 
which keep you waiting can be frustrating. Both they and I will do everything reasonably 
possible to expedite the presentation of evidence so that you can complete your duties and 
return to your normal lives as soon as possible. I laow that you understand that these 
proceedings are extremely important to the parties, and your patience will help ensure that 
the final outcome is just and legally correct. 
INSTRBICTBBN NO. 9 
Any statement by me identifying a claim of a party is not evidence in this case. I 
have advised you of the claims of the parties merely to acquaint you with the issues to 
be decided. 
llNSTRUCTlQBN NO. 10 
A witness who has special itnowledge, in a particular matter may give his or her 
opinion on that matter. In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you should 
consider the qualifications and credibility of the witness and the reasons given for his or her 
opinion. You are not bound by such opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem 
it entitled. 
IMSTRCICTIQN NO. 11 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. The law males no distinction 
between direct and circumstantial evidence. Each is accepted as a reasonable method of 
proof and each is respected for such convincing force as it may carry. 
BNSTRUeTIIQN NO. 12 
The following issues are not in dispute: 
1) Through the exercise of eminent domain, the State of Idaho has acquired the following 
property from the Defendants: 
a. A fee interest in 1.8784 acres of land (81,823 sq. ft.) for highway right-of-way and 
also a bike path under the Perrine Coulee Bridge. 
b. A permanent irrigation and slope easement over 0.3207acres of land (13,970 sq. 
ft). 
c. A temporary construction easement over 0.2145 acres of land (9,344 sq. ft.). 
d. All direct access rights to Poleline Road were acquired by the State of Idaho. 
2) The State of Idaho has the right of eminent domain. 
3) The use to which the subject property is to be applied is a use authorized by law. 
4) The taking of the subject property is necessary for such use. 
5) The State of Idaho has sought in good faith to purchase the subject property sought to 
be taken. 
IINSTWUCIPIOM NO. 13 
When I say that a party has the burdell of proof on a proposition, or use the expression 
"if you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded, that the proposition is more 
probably true than not true. 
iNSTRPIGBICBN NO. a4 
The term "fair market value" means the cash price at which a willing seller 
would sell and a willing buyer would buy the subject property, in an open marketplace 
free of restraints, taking into account the highest and most profitable use of the 
property. 
It presumes that the seller is desirous of selling, but is under no compulsion to do 
so, and that the buyer is desirous of buying, but is under no compulsion to do so. 
It presumes that both parties are fully informed, knowledgeable and fully aware 
of all the relevant market conditions and the highest and best potential use of the 
property, and are basing their decisions accordingly. 
It presumes that the market is open and competitive, and that the subject property has 
been exposed to the market for a reasonable time. 
BNSBRUCTIOM NO. 15 
The phrase "highest and best use" means the highest and most profitable use for 
- 
which the property is adaptable or needed in the reasonably near future. Highest and 
best use does not necessarily depend upon the uses to which the property is devoted; 
rather, all uses for which the property is suitable should be considered. 
IINSTRUCTION NO. Il6 
Just compensation means the fair market value of the property taken, including 
all permanent improvements thereon, together with any direct damages suffered by the 
defendant, all measured as of December 28,2004. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 117 
You were advised earlier that twelve (12) members of this panel will decide this 
case. The one among you who is the alternate juror will be selected by lot and will be 
notified after the final arguments are presented in the case. At the time the alternate iuror 
will be excused, subject to recall if necessary. 
INSTRUCTION NO.' $8 
Members of the jury, I remind you that you are not to discuss this case among 
yourselves or with anyone else, nor to form any opinion as to the merits of the case, 
until after I finally submit the case to you. 
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E DON COPPLE - ISB # 1085 
HEATHER A. CUNNINGHAM - ISB # 5480 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX 
Attorneys at Law 
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza 
199 North Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 600 
Post Office Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-3658 
Facsimile: (208) 386-9428 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership 
and Lazy J. Ranch, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF TI-IE STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANI) FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., ) CASE NO. CV 04-6336 
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN MCHUGH ) 
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C. 1 DEFENDANTS SUHTLEMENTAT, 
MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL ) PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
MILLER and JOHN X COMBO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
) 
) 
1 
Plaintiff, ) 
1 
vs. ) 
) 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED 1 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J. RANCH, 1 
WC. 1 
Defendants. 
1 
1 
TO: THE HONORABLE JUDGE HIGER, District Judge: 
DEFENDANT SUPPLEMENTAI, PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 1 
ORIGINAL J %, h 
The Defendant, Canyon Vista, presents herewith instructions to the jury which they respectfully 
request that the Court include in the instructions to be given the jury in this case. Furnished herewith are 
the original requested instructions which are numbered. 
DATED this - day of June, 2007. 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX 
By: 
E Don Copple, of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I IIEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of June, 2007, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was s e ~ e d u p o n  the following by the method indicated below: 
Joseph Mallet 
Deputy Atlorney General 
Idaho Transportalion Department 
331 1 West State Street 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129 
- U.S. MAIL 
- Hand Delivery 
- FacsimileTransmission 
Overnight Mail 
E Don Copple 
DEFENDANT SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 2 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 1 
In a conde~nnationcase, good faith is defined as a bona fide attempt to purchase the property, 
with a bona fide offer made and reasonable effort made to induce the owner to accept it. 
83 Idaho 475 [7, 81 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
DEFENDANT SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 3 
LAWRFiNCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JOSEPI-1 D. MALLET 
KARL D. VOGT 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
33 11 West State Street 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8815 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
ISB #5817 
ISB #5015 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF TI-IE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., 
DARRELL V MANNING, R. JAMES 
COLEMAN, BRUCE SWEENEY, 
MONTE C. McCLURFi, GARY BLICK, 
NEIL MILLER and JOHN X. COMBO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
1 
1 
) Case No. CV-04-6336 
) 
j 
) PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
) PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION - 
) LARGER PARCEL 
I 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED 1 
PARTNERSI-IIP AND LAZY J RANCI-1, 
INC. 
) 
Defendants. 1 
The Plaintill, State of Idaho, by and through its attorneys of record, submits to the Court 
a Proposed Jury Instruction on the issue of Larger Parcel. Plaintiff respectfully requests that the 
Court consider the attached Larger Parcel Jury Instruction. 
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION - LARGER PARCEL 
- 1 
DATED this &;y of June, 2007. 
Idaho Department of Transpoxtation 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ a y  of June, 2007, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above to be served to: 
E Don Copple 
Heather Cunningham 
Davison Copple Coppie & Cox 
P.O. Box 1583 
Boise. Idaho 83701 
0 U . s .  Mail 
0 H a n d  Delivered 
U0vernight Mail 
OTelecopy (Fax) 386-9428 
1d;ho ~epart lnent  of Transportation 
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION - LARGER PARCEL 
- 2 r t i  r 
.< .! J 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. - 
Evidence has been introduced with regard to the amount of property that should 
be considered in your determination of the laraer parcel. Parcel is defined as a 
consolidated body of land. The larger parcel is defined as a bodv of land that exhibits 
unitv of use. unity of ownership and are phvsically continuous. 
A parcel of land which has been used and treated like an entity shall be so 
considered in assessinn colnpensation for the taking of part or all of it. The fact that land 
thus treated is owned bv different entities does not destroy the unity of ownership 
concept. 
Idaho Code 57-71 1 
Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain, rev. 3d ed. (New York; Mathew Bender 
Co. Inc. 1992), vol. 4A 5 14B.04(1). 
State v. City of Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 528,493 P.2d 387 
State v. Nelson Sand & Gravel, Inc., 93 Idaho 574, 581,468 P.2d 306 (1970) 
United States v. 429.59 Acre, 612 F2d 459 (463) 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
District Judge 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. - 
Evidence has been introduced with regard to the amount of property that should 
be considered in your determination of the larger parcel. Parcel is defined as a 
consolidated body of land. The larger parcel is defined as a body of land that exhibits 
unity of use, unity of ownership and are physically contiguous. 
A parcel of land which has been used and treated like an entity shall be so 
coilsidered in assessing compensation for the taking of part or all of it. The fact that land 
thus treated is owned by different entities does not destroy the unity of ownership 
concept. 
DISTRICT COURT 
Fifth Judicial District 
Co~inty of Twln Fells . Starto of l d a o  
STATE OF BDAB.80, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex. rel., 
DARRELL V. MANNING, JAMES Case No. CV 2004-6336 
COLEMAN, BRUCE SWEENEY, 
MONTE C. McCLURE, GARY BLICK, ) 
NEIL MILLER and JOHN X. COMBO, ) 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD ) 
) 
Plaintiff, 
FINAL 
vs. JURY UNSTIWBBCT110NIS 
1 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED ) 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH, ) 
INC. ) 
Defendants. ) 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: I will now give you the final instructions 
in this case. Individual copies of these Final Instructions are being provided 
to each of you. These copies are yours to use, and you may highlight or 
make notes upon them as you wish. 
lNSBWUCTBOPl NO. f 9  
The State and Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership are entitled to the same 
fair and unprejudiced treatment that an individual would be under like circumstances. 
You should decide this case with the same impartiality that you would use in deciding a 
case between individuals. 
INSTRUGTIOM NO. 20 
In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or 
decide any question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If 
money damages are to be awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may not 
agree in advance to average the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the method of 
determining the amount of the damage awarddm-per-ca&ge~f+e~1+ 
INSTRUCTION NO. 21 
This lawsuit is a condemnation action brought under the governmental power of 
eminent domain. In this case, the state of Idaho has been authorized to acquire a strip 
of land along Pole Line Road, Twin Falls, Idaho belonging to the defendant, Canyon 
Vista Family Limited Partnership, for the purpose of building a divided four-lane 
highway, U.S. Highway 93, Twin Falls Alternate Route, Stage 1. In addition thereto, all 
the right of access to, from and between the public right of way and all of the 
contiguous remaining property of Canyon Vista has been extinguished and prohibited 
except for access, if any, as shown on the project plans. 
Under our law, no private property may be taken through the power of eminent 
domain without the payment of just compensation. The sole issue for your determination 
is the amount to be paid to the defendant, Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership by 
the plaintiff, State of Idaho. 
tlRilSTBaUCT1Btd NO. 22 
Just compensation means the fair market value of the property taken, together 
with any direct damages suffered by the defendant, all measured as of December 28, 
2004. 
The guiding principle of just compensation is reimbursement to the defendant for 
the property interest taken. The defendant is entitled to be put in as good a position 
pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken. He must be made whole but is not 
entitled to more. 
In determining what co~npensation should be paid for damages, if any, to the remainder 
of the property, you should talce into consideration the uses for which the land is adaptable before 
and after the taking, the character and quality of the property, the shape and condition in which 
the remaining property is left, the convenience of using the property before and after the taking, 
and such other factors as you find would affect the market value of the property. 
IIMSTRLBCTION NO. 24 
In determining the fair marlcet value of property in the before and after conditions, 
you may consider not only the opinions of the various witnesses who testified as to 
market value, but also all other evidence in the case which may aid in determining 
marlcet value, such as location of the property, the surroundings and general 
environment, any peculiar suitability of the property for particular uses, and the 
reasonable probabilities as to fu'cure potential uses, if any, for which the property is or 
would be suitable or physically adaptable, all as shown by the evidence in the case to 
have existed on December 28,2004. 
BNSTWUCTIQN MQ. 25 
You have heard testimony related to both city ordinances and provisions of a city 
comprehensive plan. In your deliberations, when considering the proper weight to give 
these provisions, you must remember that only the city ordinance has the force and effect 
of law. In contrast, a city's comprehensive plan is not a zoning law, but rather serves to 
guide and advise the governmental agencies responsible for making zoning decisions. 
The purpose of a comprehensive plan is to reflect the desirable goals and objectives or 
desirable future situations for the land within a jurisdiction. 
UPISTRUCTION NO. 26 
The measure of damages for the impairment of a right of access to a highway upon 
which the property of an owner abuts is the difference between the fair marlcet value of 
the property immediately before the taking, and the fair market value of the same 
property immediately after the taking of the access. The basis of the damages awarded is 
not the value of the right of access to the highway, but rather the difference in the value of 
the property before and after the taking of the access, and this in turn is based upon the 
highest and best use to which the land involved is suitable before and after the talcing. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 27 
The compensation which must be paid for property talcen by eminent domain does 
not necessarily depend upon the uses to which it is devoted at the time of the taking or on 
the planned use by the property owner; rather, all the uses for which the property is 
suitable and adaptable in the reasonably foreseeable future should be considered in 
determining market value. It is the "highest and best use" of the property that you 
should consider when determining just compensation. 
The "highest and best use" of a property is the reasonably probable and legal use 
which is physically possible, appropriately supported, financially feasible, and that 
results in the highest value. A potential highest and best use should be considered to the 
full extent that the prospect of demand for such use affects the market value of the 
property. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 28 
In determining what uses andlor access would be allowed to Pole Line Road in the 
before condition, you are instructed that a landowner whose property abuts an existing 
roadway, has a property right which includes access to that roadway. The controlling 
governniental authority (City of Twin Falls) cannot deny all direct access to that roadway 
without payment of just compensation. 
You are further instructed, in determining what access is allowed or available, 
neither the City of Twin Falls nor the State of Idaho can require a land owner to join with 
adjacent property owners for the purpose of providing access to the subject property in an 
attempt to cure the access taken by the condemnation of Canyon Vista access rights to Pole 
Line Road. Nor could the City of Twin Falls, when consideriiig a Planned Unit 
Development application in the before condition, require Canyon Vista to file a joint 
application with one or more adjoining parcels that have different ownership. 
IIMSTRUGTBON NO. 29 
Severance damages may arise where the property being talcen is only part of a 
larger parcel belonging to the defendant. Severance damage consists of either or both of 
the following. 
a. A diminution in the value of the remainder caused by the taking or 
severance of the parcel taken from the remainder; or 
b. A diminution in the value of the reminder caused by the construction upon 
and use put to the property taken. 
Severance damages are calculated by ascertaining the fair market value of the 
remainder immediately before the taking, and deducting from this value, the fair market 
value which results after the severance of the part taken and after the construction of the 
project in the manner proposed by the plaintiff. Damages to the defendant's remaining 
property are to be assessed once and for all time. 
INSTRUGTION NO. 30 
In this case, the defendant has the burden of proving that the just compensation for 
the taking of its property exceeds the sum of $202,230.00, which is the amount for just 
compensation presented in this trial by the plaintiff, State of Idaho. Since the 
condemning authority has conceded this value, your verdict should not be for an amount 
less than the amount of $202,230.00. 
INSTRUCTION NO, 3 l  
The term "fair market value" mens the cash price at which a willing seller would 
sell and a willing buyer would buy the subject property, in an open marltetplace free of 
restraints, taking into account the highest and most profitable use of the property. 
It presumes that the seller is desirous of selling, but is under no compulsion to do 
so, and that the buyer is desirous of buying, but is under no compulsion to do so. 
It presumes that both parties are fully informed, lcnowledgeable and fully aware of 
all the relevant marlcet conditions and the highest and best potential use of the property, 
and are basing their decisions accordingly. 
It presumes that the market is open and competitive, and that the subject property 
has been exposed to the marlcet for a reasonable time. 
lNSf RklCTllON NO. 32 
The phrase "highest and best use" means the highest and most profitable use for 
which the property is adaptable or needed in the reasonably near future. Highest and 
best use does not necessarily depend upon the uses to which the property is devoted; 
rather, all uses for which the property is suitable should be considered. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 33 
If you find from the evidence that the fair market value of the property 
condemned in this case increased or decreased because of the prospect of condemnation, 
you should disregard any such influence and your award should be based on the value of 
the property as it would be at the time of the taking if it had not been subjected to the 
threat of condemnation. In other words, the just compensation that is due the owner for 
the taking of his or her property should be the value of the property as it would have 
been at the time of the taking uninfluenced by the fact that it was to be taken in this 
proceeding. 
BMSTRUCTION RBO. 34 
In the State of Idaho the law provides that any incorporated city or town inay 
make and enforce, within its limits, all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as 
are not in conflict with the general laws of the State. The power of a city only exists 
within its boundaries. 
IINSTRMGTION NO. 35 
You may consider the owner's particular plan for development and use of the 
property only for the purpose of determining uses for which the property is adaptable. 
BlPBSTRaBCTION MQ. 36 
Under Idaho Law a Planned Unit Development is permitted in cities as follows: 
As part of or separate from the zoning ordinance, each governing board may provide, 
by ordinance for the processing of applications for planned unit development permits. 
A planned unit development may be defined as an area of land in which a variety of 
residential, commercial, industrial and other land uses are provided for under single 
ownership or control. Planned unit development ordinances may include, but are lxot 
limited to, requirements for milximum area, permitted uses, ownership, common open 
space, utilities, density, arrangements of land uses on a site and permit processing. 
llNSTWlBCTllQN NO. 37 
Evidence has been introduced with regard to the amount of property that should 
be considered in your determination of the Iarger parcel. Parcel is defined as a 
consolidated body of land. The larger parcel is defined as a body of land that exhibits 
unity of use, unity of ownership and are physically contiguous. 
BNSTRIUGTICPN NO. 38 
An 'exaction" is the i~nposition of co~lditions of approval by a government 
agency against a landowner for his proposed development. An exaction can take 
several forms, including but not limited to the dedication of land and/ or money in lieu 
of land, constructing public i~nprovements at the landowner's expense, providing traffic 
signalization at the landowner's expense, etc.. . 
An "exaction" must satisfy the following criteria: (1) a public problem exists; (2) 
the proposed development impacts the public problem; (3) governmental approval of 
the development based on a condition that tends to solve the problem; and (4) rough 
proportionality between the proposed solution and the development's impact on the 
problem. 
An "exactio~~" must have an "essential nexus" in that the condition of approval 
serves a legitimate state interest and the condition of approval is "roughly 
proportional" to relieve the impact created by the proposed development. 
No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the government agency 
must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is 
related both in the nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development. 
Although exactions may be required, the exaction must be accomplished without 
p?J 
going outside the boundaries of the property in question, if the extra property and/ or 
easement over it could easily be acquired or purchased. 
1NSTBBlUCTIQN NO. 39 
In this case, you should determine the just compensation as follows: 
First, determine the fair market value of the parcel being talcen for the project, 
including all improvements thereon, as of December 28,2004. 
Next, determine the fair market value of the remaining portion as it existed 
immediately before the take and the fair marlcet value of this parcel as it will exist 
immediately after the take, determined as of December 28,2004. In determining these 
values, you may not consider the impact of the project in determining the value before the 
take, but you should consider the impact of the project and any special benefits which will 
result from the col~struction of the improvements in the manner proposed by the plaintiff 
after the take, in determining the value of the remainder of the property after the take. 
If you determine that the fair market value of the remainder after the take is less 
than the fair marlcet value of the remainder before the take, and that the diminution of 
value is because of the take, the difference is considered severance damage and the 
property owner is entitled to this difference as part of the just compensation. 
If you determine that the fair value of the remainder after the take is greater than 
the value before the take, because of benefits conferred upon the property by the project or 
because of the construction of the improvements in the manner proposed by the plaintiff, 
then there are no severance damages and no other adjustment to value. Do not offset any 
excess in value applicable to the remainder, or property not taken, against the value of the 
property taken. 
Finally, determine whether the defendants have incurred any special damages or 
costs on account of the taking, and the amounts thereof. 
Combine the amounts you find under each of the elements in this instruction to 
find the amount of just compensation that is due from the plaintiff to the defendants in 
this case. 
INSTRUCTlOkB NO. 40 
In this case you must decide if the property remaining after the take will be 
specially and directly benefitted, it at all, by the construction of the project by the 
plaintiff. 
Special benefits are benefits irom the condemnation project that uniquely and/ or 
directly benefit the remaining property. The law distinguishes these from general 
benefits. General benefits, which are not offsets to damages, are general in nature and 
benefit the public generally rather thqb confer a discrete benefit directly upon the 
remaining property. 
IINSTRUQTIION NO, 44 
If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you 
may send a note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to 
communicate with me by any means other than such a note. 
During your deliberatio~~s, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands 
on any of the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so 
by me. 
I . ,  r. r,  
1. ., !., 
BNSTRUCTION NO. 42 
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you 
regarding matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the 
iacts. In a few minutes counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then 
you will retire to the jury room for your deliberations. 
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, 
the attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. 
At the outset of deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make ail emphatic 
expression of opinion on the case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one 
does that at the beginning, one's sense of pride may be aroused and there may be 
reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you 
are not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no 
triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the 
objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual 
judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only 
after a discussiol7 and consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. 
IIfMSTWUCPIION NO. 43 
Members of the Jury: In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that at least 
three-fourths of the jury agree. Your verdict must represent the considered judgment of 
each juror agreeing to it. 
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a 
view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual 
judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after ail 
impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course of your 
deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if 
convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight 
or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere 
purpose of returning a verdict. 
You are not partisans. You are judges - judges of the facts. Your sole interest is to 
ascertain the truth from the evidence in the case. 
BBUSTRUCTIQM NO, 44 
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a presiding juror, who 
will preside over your deliberations. 
An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with these instructioi~s. 
Follow the directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of 
you by the instructions on the verdict form. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As 
soon as nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in 
the verdict, you should fill it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary 
that the same nine agree on each question. If your verdict is unanimous, your presiding 
juror alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the entire jury, agree, then 
those so agreeing will sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the 
bailiff, who will then return you into open court. 
IN TI-IE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
3 y . -- [';Li:.glK. 
OF TI-IE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN EAL1.S 
1 . THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., 
DARRELL V MANNING, R. JAMES 1 
COLEMAN, BRUCE SWEENEY, 
MONTE C. McCLURE, GARY BLICIC, ) Case No. CV-04-6336 
NEIL MILLER and JOHN X. COMBO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
) SPECIAL, VERDICT 
Plaintiff, 1 
) 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED 
PAIiTNERSIlIP AND LAZY J RANCH, 
j 
N C .  1 
Defendants. 1 
We the jury, find the amount of just compensation payable by the Plaintiff to the 
Defendants in the above-entitled matter to be as follows: 
A. $ c"~)&k3g -ooa"." 
Fair Marltet Value of the Entire Property 
before the take 
B. 
Value of the Property taken in fee and $ 
easements 
C. 
Value of the Remainder of 
Property (A - B) before the take: 
D. 
Fair Market Value of the Remainder after the $ 6 
Project 
E. 
Severance Damages, if any (C - D) 
SPECIAL VERDICT - 1 
G. Just Compensation Calculation: 
Property Acquired (B) $ 399(033@~: 
PLUS Severance Damages (E) $ 2 ~ 2  / , $?$' 7- - 
EQUALS m 2 1 6% 5 
LESS Special Benefits (I;) $ -0-- 
DATED this &day of June, '2007. 
JURORS: 
SPECIAL VERDICT - 2 
E DON COPPLE - ISB # 1085 
HEATHER A. CUNNINGHAM - ISB # 5480 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX 
Attorneys at Law 
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza 
199 North Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 600 
Post Office Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-3658 
Facsimile: (2081 386-9428 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership 
and Lazy J. Ranch, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., CASE NO. CV 04-6336 
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN MCHUGH ) 
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C. 1 JUDGMENT ON VERDICT 
MCCLURE, GARY BLICIC, NEIL 1 
MILLER and JOHN X COMBO, ) 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, 
VS . 1 
1 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED ) 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J. RANCH, ) 
JNC. 
Defendants. ) 
THIS MATTER came on regularly for july trial corn~nencing on the ls' day of June, 
2007, before a District Judge, the Honorable Nathan Higer. The above-named Defendant, 
JUDGMENT ON VERDICT - 1 
Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership, appeared and was represented by its counsel of 
record, E Don Copple and Heather A. Cunningham, Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox of Boise, 
Idaho, and John C. Lezamiz, Hepwoith Lezamiz and Janis, of Twin Falls, Idaho and the above- 
named Plaintiff Stale of Idaho appeared and was represented by its counsel of record, Joseph D. 
Mallct and Karl D. Vogt, Deputy Attorney General of Boise, Idaho. Defendant Lazy J 
disclaimed all interest prior to trial. A jury of twelve persons was impaneled and sworn to try 
the action and witnesses on the part of Plaintiff and Defendant were sworn and examined. After 
hearing the evidence, the arguments of counsel and instructions of the Court, the jury retired to 
consider their verdict, and subsequently returned into Court, and by unanimous decision awarded 
the Defendant the sum of TWO MILLION, FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY-ONE THOUSAND, 
FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY AND 001100 DOLLARS ($2,421,530.00); 
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law and on the verdict of the jury, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant, recover by Judgment 
on the Verdict from the Plaintiff, State of Idaho, the sum of TWO MILLION, FOUR 
HUNDRED AND TWENTY-ONE THOUSAND, FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY AND 001100 
DOLLARS ($2,421,530.00), together with interest thereon at the legal rate per annum of 12% 
from December 28,2004, to the date of Judgment and thereafter at the statutory post-judgment 
interest rate. Interest has been computed in accordance with the Statement of Interest Due filed 
by Defendant on June 18,2007, and amounts to SIX HUNDRED TWENTY-THREE 
THOUSAND, NINE HUNDRED FORTY AND 3411 00 DOLLARS ($623,940.34) through June 
20, 2007 and $688.61 per diem thereafter until Judgment is entered. Therefore, the total amount 
now due and owing to Defendant, with credit for $327,000 previously paid pursuant to the 
JUDGMENT ON VERDICT - 2 
Stipulation for Possession, is TWO MILLION, SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND, 
FOUR HUNDRED AND SEVENTY AND 341100 DOLLARS ($2,718,470.34). 
Pursuant to Idaho Code $ 7-714, payment shall be made by Defendant within thirty (30) 
days, made payable to Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox Trust Account on behalf of Defendant. 
Upon payment of the just compensation the Court shall, pursuant to Idaho code $7-716 enter its 
final order and judgment ol'i'co~ldemnation. The Court shall retain jurisdiction of this matter for 
the purpose of enforcing the judgment. 
The matter of costs and attorneys' fees shall be determined upon timely submission af a 
,a*&- 
Motion and Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees by 
& 3:\ DATED this day of 3-m ,2007. 
,/ District Judge I 
JUDGMENT ON VERDICT - 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 
the foregoing was served upon the following: 
Karl D. Vogt -- A.s. MAIL 
Joseph D. Mallet Hand Delivery 
Deputy Attorney General Facsimile Transmission 
Idaho Transportation Department Overnight Mail 
331 1 West State Street 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129 
E Don Copple A.s. MAIL 
Heather A. Cunningham Hand Delivery 
Davison, Coppie, Copple & Cox Facsimile Tra~ismission 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 600 Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 1583 
Boise, ID 83701 
JUDGMENT ON VERDICT - 4 
DISIRICT COURT 
Fifth Judicial D,istrict 
co:O"nty of Twin Fells - atate of ldaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 0 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, EX REL., 
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN 
MCHUGH, BRUCE SWEENEY, 
MONTE C. MCCLURE, GARY 
BLICIC, NEIL MILLER, AND JOHN 
X. COMBO, IDAHO 
TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiffs, 
CASE NO. CR-2004-6336 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER 
CANYON VISTA FAMIT,Y LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J. 
RANCH, INC. 
Defendants. 
INTRODUCTION 
This motion comes b y  way of the defendants' request for costs and attorneys 
fees pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(D)(l)(C,D); 54(e)(l); and 
26(b)(4)(C). Don E. Copple, John T. Lezamiz, and Heather Cunningham were 
present as counsel for the defendant Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership 
T l ~ e  State, as plaintiff, was represented b y  Joseph Mallet. 
1. Wl~etl-ter the defendants are entitled to costs as a matter of rigl-tt? 
2. Whether the defendants are entitled to discretionary costs? 
3. Whether the defendants are entitled to attorneys fees? 
DISCUSSION AND RESOLUTION OF THE FIRST ISSUE - - WHETHER THE 
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT. 
The defendants, the prevailing party in this condemnation action, 
incurred costs and fees which they now seek as matter of right. The decision to 
grant costs as a matter of right is left to the sound discretion of the trial court 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)il)(C); Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co. 140 Idaho 495,510,95 
P.3d 977,992 (2004). "Tl~e party opposing the award bears the burden of 
demonstrating an abuse of the trial court's discretion." Workmen's Auto Ins. Co. 
140 Idaho at 510, 95 P.3 at 992. In exercise of its discretion, the Court will look to 
see if the costs as a matter of right were reasonable and necessary. Judge McKee 
has ruled eminent domain cases are exceptional by nature. Therefore, due to the 
exceptional nature of these cases, costs are clearly reasonable and necessary and 
should be allowed. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 54(d)(l)(C) provides in pertinent part 
(emphasis added): 
Costs as a Mattel. ofRig1zt. When costs are awarded to a party, such party 
shall be entitled to the following costs, actually paid, as a matter of right 
1. Court filing fees. 
4. Travel expenses of witnesses who travel by private transportation, other 
tl-rai~ a party, who testify in the trial of an action, computed at the rate of 
$30 per mile, one way, from the place of residence, whether it be within 
or without the state of Idaho; travel expenses of witnesses who travel 
other than by private transportation, other than a party, computed as the 
actual travel expenses of the witness not to exceed $.30 per mile, one way, 
from the place of residence of the witness, whether it be within or without 
the state of Idal~o. 
6. Reasonable costs of the preparation of models, maps, pictures, 
photographs, or other exhibits admitted in evidence as exhibits in a 
hearing or trial of an action, but not to exceed the sum of $500 for all oi 
such exhibits of each party. 
8. Reasonable expert witness fees for an expert who testifies at a 
deposition or at a trial of an action not to exceed the sum of $2,000 for each 
expert witness for all appearances. 
9. Charges for reporting and transcribing of a deposition taken in 
preparation for trial of an action, whether or not read into evidence in t l~e  
trial of an action. 
The State has agreed by stipulation to pay the defendants' filing fees 
($47.00), the costs of transcripts of depositions taken by the State ($2,326.48) and 
by the Defendant ($4,475.14). The total of these costs equals $6,848.62. 
Next, this Court has reviewed the defendants' requested expert witness 
fees and finds they were not duplicative as they provided the jury wit11 a wide 
range of informative value, and due to the exceptional nature of the case the fees 
were reasonable and necessary. Therefore the Court shall award the following 
expert witness fees as a matter of right 
1. Roger Dunlav: $2,000.00. 6. Pat Dobie: $2,000.00 
2. Gale Poolev: $2,000.00. 7. Roger Dunlau: $2,000.00 
3. Richard Evans: $1,775.00. 8. Mark Butler: $2,000.00 
4. Micl~ael Mongelli: $2,000.00. 9. Mark Richey: $2,000.00 
5. Gerald Martins: $625.00. 10. Greg Kellev $2,000.00 
Total = $18,400.00 
' r  .i B 
f.. <> ( 1  
Finally, the Court will grant mileage for expert witnesses ($736.70) as 
stipulated by the State and Trial exhibits, preparation and supplies of $500.00. 
I-lowever, this Court denies costs as a matter of right for t l~e  testimonies of 
Michael Bingllam, and James McDonald as they were not reasonable and 
necessary for the case. Nor will the Court grant to the defendants travel 
expenses and hotel costs, preparation and researcl~ for tile trial, exceptional copy 
costs, or mediation costs as none are exceptional even though they were 
necessary and reasonable. 
EXPERT DEPOSITION FEES 
In addition to reasonable expert witness fees as a matter of right, the 
defendants request reasonable expert fees for depositions pursuant to IRCP 
26(b)(4)(C). Under IRCP 26(B)(4)(C) "Unless manifest injustice would result, (i) 
the court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a 
reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery.. ." 
Expert fees for depositions shall be awarded as requested in the amount of 
$5,803.65; the costs are itemized below. 
1. Patrick Dobie Deposition Time 
Prep Time 
2. Roger Dunlap Deposition Time 
Prep Time 
3. Mark Butler Deposition Time 
Prep Time 
4. Mark Ricl~ey Deposition Time 
Prep Time 
5. Greg ICelly Deposition Time 
Prep Time 
6. Gale Pooley Deposition Time 
Prep Time 
7. Richard Evans Deposition Time 
Prep Time 
8. Mike Mongelli Deposition Time 
Prep Time 
9. James MacDonald Deposition Time 
Prep Time 
Total - $5,803.65 
The defendants would not have incurred these costs if the State had not 
initiated condemnation proceedings against them. As previously stated, 
condemnation proceedings by their nature are exceptional, and costs and fees 
si~ould therefore be granted. The deposition fees for expert witnesses in this case 
were necessary and it is appropriate to award such fees to the prevailing party. 
DISCUSSION AND RESOLUTION OF THE SECOND ISSUE - - WHETHER 
THE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO DISCRETIONARY COSTS. 
In addition to the cost as a matter of right for the expert witnesses, the 
defendants have also requested discretionary costs as they relate to the expert 
witnesses. IRCP 54(d)(l)(D) reads in part "Discretioi~ary Costs.. . may be 
allowed upon a showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional costs 
reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the 
adverse party." 
As mentioned in the previous section, condemnation proceedings by 
nature are exceptional and costs and fees should be allowed. Tl-ris Court has 
reviewed all the information before it and finds the following discretionary 
expert witness fees were reasonable and necessary to defend against the State's 
position: 
1. Patrick Dobie $28,700.50 
2. Roger Dunlap $16,111.04 
3. Mark Butler $41,467.50 
4. Mark Ritchey $27,604.55 
5. Greg Kelley $15,922.50 
6. Gale Pooley $8,150.50 
7. Michael Mongelli $3,369.60 
Total = $141,326.19 
Additionally, the Court has reviewed the defendants' request for costs for 
trial exhibits, the preparation of the exhibits, exhibit equipment and supplies and 
finds they were reasonable and necessary for trial. The Court will award these 
costs in the amount of $31,305.44. 
Trial Exhibits, Preparation, Equipment and Supplies = $31,305.44 
The Court does not find the defendants' travel expenses, hotel costs, trial 
preparation and research, exceptional copy costs, and the cost of mediation, 
exceptional even though they are necessary and reasonable and these requests 
are denied. 
DISCUSSION AND RESOLUTION OF THE THIRD ISSUE - - 
WHETHER REOUESTED ATTORNEYS FEES SHOULD BE ALLOWED 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(e)(l) is quoted in part below: 
Attorney Fees. In any civil action the court may award reasonable 
attorney fees, which at the discretion of the court may include 
paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 
54(d)(l)(B), when provided for by any statute or contract. 
Idaho Code section 12-121 addresses attorney fees and reads as follows: 
111 any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees 
to the prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall 
not alter, repeal or amend any statute which otherwise provides for 
the award of attorney's fees. The term "party" or "parties" is 
defined to include any person, partnership, corporation, 
association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political 
subdivision thereof. 
The defendants' attorneys agreed to tale the case on a contingency fee 
basis. The contingency agreement allowed the attorneys to take one-third (113) of 
any amount recovered above $327,000.00. At the close of trial, the defendants 
received an award of $2,421,530.00. 
This Court finds the work performed by the defendants' attorneys to be 
both reasonable and necessary. In this case, the Court finds a contingency 
agreement to be a reasonable manner to calculate attorneys' fees because this is 
an exceptional case and exceptional hours were required to defend it. Thus, the 
requested attorneys' fees are granted in the amount of $698,176.67. The Court 
determined this amount as calculated below: 
1.. $2,421,530.00 (award) - $327,000.00 = $2,094,530.00 
2. $2,094,530.00 / 3 (contingency agreement) = $698,176.67 
CONCLUSION 
Using its discretion, and for the reasons heretofore given, this Court will 
award the defendants' costs and fees in the following amounts: 
1. Attorneys Fees: 
2. Costs as a matter of right: 
3. Discretionary Costs: 
Total Award $903,096.77 
Counsel for tlie defendants is requested to prepare an order consiste~~t 
witli this opinion. 
L l  
DATED t h i r z  day of July, 2007 
/' 
/ / Senior District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Sharie Cooper, hereby certify that on the 27Ih day of July, 2007, 1 caused 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMOMNDUM DECISION AND ORDER to be 
mailed to the following persons by U.S. Mail postage prepaid, or placed in Courthouse 
mail folder as follows: 
Joseph Mallet 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. 0. Box 71 29 
Boise, ID 83707-1 129 
Don Copple 
Heather Cunningham 
Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox 
P. 0. Box 1583 
Boise, ID 83701 
John Lezamiz 
Hepworth, Lezamiz & Janis 
P. 0. Box 389 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0389 
A+KS. Mail 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Faxed 
( ) Court Folder 
k)"dS. Mail 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Faxed 
( ) Court Folder 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Faxed 
,.l+.%urt Folder 
E DON COPPLE - ISB # 1085 
HEATHER A. CUNNINGHAM - ISB # 5480 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX 
Attoineys at Law 
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza 
199 North Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 600 
Post Office Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-3658 
Facsimile: (208) 380-9428 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership 
and Lazy J. Ranch, Inc. 
TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., CASE NO. CV 04-6336 
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN MCHUGH ) 
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C. 1 SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT ON 
MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL ) VERIblCT 
MILLER and JOHN X COMBO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATlON BOARD, ) 
Plaintiff, 1 
VS . ) 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED ) 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J. RANCH, ) 
rNC. 
1 
Defendants. 
SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT ON VERDICT - 1 
This matter came on regularly for hearing on the 19'h day of July, 2007, before District 
Judge, the Honorable Nathan Higer. The above-named Defendant appeared through its counsel 
of record, E Don Copple and Heather A. Cunningham of Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox of 
Boise, Idaho, and John Leza~niz of Hepworlh, Lezamiz & Janis of Twin Falls, Idaho, the above- 
named Plaintiff appeared and was represented by its counsel of record, Joseph Mallet, Deputy 
Attorney General, of Boise, Idaho. A Memorandum Decision and Order Regarding Attorneys' 
Fees and costs was entered on July 26,2007, ordering Plaintiff to pay $32,288.47 as costs as a 
matter of right, $170,631.63 as discretionary costs and $698,176.67 in attorneys fees. The parties 
have stipulated that there was a math enor and costs awarded should be $30,288.47 and have 
submitted a separate Order to Amend the Memorandum Decision and Order entered July 26, 
2007. This is in addition to the jury verdict of $2,421,530.00, together with pre-judgment 
interest which has been paid by Plaintiff 
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law and on the Memorandum Decision and Order 
Regarding Attorneys' Fees and Costs, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant, Canyon Vista Family 
Partnership, recover by Supplemental Judgment for Costs and Attorneys Fees from Plaintiff, 
State of Idaho, the additional sum of NINE HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND NINETY-SIX 
HUNDRED AND 771100 DOLLARS ($901,096.77), together with interest after the date of 
Judgment at the legal rate. 
DATED this _& day of August, 2007. 
/'- 
SUPPLEMENTAI.. JUDGMENT ON VERDICT - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the & day of dly & ,2007, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing was served upon the following: 
L ~ . ~ .  MAIL 
Joseph D. Mallet Hand Delivery 
Deputy Attorney General Facsimile Transmissioll 
Idaho Transponacioli Department -- Overnight Mall 
331 1 West State Street 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129 
J 
E Don Copple -U.S. MAIL 
Heather A. Cunningham Hand Delivery 
Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox - Facsimile Trans~nission 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 600 Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 1583 
Boise, ID 83701 
B k 
Clerk 01 the ~fOljrt 
SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT ON VERDICT - 3 
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LAWRENCE G: WASDEN F"i!,-E2 
' ATTORNEY QENERAL 2007 WiJG 14 '.BE.! 7: 40 
JOST?PH D. MALLET, 1SB #581? ,.. , 0 Y - -,-.-.-.". .-----.-,. 
KARI. P. VOGT, ISB #SO1 5. , CLERK 
Deputy ~ t t o rn iy  General 
Idaho Tkspoaaticin Department . . . . .  . . 
. , 331 1 West State ~dieet 
P.O. Box 7129' 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129 , . .  
. . . Telephone: (208) 334-8815 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
Attorney for Appellant . . 
.. . 
. . 
. . , IN THE DISTRICT C O ~ T  OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF m STATE OF , . , .. . . . . ., . 
- IDAHO, IN FOR THE COUNTY OF TWM FALLS IN THE STATE OP IDAHO , . . ,   
. . 
. , 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., ' ) ' ' Case No. CV-04-6336 , . 
; IDAHO.~I~SPORTATION 1 
BOARD,. . ,I NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) 
~ i ~ e ~ a n t ,  
. . . . 
. , .  .. 
. . 1 
-VS- 
1 
) . . CANYON V I S ~ A  FAMILY 
LIMITEDPAR.TNERSHPAND' . ) . . 
LAZY J RAN@, INC., 1 
. . . . 1 , . 
. . f &eshbndents. . , 
. . 
TO:: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED . ,  :' 
PARWRSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH, WC., AND THE? P:ARTIES AmORNEYS, E DON . . 
COPPLE, DAVXSON, COPPLE, COWLE, ANn COX, P.O. BOX 1583, BOISE, ID 83701 AND 
JOHN LEZAM,g, EpWOR7J3 & LEZAM[Z,1.33 SHOSHONE ST. N, TmFALLS,  ID 83303- : . . 
0389, AND TNECLERK OF IFHE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GWEN THAT: . 
. , 
1. The above namedAppellant, State of idaho, ex rel. Idaho TransportationBoard, appeals 
against the above-named Respondents to the fdaho Supreme Court from Judgment on'verdict 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - Pagel 
I T D  LEGAL F a x :  2083344498  bug 1 3  2007  1 1 : 2 3  P. U 4  
. . 
. . 
entered in the-ib.dGe-entitled actionbn.the 3* day of July, 2007, Honorable Judge Nathan Higer 
presiding. . . 
. , 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the rdaho Supreme C o w  and the judgrneirts or 
. . 
orders described in pkgfaph.1 above are appealable orders under and pursuakt to il(a)(l), 
. . 
I.A.R. , , . .  . 
. . 
. . 
. . 
3. P preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which tb6 Appellant then intends t i  assert 
in the appeal; ~rovided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the, Appellant Froom 
asserting other issues on appeal: . . 
' a )  The Disdct Court erred in admitting the Order of ~ondemBti& for purpos6s of. 
, . 
deening the scripe of &e taking. 
b) The District Court ened in defining the scope of the taking with regard to access by 
relying solely on the Order of Condemnation and in denying PIaintiWAppelIant a fxial on the scope 
of the take issue. ' . . . 
c) 'The District Court erred in admittink DefendantRespondents' &x*ert te&ony ofthe 
value of theprope~%y takenwhe,n that testigony was based on tbevaluk of noxi-existent lotsor "pad 
sites," rathei . thw .. the property as a whole.: . . , . 
. . 
d) The District Cburt erred in excluding P1aintifYAppellant7s reb~rtal ei&t wimess 
. - 
. . 
testimony regai8ing the amount of damages ~kfendant&os~ondents' expert witqesii . met@dslogy . 
would have indicated if those experts , would . have used the proper adjustments and asmptions irt 
calculating theit daniage opinions,. 
4. An &der has not been'intered sealing all or any portion of the recbrd. 
5. (a)' A reporte~'~ rranscript is requested. 
NOTICE'OF APPEAL, -Page 2 
. . .  
. , 
@) ,The Apptllant requests the preparation of the fellowing portions of the reporter's 
. , 
traa'script: Th@ entire reportir's standaid transcript as defined in Rule 2S(a), LAX., suppkmmted by 
. . 
the fo~owing: .. 
, . 
. .  .., 
, . * '  Tbe ~ l ~ s i n ~ a r ~ e n t s  of coun el. . ,  . 
. . 
Q The cor66rencb on requested jury instmctiqns, $lie objedtiom of the p d e s  to 
. . 
the inshctions, ,&d the court's rulings thereon, 
. . 
All of the, hearings and proceedings this matter th@t occurred on May 18, 
,2007. ' . . 
,' . 
6..The.8~peIlant requests the following documents to be includea in the clerk's record in 
addition to those automatically iiiclud'ed undet Rule 28, I.A.R.: , , , . . .  .  
. .. . . . 
. . 
. .  . 
' s . All requestedmd given jury insiiuctions. . , . . 
. .. 
o Order Regarding Both Plaintiffs'. &d Defendants' Motions in Limine and 
Motions ., to . Exclude, issued May 23,2007. 
, . .  .. . Plaintiffs Motion in Limine to Exclude the Testimony of Roger Dunlap. 
s Plaintiffs Brief in Support of Motion in Limine to Exclude the Testimony of 
Roger Dunlap. 
. . 
' o Amended Fourth AEfidavit of Joseph D. Mallet. . . . . 
e Plaintiffs Second Motion in'Limiie. 
' P Brief in Support of Plaintiff's SecondMotion in Limine. 
, . 
"' e All exhibits of ~iaint if l~p~ellant 's  expert witness, Paul Hyde, that were . " ' .. 
excluded from evidence. 
7. I.certify: . 
. . .  
'(a) Th8t a copy of this ~ h t i c e  of Appeal has been s&ed on the report&. 
@) . ' TEat .. the c o w  reporter has been paid the estimated fee of $100.00 for preparation of 
the reptiBer's transcript: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 3 
Hug I S  Z U U l  11:24 Y .  U D  
. . 
(c) That .the Appellant is exenipt from payhg the estimbted fee for the preparation ofthe 
, ?  
recbrd beciusi of Section 31-3212(2), Idaho Code. 
. . . . 
(d) That the appellate is exempt from paying the appellat& filing fee because of Sectian.67- ,, 
. . . . .  
2301, Idaho Code. . . 
a (e) %at sei+ice has been made upon all parties requi*ed to be served pursaant to Rule 20.. 
&.+mi Ti& I ~*day~NdayofAugu~t, 2007. , . . . 
~ e ~ d t y  ~ t t o r n e ~  General . ' 
Attorney for the Appellint ' ' 
, 
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. . .  
. . 
?", 
.,.. . . . .  
I HEREBY , , , .  .. .. . CERTFY . that on & day of ~ugust,'2007, I caus6d to be ?ewe$ a h e  and 
6 b i . i . e ~ t ~ b ~ ~  d f  the-foiigoing by the'niethod indicated below, aid addressed to the following: 
, .  .. 
, . 
Idaho Supreme Court [IIu.S..hiail 
451'W. state St. a H a n d  Delivered 
, ' P.O. BOX 83720 . . ' . CjOv&ight Mail 
Boise, Tt) 83720 n ~ e l e c o ~ y  pax) 
, . 
. . 
. . T&  ails ~ i u n t y  clerk 
C;ooper 
. .. Fifth ~udicial District 
P..O.,BOX 126 
Twin %hs ID' 83303-0126 
. . 
E Don copi1e 
Davison~ Coppie., Copple & Cox 
P.O. Box 1583 
.. ., . . . . . , 
.poise, . @ ,.. 83701 
. . 
3bhn T. gzamiz.  
Hepworth & Lezamiz 
133 ~ h & i b n k  St! N. 
P.O. Box 389 
.Twii:~ijfs, ID 83303-0389 
. ., .. 
~ u ~ k e r  & Associates, LLC 
A 605 ~ e s i  Fort St. 
. . P.O;'BOX i625 ' 
Boise, ID 83701 
. . 
~ u . s .  Mail 
IZ]~and Delivered 
Dovemight  ail . . 
~ T e l e c o p y  (Fax) 
NUS. Mail , . 
U ~ a f i d  Delivered 
Clovernight Mail 
m~e lecopy  (Fax) 
a U . S .  Mail 
a ~ a n d  Delivered 
' [IIOvemight'Mail 
[IITelecopy (Fax) 
[ S l ~ . ~ . ' ~ a i l  
r ] ~ a n d  ~eliyered . . 
00vernight Mail 
n ~ e l e c o ~ y  (Fax) 
~ c / ~ u l y  Attorney General' 
Idaho Department of Transportation 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAI-10, ex rel., 1 
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN 1 SUPREME COURT NO. 34485 
MCHUGH, BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE ) 
C. MCCLURE, GARY RLICK, NEIL ) 
MILLER, AND JOHN X COMBO, 1 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, ) 
1 
PlaintiffIAppellant, f 
vs. 1 CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
) 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED ) 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH ) 
INC., 1 
1 
1 
I, KRISTINA GLASCOCK, Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls, do hereby certify: 
That the following is a list of exhibits to the record that have been filed during the 
course of this case. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 (aerial photo of area) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 (Aerial photo of area) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 (aerial photo of area with depiction of previous alternate route) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 (aerial photo of area with depiction of current alternate route) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 (Aerial photo of subject property) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 (aerial photo of subject property) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 7 (aerial photo of subject property) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 (aerial photo of subject property) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 9 (aerial photo of subject property) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 10 (aerial photo of subject property with depiction of property line of 
parcel 41) 
. , .  
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS - 1 ?: .c r, I , . /  . 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., CHARLES L. 
WINDER, JOHN MC HUGH, BRUCE 
SWEENEY, MONTE C. MC CLURE, GARY 
BLICK, NEIL MILLER and JOHN X COMBO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION 
BOARD, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
and 
LAZY J RANCH, INC., 
Defendant. 
1 
1 ) ORDER GRANTING SECOND MOTION 
) TO AUGMENT CLERK'S RECORD 
) SupremeCburt Docket No. 34485-2007 
) Twin Falls County District Court No. 
) 04-6336 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
A SECOND MOTION TO AUGMENT CLERK'S RECORD and AFFIDAVIT OF HEATHER 
A. CUNNINGHAM IN SUPPORT OF SECOND MOTION TO AUGMENT CLERK'S RECORD with 
attachments were filed by counsel for Respondent on December 1, 2008. Therefore, good cause 
appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondent's SECOND MOTION TO AUGMENT CLERK'S 
RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED &d the augmentation record shall include the documents 
listed below, copies of which accompanied this Motion, as EXHIBITS: 
1. Jury Instruction No. 28; and 
2. Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude all Evidence, Testimony and 
Argument regarding the development of subject property with adjacent properties. 
DATED this !be day of December 2008, 
For the Supreme Court 
cc: ' Counsel of Record 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 11 (aerial photo of subject property with depiction of property line of 
parcel 41-1) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 12 (aerial photo of neighboring property with depiction of property 
line of Lazy J Ranch Mobile Home Park) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 13 (aerial photo with depiction of subject property and Lazy J Ranch 
Mobile Home Park) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 14 (aerial photo of depiction of right of way requirements of parcel 
41 and parcel 41-1 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 15 (close-up aerial photo of depiction of right of way requirements 
of parcel 41 and parcel 41-1) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 16 (construction plans of right of way requirements of parcel 41 and 
parcel 41-1) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 17 (aerial photo of subject property and Lazy J Ranch Mobile home 
park at completion of project) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 18 (aerial photo of approaches at completion of project) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 19 (Hyde comparable sales location map) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 20 (Hyde land sales info comparable sale 1) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 21 (Hyde land sales photo comparable sale 1) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 22 (Hyde land sales info comparable sale 2) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 23 (Hyde land sales photo comparable sale 2) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 24 (Hyde land sales info comparable sale 3) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 25 (Ilyde land sales photo comparable sale 3) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 26 (Hyde land sales ii~fo comparable sale 4) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 27 (Hyde land sales photo comparable sale 4) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 28 (Hyde land sales info comparable sale 5 )  
Plaintiff's Exhibit 29 (Hyde land sales photo comparable sale 5) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 30 (Hyde land sales info comparable sale 6) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 31 (Hyde land sales photo comparable sale 6) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 32 (Hyde land sales info comparable sale 7) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 33 (Hyde land sales photo comparable sale 7) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 34 (Hyde land sales info comparable sale 8) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 35 (Hyde land sales photo comparable sale 8) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 36 (Hyde land sales info comparable sale 9) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 37 (Hyde land sales photo colnparable sale 9) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 38 (Hyde land sales info comparable sale 10) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 39 (Hyde land sales photo comparable sale 10) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 40 (Hyde land sales info comparable sale 11) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 41 (Hyde land sales photo comparable sale 11) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 42 (Hyde land sales info comparable sale 12) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 43 (Hyde land sales photo comparable sale 12) 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS - 2 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 44 (Hyde just comnpensation) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 45 (Market conditions survey) 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 46 (Richey Comparables Locations map) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 47 (Richey Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 1) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 48 (Richey Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale I) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 49 (Richey Land Sales Info comparable Sale 2) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 50 (Richey Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 2) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 51 (Richey Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 3) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 52 (Richey Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 3) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 53 (Richey Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 4) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 54 (Richey Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 4) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 55 (Richey Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 5) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 56 (Richey Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 5) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 57 (Richey Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 6) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 58 (Richey Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 6) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 59 (Richey Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 7) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 60 (Richey Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 7) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 61 (Richey Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 8) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 62 (Richey Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 8) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 63 (Richey Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 9) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 64 (Richey Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 9) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 65 (Richey Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 10) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 66 (Richey Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 10) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 67 (Richey Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 11) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 68 (Richey Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 11) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 70 (Kelley Comparables Locations) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 71 (Kelley Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 1) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 72 (Kelley Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 1) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 73 (Kelley Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 2) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 74 (Kelley Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 2) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 75 (Kelley Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 3) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 76 (Kelley Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 3) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 77 (Kelley Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 4) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 78 (Kelley Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 4) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 80 (Dunlap Co~nparables Locations) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 81 (Dunlap Land Sales Info Coml~arable Sale 1) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 82 (Dunlap Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 1) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 83 (Dnnlap Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 2) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 84 (Dunlap Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 2) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 85 (Dunlap Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 3) 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS - 3 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 86 (Dunlap Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 3) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 87 (Dunlap Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 4) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 88 (Dunlap Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 4) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 89 (Dunlap Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 5) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 90 (Dunlap Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 5) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 91 (Dunlap Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 6) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 92 (Dunlap Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 6) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 93 (Dunlap Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 7) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 94 (Dunlap Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 7) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 95 (Dunlap Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 8) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 96 (Dunlap Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 8) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 97 (Dunlap Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 9) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 98 (Dunlap Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 9) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 99 (Dunlap Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 10) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 100 (Dunlap Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 10) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 101 (Dunlap Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 11) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 102 (Dunlap Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 1 I) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 103 (Dunlap Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 12) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 104 (Dunlap Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 12) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 105 (Dunlap Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 13) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 106 (Dunlap Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 13) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 108 (Canyon Vista and Lazy J Aerial Photograph) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 109 (Canyon Vista and Lazy J Aerial Photograph) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 110 (Depiction of Property before separation) 
Plaintiff' s Exhibit 1 11 (Dillinan Comparables Locations) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 112 (Dillman Land Sales info and Photo Comparable Sale 1) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 113 (Dillman Land Sales info and Photo Comparable Sale 2) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 114 (Dillinan Land Sales info and Photo Comparable Sale 3) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 115 (Dillman Land Sales info and Photo Comparable Sale 4) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 116 (Dillman Land Sales info and Photo Comparable Sale 5) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 117 (Dillman Land Sales info and Photo Comparable Sale 6) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 118 (Dillman Land Sales info and Photo Comparable Sale 7) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 119 (Dillman Just Compensation) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 120 (Twin Falls City Code 10-1-6) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 121 (Twin Falls City Code 10-1-5) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 122 (Twin Falls City Code 10-6-1.4) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 123 (Twin Falls City Code) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 124 (Twin Falls City Code 10-12-1-2) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 125 (Twin Falls City Code 10-12-1-5) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 126 (Twin Falls City Code 10-12-2-1) 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS - 4 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 127 (Twin Falls City Code 10-12-3-2) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 128 (Twin Falls City Code 10-12-3-3) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 129 (Twin Falls City Code 10-12-3-9) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 130 (Twin Falls City Code 10-12-4-2) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 131 (Twin Falls City Code 10-1-12) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 132 (Twin Falls City Code 10-2-1) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 133 (letter from Gerald Martens to the City) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 141 (turning movement Canyon Vista) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 142 (turning movement Canyon VistalLazy J) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 144 (traffic flowlWashington StISo. of Falls Ave) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 146 (Fred Meyer aerial) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 147 (Twin Falls Home Depot aerial) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 148 (Twin Falls Canyon Park East aerial) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 149 (Magic Valley Mall aerial) 
Plaintiff's exhibit 153, site diagram concept plan 
Plaintiff's exhibit 154, site diagram concept plan 
Defendant's Exhibits 1001 (property before) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1002 (conditions before the state's taking) 
Defendant's Exhibits 1003 (adjacent properties aerial) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1004 (Resolution No. 1493) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1005 (May 25, 1994 ITD Menlo) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1006 (May 1995 City minutes) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1007 (April 15, 1996 Filer Highway District Letter) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1008 (ITD memo to PDE from ADE dated September 27, 1998) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1009 (Letter to City zoning Administrator f rob  ITD dated July 7 ,  
1998) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1010 (Entrance meeting minutes dated July 16, 1998) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1011 (December 3, 1998 ITD memo to Federal Highway 
Administration from Chuck Carnohan) 
Defendant's exhibit 1012 (access control section of enviromnental assessment) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1013 (Letter to Bonita Koonce from Robert Latham dated January 
5, 2000) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1014 (Letter to Robert Latham from Bonita Koonce dated January 
2 1, 2000) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1015 (Letter to Twin Falls Highway District from ITD dated 
October 22, 2001) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1016 (Section of Canyon Properties PUD Agreement dated March 
2, 2003) 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS - 5 '1 1: m L.d ' i  
Defendant's Exhibit 1018 (Annexation ordinance- Ordinance 2510) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1019 offered, stipulated admitted (Official zoning map for city of 
Twin Falls) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1021 (City of Twin Falls Comprehensive plan land use map) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1022 (excerpt of Twin Falls, City Code 10-2-1 definition of PUD) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1023 (before highs and best use illustration) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1024 (floodwaylfloodplain exhibit) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1025 (Blue Lakes and Pole Line Road existing accesses) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1026 (ordinance no. 24lordinaince adopting street plan 
Defendant's Exhibit 1027 (Twin Falls master street plan functional street classification 
map) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1028 (Pole line road access history) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1029 (property taken by Government) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1030 (neighborhood after taking photo) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1031 (after highs and best use illustration) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1032 (examples of recently approved commercial access) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1033 (comparable sales map) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1034 (Comparable Sales Information) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1035 (just compensation: Roger Dunlap) 
Defeildant's Exhibit 1036 (just compensation of Greg Kelley) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1037 (just compensation: Mark Richey) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1038 (Roger Dunlap adjustment chart) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1039 (Greg Kelley adjustment chart) 
Defe~ldant's Exhibit 1040 (Mark Richey Adjustment chart) 
Defendant's Exhibits 1041 (order of condemnation) 
Defendant's 1042 (First amended Complaint) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1043 (Warranty Deed for Lazy J dated May 7, 1970) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1044 (Quitclaim deed KLS& M) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1045 (Quitclaim Deed BCM&W) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1046 (Quitclaim Deed Canyon Vista) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1047 (building permit for new shop) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1048 (application for building permit) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1049 (master street plan access guidelines table 7) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1050 (actual after approved site plan in Billiar) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1051 (city of Twin Falls map) 
Defe~~dant's Exhibit 1052 (options 1 and 2: parcel 2 approximately 8.8 acres, parcel 3 
approx. 10 acres buyer Manaus, LLC 6-1-04) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1053 (option 3: parcel 4 approx 31.8 buyer Frontera Acquisitions, 
LLC 12-10-2004) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1054 (Option 4: parcel 1 approx 10.6 sold to Manaus) 
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Defendant's Exhibit 1055 (US 93 Study area and system linage) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1056 (project plans pages 112, 113 abd 115 of 477) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1058 (Site generated traffic table 4 page 7) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1059 (access management guidelines for activity centers pages 59 
and 61) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1061 (traffic impact study figure 2 plus table 5) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1062 (traffic impact study figure 4 table 8 and table 9) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1063 (environmental assessment- projected traffic volumes) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1064 (ITD access management standards- auxiliary lane) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1069 (Road and Traffic Signal Spacing) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1070 (aerial photo of showing gold's gym) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1071 (Lease to Lazy J) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1072 (before access options) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1074 (City of Twin Falls/Special Meeting Council Minutes dated 
April 19, 1995) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1078 (Ksispy Kseme Permit) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1079 (PUD Comp plan section 3.7) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1080 (Blue Lakes and Pole Line Intersection Photo) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1082 (before and after aerial photo of property) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1084 (photo of Pole Line Road as built) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1085 (IDAPA Rules 39.03.42) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1086 (Dunlap Land Sales) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1087 (access control section of environmental re-assessment) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1088 (master street plan access guidelines) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1094 (historic deed depiction) 
Defendant's Exhibits 1095 (page from concept report) 
Defendant's Exhibits 1096 (page from concept report) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1099 (ITD policy) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1100 (aerial photo) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1101 (aerial photo before) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1102 (8 aerial photos on one page of Billiar property) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1103 (Billiar property before the taking) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1104 (Billiar property highest and best use photo) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1106 (annexation exhibit) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1108 (John Dillman opinions of value) 
Defendant's Exhibit 11 10 (retail development examples) 
Defendant's Exhibit 11 11 (Eagle River Retail Development) 
Defendant's Exhibit 11 12 (site plan accesses) 
Defendant's Exhibit 11 13 (subdivision definition page) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1114 (Letter from Assistant City Engineer) 
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Court's Exhibit 1 (front page of Times News dated June 11, 2007) 
Exhibits not sent to Supreme Court 
Defendant's Exhibit 1105 (Roger Dunlap's computation on white pad) 
Illustrative purposes 
Defendant's Exhibit 1107 (computation of Greg Kelley white pad) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1109 (map of properties) 
In WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 17Ih day of March, 2008. 
KRISTINA GLASCOCK 
Clerk of the District Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., 1 
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN 1 SUPREME COURT NO. 34485 
MCHUGH, BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE ) 
C. MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL ) 
MILLER, AND JOHN X COMBO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, ) 
Plai~ltiffIAppella~~t, 
VS. 1 CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED ) 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH ) 
INC., 
DefendantIRespondent, 1 
I, KRISTINA GLASCOCK, Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls, do hereby certify that the 
foregoing CLERK'S RECORD on Appeal in this cause was compiled and bound under my 
direction and is a true, correct and complete Record of the pleadings and documents requested by 
Appellate Rule 28. 
I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above-entitled 
cause, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. 
WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court 
this 17Ih day of March, 2008. 
KRISTINA GLASCOCK 
C l ~ k  of the District Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
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PlaintiffIAppellant, 
VS. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED ) 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH ) 
INC., 
DefendantiRespondent, 
I, KRISTINA GLASCOCK, Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the CLERK'S RECORD and 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
Joseph Mallet 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. 0 .  Box 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1 129 
Don Copple 
Heather Cunningham 
Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox 
P. 0. Box 1583 
Boise, ID 83701 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said this 17"' 
day of March, 2008. 
KRISTINA GLASCOCK 
Certificate of Service 
Fax:  2 0 8 3 3 4 4 4 9 8  May 1 0  2 0 0 7  1 6 : 3 6  P. 0 1  
LAWRENNCE G. WASDEN 
ATTOIWEYCrENEIiGL 
JOSEPH D. MALLET 
KARt D. VOGT 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho T~anspo'kttttion Depattmmt 
331 1. West State Sweet 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, I[daba 83707-1129 
Telephone: (2m) 334-8815 
'Facsimile: (268) 334-4498 
ISB 85817 
XSB $501 5 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
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CLERK 
DEPUTY 
IN T E  DISTRICT COURT OF THE FFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF TKE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AM) FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
TH;E STATE OF.IDAHO,, ex rel., 1 
DARREkL V.;MANI\TXNG, R. JAMES 1 
COLEMAN, BRUC~ SWEEW, MONTE C. ) 
~ c C L W ,  GARYBLICK, NEa MJLLER ) Case No. CV-04-6336 
and JOHN X. :COMBO, IDAHO ) 
~ S P O R T A T I O ~ I  BOW, 1 
\ 
Plaintiff, 
I 
) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
1 BIEURCATE 
j -vs- 
1 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED 1 
PARTNERS* AND FAZY J . W C H ,  1 
INc.; ..,, 1 
1 . . 
, D,efendants. 1 
Comes now the Pl&tiff, State of Idaho, by and through its cowe l  of record, Joseph D. 
Mallet, Deputy Attorney General for the State of Idaho, and hereby moves this Court for an order 
bihcating the trial in Ulis'matter so that the scope of the taking issues can be Med and resolved 
by the Court prio* to the presentation of the issue ofjust compensation to the jwy. 
PLAINTIFF~S:MOT~ON'TO BIFURCATE - 1 
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This motion is based upon Idaho Rules of Evidence 42@), and other authorities, as 
further set forth in the Brief in Support of PlaintifPs Motion to Bifurcate, filed concurrently 
herewi as well as the other pleadings and papers on file in this case. 
a 
DATED  his 10 day O ~ M ~ Y ,  2007,
Idaho llmsportation Department 
CERT.WECATE OF SERVICE 
Ei I KflRjBY C~RTIFY that on the day of May, 2007, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above to be served to: 
E Don Copple, ~ u . s .  Mail 
Heather C w g h a m  Q ~ m d  Delivered 
Davison Copple Copple & Cox novernight Mail 
P.O. Box 1583 B~elecopy  (Fax) 386-9428 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
PLAINTIFF'SMOTION TO BIFURCATE - 2 
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JOSEPH D. MALLET 
KARL D. VOGT 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation DeparZment 
33 11 West State Street 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1.129 
Telephone: (208) 334-88 15 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
TSB #5817 
ISB #5015 
Counsel £OK Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRfCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICW DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
TE& STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., ) 
DARRELL V, ML$;NNING, R. JAMES ) 
COLEMAN, ~ R U C E  SWEENY, MONTE C. ) 
McCLURE, GARY BLXCK, NEIL MILLER ) Case No. CV-04-6336 
and JOHN X.':C~;MBO. IDAHO .I 
j 
) BREF IN SUPPORT OF PLAJNTIFR'S ) MOTlQN TO BIFURCATE 
\ 
CANYON V f ~ ~ ~  FAMILY LMTED
1 
,, P A R T N E ~ ~ ~  AND LAZY J RANCH, 
1 
mc., 1 
.I 
Comes now the Plaintiff, State of Idaho, by and through i t s  counsel of record, Joseph D. 
Mallet, Deputy ~ t k e ~  General for the State of Iclaho, and hereby submits rhis Memorandum in 
support of its motion to bifurcate the trial in this matter so that the scope of the taking issues can 
be tried and resolved by the Court prjor tothe presentation of the issue ofjust compensation to 
BRIEF IN SWPORT OF PLALNTJIT'S MOTION TO BIFURCATE - 1 
I T D  LEGAL F a x :  2083344498  
the jury. 
1. 
mTRODU%TION 
Thb ii an eminent domain case. The Plaintiff, State of Idaho (hereinafter, "ED") has 
essentially taken a "slrip take" from Defe~dants, Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership and 
Lazy J. ~ a n c h  (hereinafter, Tefendants") in conjunction with phase one of the US 93 Twin 
Falls Alternate Route Project (hereinafter, "Project"). This Project will ultimately route US 93 
west on Pole Line Road, bypassing the core of the City of Twin Falls. 
Through the discovery process and the recent exchange of pretrial motions, it has become 
clear that there is a dispute between the parties regarding the 'lager parcel" issue in this case. In 
other words, ihe parties disagree as to what consolidated body of land constitutes the remainder 
parcel or the f;tl parcel in the before condition. A specific description of the remaiader parcel is 
essential for &e jury to' analyze the issue of severance damages. For this reason, Plaintiff has 
moved to bihrcate the trial so that the Court can resolve Ihe larger parcel dispute prior to 
submitting the issue of just compensation to the jury. 
11. 
LEGAL STANDaW) 
~ o t i o k  to  bikcate are common in eminent domain cases because, in Idaho, the Coud 
and the jury are both required to decide separate factual issues. In eminent domain cases, 'Yhe 
only issue for,,submission to a jury is the question of the value of the property sought to be taken 
or the amo&t of compensation for the taking." Srate ex rel. Fl~ndro v. Seddon, 94 Idaho 940, 
943, 500 ~ . 2 d  841, 844 (July 28, 1972). All issues other than just compensation are for 
resolution by the trial court. Ruefh v. State, 100 Idaho 203,223, 596 P.2d 75, 95 (1978) rehr'g 
denied (1979) (hereinafter "Rueth r9. This includes any question as to the scope of .the take, 
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which are legdquestions to be decided by the court. Ada County Highway District v. Sharp, 135 
.Idaho 888,892i.26 P:3d 1225,1229 (Ct. App. 2001)). 
Because of the inteaelated fact findig roles of the judge and jury, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has recobzed that trial courts may find it preferable to bifurcate the issues with the court 
fist determining the taking issues, then providing the jury with "an accurate description of the 
property or right therein which has been taken." Ruerh I at 223, 95. The policy behind 
bifurcation is @at "Such a procedure would save the litigants the unnecessary expense of expert 
witness fees &d trial Mme were all issues submirted in one trial and the taking issue then 
resolved adversely to the property owner." Id. 
However, the deeision to bifurcate em'inent domain proceedings is left to the sound 
discretion of ifie trial court. Rueth v, State, 103 Idaho 74, '80, 644 P.2d 1333, 1339 (1982) 
(be~einafter "kueth IT'). This is consistent with azCP 42@) which allows for a cowf, in its 
discretion, to Order separate trials for any sepmte issues in a case "'in fuahemnce of convenience 
or to avoid pkjudice, or *en separate trials will. be conduotive to eexpdition md economy." 
RCP 42@). 
In this case, bifurcation i s  approprjate because the parties have a mate*jal dispute as to 
what constitutes the "larger parcel." ITD asks the court to bifurcate the trial and resolve the 
larger parcel dispute prior to submitting the issue of just compensation to the jury. 
A. The hrrer Parcel Rile. 
The larger parcei issue arises from the language of Section 7-71 1, Idaho Code, which sets 
forth the rules for assessing damages in eminent domain cases. .This statute provides in part that 
"If the property sought to be condemned consfitutes only a part of a larger parcel.. ." then the 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF P,LAINTIFF'S MOTION TO BEWRCATE - 3 
jury must assess '&e damages, if any, '"which will accrue to the portion not sought to be 
coodemned, b.i reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned, and the 
oonstruction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff." I.C. $ 7-711(2) 
(emphasis added).' Incidentally, if severance damages are found, they must be offset by the 
extent the larger parcel is "specially and directly benefited" by the ttaldag. 1.C. $ 7-711(3). 
"Parcel," as used in .(his section, means a consolidated body of land. State ex rel. $mms v. City 
of Motrntain Home, 94 Idaho 528,531,493 P.2d 387,390 (1972)(citing Big Lost River kigation 
Co. v. ~uvidFon,2i Idaho 160,171-172, l Z 1  P. 88 (1912)). 
The larger parcel issue is also related to the valuation of the paxt taken. In the Cfry of 
Galdwell v. Roark, 92 Idaho 99, 437 F.2d 615 (1968), the Court held that the vdue of the part 
taken should be dekmkned "&th the whole parcel being sold in its then condition in one sale." 
Id. at 101, 617 (emphasis added). In that case, the court invalidated a valuation methdd that 
valued the .j&e by comparing it to the market piice of a small portion of the remainder  arce el, 
not the whole.property itself. Simihly, it is enor to not consider the correct larger parcel when 
deciding the appricable highest and best use of the property. Stde ex rel. Symmr v City oJ- 
Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 528,531,493 P.2d 387,390. 
Accordingly, for the jury to analyze just compensation, the jury must be supplied with a 
specific description of the larger parcel. Only after the jw knows the hebods of the correct 
larger parcel can @e jury decide the highest and best use, value of property taken, and whether 
any damages accrue to the larger parcel in excess of special benefits confeaed. It is the court's 
responsibility to decide the larger parcel. In State ex re1 FInndro v. Seddon, 94 Xd&o 940, 500 
P.2d 841, (Jdy 28, 1972), the court held that the jury can only decide questions of just 
compensation. All othw factual issues are to be resolved by the court. Id. at 943,844. Flandro, 
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while not a larger parcel case, concerned a fie issue. The court held W whether or not an 
item was a f i m e  had to be decided by the trial court. Only if and when the trial court decided 
the item in was a fixture would the jury be allowed to determine the value of the fixture. 
. . 
Similarly, in t)~e c+e at bar, it should be the Court that determines the larger parcel. Once the 
larger parcel is settled, the issue can then be given to the jury to determine just compensation. In 
both cases, the court describes the property and the jury values it. 
ITD is obligated to disclose and discuss contrary dicta from State ex rel. Symms v. Cify of 
Mowtadn Home, 94 Idaho 528, 493 P.2d 387 (Feb 2, 1972). In that case, while reviewing the 
correctness of a larger parcei determination, the court mentioned that ordinarily the larger parcel 
, ,.. . 
question wa5.a practical question for the jury. Id. 532, 391. Since that time, the cow has 
specifically addressed. the boundaries of what a jury may properly decide in an eminent domain 
case. It was .the Flandro owe, decided later in 1972, that Tust made it clear tbat '%I emineht 
domain prociediigs the ody issue for submission to a jury is the question of the value of the 
property sought to be taken or tbe mount of compensation for the taking!' Flandro, 94 Idaho at 
943,500 ~ . 2 d  at 844 Ruefh ZaIso clatiiied that the role of the cow was to provide the jury with 
both the "des,wiption of the property or the right therein which has been taken." Rueah I, 100 
Idaho at 223, 596 P. 2d at 95. Since the larger parcel determination arrives at an accurate 
description ofthe property, under Randro and Rueth I, it is a ques'don for the court to resolve. 
p. The Lar~er Parcel Dispute. 
In the,case at bar, there is a dispute as to the larger parcel that needs to be resolved. The 
expert witnesses hired by each side disagree as to the larger parcel determination. For a correct 
resolution of ,$his issue, .the parties need to have a fair opportuuity to argue the applicable law as 
well, as the facts. The larger parcel answers \wy from expert to expert, and those answers wit1 
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vary dependiug on how the Court inteprets the applicable law. Examples of the larger parcel 
dispute follow: 
1. Roger Dunlap (Defense valuation witness). M f .  Dunlap analyzed the larger 
parcel and concluded that the larger parcel matched the legal description jn the 
.complaint. (See Deposition Transcript of Roger L. Dunlap, Exhibit "A7' to 
Affidavit of Josepb D. Mallet in Support of Plaintiffs Mo.tion to Bifurcate, at p. 
,120, LL. 8-1 1) (hereafter 'Dunlap Tr."). However, for purposes of valuing the 
.. taking, he assmed the property was taken from a 1-acre pad site. (Dunlap Tr. at 
1 6 5 , ' ~ ~ .  5-24). This allowed bim to use co&mble sales that indicated pad 
site values, not the value of the parcel described in the legat description. 
2. Mark Ricley (Defense valuation witness). Mr. Richey analyzed the larger parcel 
and concluded that the larger parcel was ody the property described in the 
. 
. complaint. (See Deposition Transcript of Mark Richey, Exhibit "B" to Affidavit 
. of Josepb D. Mallet id Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Bifurcate, at p. 89, L. 24 to 
: p. 90, L. 3) (hereafter 'Schey Tr."). 
3. - S o h  Dillman (Plaintiff valuation witness). Mr. 'Dillman concluded the larger 
parcel included not only ~e subject property, but dso a+ least the adjacent parcel 
to the east. (See Deposition Transcript of John Dillman, Exhibit "C" to Afftdavit 
" of Joseph D. Malle't in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Bifurcate, at p. 13, L. 21 to 
p. 14, L. 12) &reafter "Dillman Tr."). Mr. Dillman discussed that the larger 
. parcel could be She four adjacent parcels. @illman Tr. at p. 3 1, LL. 9-1 1). 
4. . Paul Hyde (Plaintiff valuation witness). While Mr. Hyde assessed damages to the 
subject property, calling that the larger parcel, he also discussed the fact that he 
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. .. 
with dl four adjacent parcels 'developing together, which is essentially a larger 
parcel determination. (See Deposition Transcript of Paul Hyde, Exhibit "D" .to 
~ffidavit of Joseph D. Mallet in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Bifurcate, at p. 7, 
,LL. 13-24) eereafker "Hyde Tr."). Mr. Eyde analyzed the value of the subject 
pxoperty assuming that it would at least develop in conjunction with the: 
peighboring parcels. ffXyde TI. at p. 103, L. 23 to p. 104, L. 7) .  
In a d d i k  to the factual issues related to the larger parcel issue, the C o w  also needs to 
clarify the applicable law. The parties dispute whether legally sufficient unity of ownership 
exists for the.i&er parcel to include the neighboring parceis. In State ex rel. Symsns v. Nelson 
Sadand Gravel, Inc., 93 Idaho 574,468 P.2d 306 (1970), the Idaho Supreme Court held that a 
larger parcel determination does not require a fee interest in each tract. Diering ownerships, 
such as a fee ownership in one paroel and a leasehold interest in another, are sufficient for larger 
parcel purposes. Ndsovr Sand and Gravel, 93 Idaho at 581,468 P.2d at 313. 
The defense witnesses mistakenly believe that a larger parcel determination requires a 
party to own the land in question in fee. Dunlap, for example, says his largw parcel 
determination would have been lafger if su$icient unity of ownetsbip (a fee interest) existed. 
(Dunlap Tr. at p. 112, L. 23 to p. 115, L. 3). Richey also says the absence of common fee 
ownership caused bim to fmd a smaller larger parcel. (Richey Tr. at p. 96, L. 10 to p. 97, I,. 14). 
While finding no univ of ownership, Riohey admi& that the subject property i s  leased by the 
neighboring parcel. (Richey Tr. at p. 102, LL. 3-5). Correctly applying the Nelson Sand and 
Gravel rule, both Dunlap and Richey would have different larger parcels. This law nwds to be 
clarified and applied by the Court before the jury can determine just compensation. 
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Confwion on this issue also exists to the reality of .the ownership of the related parcels. 
J.C, and Magwet , ~ i E m s ,  at one h e ,  owned a "parent parcel7' that has been split bb four 
parts. (~ee :~ ;~os i6on  Transcript of Linda Wills, Exhibit '73" to Affidavit of Joseph D. Mallet in 
. .  . 
Support of ~k&iffs Motion to Bifurcate, at p. 49, LL. 5-14) (bereafter "Wills Tr."). One of 
theses parts the subject parcel which is owned by the Cmyon Vista Family Limited 
Partnership. The children of J+C. and Margaret Wiflims, Linda Wis, Christie Williams, and 
Gary WiIl@!s, are all equal partners in that entity and receive equal disbursements of 
pWership,incpme. (,Wills Tr, atp. 67, L. 1 to p. 69, L.6). The ownership of the m S & M  parcel 
to the west is the same. (Wills Tr. at p. 59, L. 23 top. 60, LA). SimUarly, the parcel to the east, 
the Lazy J. picel, is owned by a corporation and the shareholders of that corporation are the 
. . same people wpo o . p ,  the adjacent parcels as partners. (Wills Tr. at p. 23, L. 6 to p. 24, L. 11). 
h a  sitmation this, .*re the same four people own four adjacent pieces of property 
., . 
under different business entities, fhe hequestion of unity of title for purposes of a larger parcel 
analysis is..a.factual detemhation that needs to be resolved before the jusy can value h a g e s .  
Theparties dispute whether yity of .title exists where the same people o m  adjacent properties 
t h u g h  different entities. ITD argues Nelson Sand and Gravel only requires that the same 
person has an ownership interevt in each of the two tracts. The Defendants, lhrougla aeir 
. " . .  
experts,. argue that the different entity fee owners   re elude a larger   arc el determination 
hcludidg &e.adjacent properties. Tbis factual pad legal dispute must be resolved by the Court 
Pr;or to allow& the jury to determine just compensation. Under these ckcumstances, 
b iba t ion  is.approptiate to resolve the issue prior to presenting the issue of just compensation to 
the jury. 
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IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above-stated reasons, respectfully requests that the Court bifurcate the Ma1 in 
this matter to resolve the larger parcel issues prior to the jury's assessment ofjust compensation. 
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1 identifies the parcels that it is touching. 
2 So the first thing I do is I look at 
3 title to other adjacent properties. And then 1 
4 look at whether these properties have a similar 
5 highest and best use. So if you have a smaller 
6 property with a different zoning, and a different 
7 highest and best use, but it happens to be under 
8 the same ownership, I may call the smaller parce 
9 the larger parcel. 
10 And then the other thing I do is look 
11 at unity of title. Who owns the property is the 
12 potential larger parcel. And then possibly 
13 narrow it down from there. 
14 Q. So you look at the governmental -- you 
15 look at the parcel the government identifies to 
16 start with; correct? 
17 A. Right. 
18 Q. And you look to see if that truly is 
19 what the market would consider the parcel for thd9 
20 purposes of development? 
21 A. Right. 
22 Q. Did I state that accurately? 
23 A. Right. Plus, the ownership. 
24 Q. Right. And that is relevant to you 
2154&e~i~~~.l.uein-what-~egar$L P ge 
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I was. 
2 Do you believe that that is the same 
3 highest and best use for adjacent parcels on both 
4 sides? 
5 A. It's very similar. I can't recall 
6 exactly what it was on Lazy J or KLS&M right now. 
7 But I think it was really similar. 
8 Q. It is your opinion, then, if not 
9 identical, they are substantially the same? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. So in the highest and best use factor 
12 we actually got a check mark. I mean, that is 
13 present on that one factor in your analysis; 
14 correct? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. You don't see any barriers related to 
17 the highest and best use -- nothing about the 
18 highest and best use of the neighboring parcels 
would cause you to make a larger parcel 
20 determination than what you have done? 
21 A. No. You're correct. 
22 Q. And the second factor was -- or it ]nay 
23 have been the first factor you gave me. The next 
24 factor is whether or not the parcels are 
25a.nti.gu~usI&atc~t?.e& 
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1 A. Well, you need to know what you are 
2 appraising. Once you come up with your larger 
3 parcel, that is your subject property. And that 
4 is what you appraise. 
5 Q. Did you perform that analysis in this 
6 case? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. And what was your determination? 
9 A. The determination is the legal 
10 description in the complaint is the larger 
I 1  parcel. 
12 Q. And what was it that made you decide t 
13 use that as your larger parcel in this case? 
14 A. Well, the highest and best use is a 
1 5  mixed used center as illustrated on this diagram 
16 And there are no other contiguous parcels that 
1 7  are owned by the same folks. I guess that's the 
18 end of the analysis. 
19 Q. Okay. So you gave me three factors. 
20 And you applied those three factors. And the 
21 result was the parcel that we've identified is 
22 the larger parcel? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Now, highest and best use of the 
25 subject property. You have just stated what that25 
M & M COlJRT REPORTING 
1 A. Right. 
2 Q. You called it contiguity? 
3 A. Right. 
4 Q. Whether that's a word or not, I think I 
5 know what you are mean. They are touching each 
6 other. They are next to each other. Right? 
7 A. That is a word. 
8 Q. Okay. So you look at the Lazy J parcel 
9 on the east. And what we call the KLS&M parcel 
10 on the west. In fact, the BCM&W parcel -- let's 
11 go one more furiher on the west. 
112 The BCM&W is not contiguous; is it? 
13 A. To the subject; no. 
14 Q. But the two adjacent parcels that 1 
15 have just identified, they are contiguous, and 
16 share the same highest and best use? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. So far so good. It looks like we have 
19 a larger parcel as of these two factors; correct? 
20 A. Correct. 
27 Q. We move down to the unity of title. 
22 A. Right. 
23 Q. And that is the sole reason that you 
24 have determined the lar er parcel to be only the 
subject parcel? 
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I A. Yes. 
2 Q. And what was it that made you decide 
3 there wasn't sufficient unity of title? 
4 A. There are different companies that own 
5 three different parcels. 
6 Q. And the companies would be? On the 
7 subject we have Canyon Vista -- 
8 A. LLC. 
9 Q. It's a limited family partnership, I 
10  think. 
1 1 A. I think it's limited liability company. 
12  But I could be wrong. 
1 3  Q. Whichever the entity is. We've got 
1 4  that entity. And Lazy J is owned by the Lazy J 
1 5  Ranch Corporation? 
16 A. Something like that. 
17 Q. Because those two are different 
1 8  entities, that is the basis of your determination 
19  that unity of title didn't exist? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. And because unity of title didn't 
22 exist, for that sole reason you have taken the 
2 3  larger parcel oiily as the subject property? 
24 A. I should say I started with the premise 
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1 Q. Now, you said it's possible. Is it 
2 likely that would have occurred? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. What effect, if any, would that have 
5 had on your valuation in this case, in your 
6 opinion? 
7 A. I don't know. I can't do that 
8 appraisal on the fly. 
9 Q. Too big for you to say as you sit here 
10  today? 
11 A. Yeah. 
12 Q. Is it possible it would have had a 
1 3  difference? Is it possible it would have made a 
14  difference? 
1 5  A. Yes. 
16  Q. It seems like your severance damage 
17 determination that the subject parcel is 
1 8  landlocked, your determination that there is 
19  damages because it is legally landlocked, that 
20 aspect would go away if the larger parcel 
21 included all three parcels; would it not? 
22 A. It would be different. Now, if it had 
23  access somehow through adjacent parcels -- for 
24 instance, if there was one here (indicating), and 
25-that-.t--thelega-l-de~~-1pt~i0ni~~~~0~~e~t..i~n~~t~~~~25~-~0nehe~e~~i~nd~i~.ti~ng~~w0~1d~~that-b~~a~~~t~t~ 
1 complaint. You know, if you legally described 
2 this, and this property was also owned by Canyon 
3 Vista, LLC, 1 would say, "Wait a minute. How 
4 come there is two different lawsuits or two 
5 different complaints?" But I saw no reason to 
6 include other properties, because they are not 
7 owned by the same entity. 
8 Q. Now, if they were, hypothetically, 
9 owned by the same entity, would your highest and 
10 best -- would your larger parcel determination 
11 have been different? 
12 A. Very possible. 
13 Q. It seems like unity of title was the 
14  one aspect that bumped it down to the size that 
15  you have determined. If that made any sense to 
16 you. Go ahead and answer. 
17 It seemed like unity of title was the 
18 sole factor for you determining the larger parcel 
19 that you did. And I gave you a hypothetical. If 
20 we would have had unity of ownership, or, as yo120 
21 call it, unity of title on the two adjacent 
22 properties, is it possible that your larger 
23 parcel would have been all three of the parcels? 
24 Being Lazy J, Canyon Vista, and I<LS&M? 
25 A. Yes. 
1 drain the whole property? And would all three of 
2 these properties be worth less? Maybe Lazy J and 
3 KLS&M have value now that would be lower if they 
4 had to share access with this middle parcel. I 
5 don't know. That's a biggy. That would be 
6 another assignment. 
7 Q. Ican appreciate the fact that that is 
8 a complex question. 
9 If you can tell me, would you assume 
10 that a larger parcel of all three, including all 
1 I three properties we just discussed, would you 
12 assume that that determination would give you 
13 less severance damages overall? Or can you even 
14 say? 
15 A. I can't say. 
16 MR. MALLET: OEf the record. 
17 (A discussion was held offthe record.) 
18 (Noon recess taken.) 
19 Q. (BY MR. MALLET) Before our lunch break 
we were speaking about the large parcel issue. 
21 And your large parcel determination in this case. 
22 I want to switch gears a little bit and talk 
23 about a concept called assemblage. 
24 Are you familiar with that concept? 
25 A. Yes. 
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1 whole parcel. If I were to buy this whole large 
2 parcel at $5.50 a square foot in the before; 
3 correct? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Your $9.50 a square foot, isn't that 
6 essentially what a purchaser would pay for -- I 
7 want to say a pad site on the front. Is that 
8 fair to say? If I were to buy a pad site on the 
9 front, or if I were to sever off something in 
10 that band on the front, sever off a pad site, I 
I I would pay $9.50 for that as a purchaser? 
12 A. Yeah. And let me just clarify that. 
13 $9.50 contemplates selling off an acre of land 
14 with frontage on Pole Line. There is some 
15 confusioii in the market and in our termiilology 
16 when we talk about real estate. Sometimes padd 
17 mean that you sell this area off to a potential 
18 user. And the parking lot has been installed. 
19 And all of the utilities been stubbed to this 
20 building. And the only thing that is there is a 
21 little piece of dirt where they can drop in the 
22 building and everything is ready to go. That is 
23 not what I'm thinking of when I say pad sites. 
24 Q. I'm with you. What are you describing 
2~-~~..~-.contp~st--t~~what..y~)u..haye 
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1 site for the sake of our discussion right now to 
2 avoid confusion? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Okay. Under that definition of a pad 
5 site, if I were to come up with this piece of 
6 property in the before, and want one of those pad 
7 sites, and I were to buy it, you are saying $9.50 
8 a square foot; right? 
9 A. I'm saying that is the price for the 
10 dirt. 
1 1  Q. Right. 
12 A. The one acre of dirt undeveloped. 
13 Q. The one acre of dirt undeveloped. So 
14 that $9.50 a square foot equates to what you 
15 would sell a piece of -- sever off and sell a 
6 piece of the front dirt to a purchaser? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. You would call that the economy scale? 
19 What do you call that when the individual part in 
20 the front has a higher price than what a 
21 purchaser would be induced to pay for the whole 
22 parcel? What do you attribute that to? 
23 A. Proximity, access, and size. 
24 Q. Those are all characteristics unique to 
j. ~t+~a~~~~~~~-what.-wg.~~&~.~.~.i.n.ga-.pa~i.t~ e?--e?-...----e?- 
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1 A. I'm thinking of a pad site with a 
2 one-acre -- approximately one-acre site that is 
3 suitable for a user to develop a building, as 
4 well as a parking lot. 
5 Q. I appreciate you clarifying that. I 
6 was having trouble forlnulating my question. An 
7 that, I think, was the part I was having trouble 
8 with. 
9 So if you've got a shopping center that 
10 is almost 90 percent built out. There may be a 
1 1  little square of dirt up there with a parking 
12 lot. Services stubbed out. Everything of that 
13 nature. And somebody is going to come by and 
14 stick a coffee shop, or a Jack in the Box, or 
15 something on that square of dirt. 
16 That is what some people refer to as a 
17 pad site; correct? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. My question was -- and I think it was 
20 in line of what you are thinking. What do you 
21 call it when you have your band of value up here, 
22 and you're contemplating the whole site that 
23 would be encompassed for that use? In other 
24 words, not only that little square of dirt, but 
25 the parking lot and -- can we call that a pad 
1 A. Right. 
2 Q. Now, you could have taken the approach 
3 to where you assessed the value by determining 
4 what would be -- what price would be paid by one 
5 buyer for the whole parcel; correct? You could 
,6 have done that? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. But you chose not to? 
9 A. Right. 
10 Q. Now, at the date of the take there was 
I 1  no platted pad site on this property; was there? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. It is still your opinion that a market 
14 existed for one of. those at the date of the take? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. So you basically decide what a 
17 purchaser would pay in the future for land in one 
18 of those smaller pad sites and that is what you 
19 assign to the take? 
20 A. In the future? 
21 Q. At the date of the take. Excuse me. 
22 Would you lilte me to rephrase that? 
23 A. Yes, please. 
24 Q. You basically decide what a purchaser 
25 would pay at the date of the take for land in one 
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1 control on those roads have to reflect the 
2 movement of traffic through urban areas. So 
3 access has changed and I expect it to continually 
4 change to ease the flow of traffic through most 
5 all the towns in Idaho. 
6 Q. So is it fair to say that as cities or 
7 communities grow their access policies become 
8 more restrictive kind of as a general 
9 proposition? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Have you observed this in Twin Falls? 
12 A. 1 observed it, yes. 
13 Q. Certainly Twin Falls is a classic 
1 4  example of a rural community that is being 
15 affected by a lot of growth; is it not? 
1 6  A. Yes. 
17 Q. When you appraised this property, my 
18  understanding of your work and what you've donid 
19 is that your larger parcel determination 
20 coincides with the way ITD has identified this 
21 parcel; is that correct? 
22 A. Well, that would be partly due to it 
2 3  and also it's the ownership of record. 
24 Q. Without respect yet to the reasons why, 
ge 90 
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1 analysis; why didn't you just go in and take 
2 ITD's parcel they've identified and use that as 
3 your large parcel; why does it matter to you as 
4 an appraiser? 
5 A. Well, sometimes the properties that you 
6 are appraising that's identified in a project 
7 reflect a larger parcel and sometimes they don't. 
8 Q. Why do you even care what the larger 
9 parcel is, is what I'm asking; why does it matter 
1 0 to you? 
11 A. Because it determines the highest and 
12 best use. 
1 3  Q. Other than the fact that it relates to 
1 4  the highest and best use, is it useful to you at 
1 5  all? 
16 A. It defines the larger parcel that I'm 
1 7  appraising. 
8 Q. I understand that is what it does. I'm 
1 9  asking yon why that matters. You seem to say it 
20 matters for highest and best use. Does it matter 
21 for any other reason? 
22 A. It matters for highest and best use 
2 3  because you measure the effects of the project 
24 against the highest and best use. Should this 
25-am--I-c~~e~ti~~~de~stand.i.n.g--tbat-y0~1-laer--~~-just-beas~ma~~.-pa~ce1~a-sma~-~~~-pa~~~~~d~ 
1 parcel is exactly the same as the parcel 
2 identified in ITD's complaint? 
3 A. I believe it is. 
4 Q. When you undertake your larger parcel 
5 determination, do you consider it persuasive the 
6 way ITD has addressed the properties? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. In other words, you really don't care 
9 what ITD says the larger parcel is, you make y o u  
1 0  own; is that right? 
11 A. I make my own; that 1s correct. 
1 2  Q. It just happens in this case that your 
13 larger parcel coincides with ITD's parcel in this 
14 case? 
1 5  A. It coincides. 
16 Q. I-Iow is the larger parcel determination 
17 rclevant to your valuation? 
18  A. It generally determines the contiguity 
19 of use, contiguity of ownership, continuity of 
20 use and ownership. It's part and parcel to the 
21 valuation of the property. 
22 Q. Whcn you say it's part and parcel to 
2 3  the determination of the value of the property, 
24 how does that affect the outcome, a smaller 
25  versus a larger; why do you even do this 
1 the project affects the use of that property 
2 stand alone, that is the parcel. 
3 Q. What about severance damages, does it 
4 have any relationship to severance damages or 
5 your assessment of severance damages in the case? 
6 A. The larger parcel; is that your 
7 question? 
8 Q. That is my question. 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. How is that related? 
11 A. Severance damages can be reflected by 
12 change in highest and best use. 
13  Q. We've talked about your general 
14 approach to determining the highest and best use 
15 and why you do it. Did you do that analysis in 
16 this case? 
17 A. Did I do the highest and besl use 
18 analysis? 
19 Q. Yes. Actually, I'm asking about the 
20 larger parcel analysis. I'm sorry. 
21 Did you undertake that in this case? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. You gave me three factors, you said 
24 use, I believe, you looked at, ownership, and 
25 whether the properties a .  
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. While that is generally the analysis 
3 you apply to your larger parcel determinations, 
4 is that the analysis you applied in this case? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. The result of that analysis was that 
7 the property we've described in the complaint i 
8 the larger parcel? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. When you look at neighboring parcels 
I1  the subject property, say, the Lazy J parcel, for 
1 2  example, are there similar uses on the property 
1 3  right now or at the date of the take? 
14 A. Yes. 
1 5  Q. Are the highest and best uses similar, 
16 in your opinion? 
1 7  A. I haven't done one on the Lazy J, so I 
1 8  can't answer that. 
1 9  Q. As you sit here today, do you have an 
20 opinion on whether the highest and best use is 
21 likely the same? 
22 A. I don't know. I don't really know how 
23 the Lazy J fits with all the adjacent properties 
24 and what the access scenarios are. I can't 
25--answer-thatt Page 9 4  
1 Q. You've done the KLS&M property. Let's 
2 look to that side. Is the highest and best use 
3 similar between these two properties, KLS&M and 
4 the subject? 
5 A. In what condition? 
6 Q. In the before condition. 
7 A. Similar. 
8 Q. So it looks like on your use leg of 
9 your analysis you've got the use at the time of 
1 0  the take is similar to at least one of the 
11 adjacent properties; correct? 
12 A. Similar highest and best use, that's 
1 3  correct. 
1 4  Q. Well, not only the highest and best 
1 5  use, but you've got the mobile home park use that 
1 6  spills over on to the KLS&M property, occupies 
17 the Canyon Vista property and the Lazy J as well; 
1 8  right? 
19 A. Well, I believe the manufactured units 
20 that slop over from the Lazy J park that is 
21 located on Canyon View, some of those units, just21 
22 due to the line of the legal description, flop 
2 3  over onto KLS&M property. 1 don't think there is 
24  a technically improved mobile home park, an 
25  economic entity mobile home park constructed on 
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1 KLS&M. I think there is just some survey 
2 discrepancy where they fall over. So highest and 
3 best uses are similar, but the existing uses 
4 would be different. 
5 Q. So we are talking about your larger 
6 parcel determination in this case. When you are 
7 looking at that use factor, just as to that 
8 factor, it looks like you've got some uses that 
9 are common between the adjoining properties on 
t(80 both sides; is that correct? 
I1 A. Well, that happens with almost any 
12 property you would ever appraise has some common 
13 uses. 
14 Q. We are just talking about the use leg. 
15 1 understand you gave me three legs of analysis. 
16 But just as to the use leg, it seems like what 
17 you are telling me is you've got this prong 
18 satisfied as to the neighboring parcels, at least 
19 this prong; is that your opinion? 
20 A. On the highest and best use they have 
21 similar highest and best uses. 
22 Q. But that is not the end of your 
23 analysis; is it? If it was, you'd have a larger 
24 parcel of possibly three or four other parcels; 
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1 A. Right. They don't have common 
2 ownership. 
3 Q. One of the other factors was contiguity 
4 I think you said, whether they are contiguous or 
5 whether they are next to each other. Certainly 
6 the parcels we are talking about, the KLS&M and 
7 Lazy J, are contiguous to the subject property; 
8 are they not? 
9 A. They are contiguous. 
10 Q. We've bumped through two of the factors 
11 and so far it looks like we've got those 
12 satisfied. I take it you get hung up on the 
13 third one, that is ownership? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. If there were common ownership between 
16 all three of the parcels, would you have made a 
17 larger parcel determination that was greater than 
18 the one you made in this case? 
19 A. There is common ownerships between the 
20 two parcels or I should say common interests 
between the two parcels. It's my understanding 
22 the ownership of the subject property is sole and 
23 separate from the ownership of the KLS&M properly 
24 even though they are related entities. The owner 
25 of the subject property doesn't have 100 percent 
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1 interest in the subject property because those 
2 shares or whatever are being transfened out 
3 through estate planning through a family 
4 partnership. 
5 I believe the KLS&M parcel, the owner 
6 there doesn't own 100 percent interest, but has a 
7 majority interest like the subject property, 
8 awaiting additional shares to be gifted through 
9 estate planning and via a family partnership. 
1 0  But it's also my understanding that those parcels 
11 were all created -- they were created prior to 
1 2  the project and the project caused the change of 
13 access to each of those parcels that were 
1 4  created. 
1 5  Q. You have read Christy Williams' 
1 6  deposition; is that correct? 
1 7  A. Yes. 
18 Q. 1,s that where you base your opinion of 
1 9  the ownership or information you received from 
20  her, is that the basis for your opinion that the 
21 larger parcel determination as far as the 
22 neighboring parcels fails on the ownership prong'22 
2 3  A. I think you asked two or three 
24  questions in there. Could you repeat that for 
25...m+please ~ Page 98 
1 Q. I'd be happy to reask it. 
2 It looks like you've considered the 
3 ownership prong in your larger parcel 
4 determination and you think that the adjoining 
5 properties fail that common ownership 
6 requirement; is that correct? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. You get that information from where 
9 that leads you to that determination? 
1 0  A. Well, it's contained in that 
11 deposition, but also at a meeting years ago they 
12 described the ownership in those three parcels 
1 3  when we had the meeting at the clubhouse. 
1 4  Q. Now, the Lazy J Ranch Mobile Home Par134 
15 or manufactured home park has a use that Lazy J 
1 6  parcel and Canyon Vista parcel share; does it 
17  not? 
18  A. Is a use that they share, that's 
1 9  correct. 
20 Q. In other words, this operating mobile 
21 home park, which is apparently named Lazy J 
22 Ranch, it is cited on both of these, the Lazy J 
2 3  and the Canyon Vista parcels? 
24 A. It covers both of those parcels, that's 
25 correct. 
M & M COURT REPORTING 
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1 Q. Now, when you are looking at the 
2 current use of the property, do you believe or is 
3 it your understanding that the Lazy J Ranch 
4 Corporation that owns the Lazy J property, that 
5 they have some sort of a lease or right of use 
6 over the Canyon Vista property? 
7 A. They have a lease over at least a 
8 portion of the property. 
9 Q. "This property" being the subject 
1 0  property? 
1 1 A. Over the subject property, that's 
12 correct. 
13 Q. I know my question may have been a 
1 4  little confusing, so I want to clarify. 
1 5  You believe that the Lazy J parcel 
1 6  owners have a lease on the subject property? 
1 7  A. Well, let me review the lease to be 
1 8  accurate on that. There is a lease in there and 
1 9  I have a copy of the lease in my file and I would 
2 0  like to review that before I answer that 
21 question. 
Q. That would be fine. 
2 3  A. Can we take a break? 
24 MR. MALLET: Actually, that's a good 
2l-.&,a :.. &t$t&~a..bre& Page 1 0 0  
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2 Q. (BY MR. MALLET) We are back on the 
3 record after a short break. 
4 Before we left we were talking about 
5 your opinion that there was some sort of a lease 
6 by the owners of the Lazy J parcel over the 
7 subject property and you qualified that by 
8 saying: I've got a document I need to look at to 
9 give you the real answer. Have you had that 
1 0  document in front of you? 
11 A. Yes. 
1 2  Q. What, if anything, does that tell you 
1 3  about the possibility or the certainty that the 
Lazy J owners have a lease over the subject 
1 5  property? 
1 6  A. It just shows the parties to the lease 
17 and when it was made. So what I wanted to 
1 8  confirm is that the Lazy J did have the lease on 
1 9  it. When you asked me the question, I knew there 
20 was a related entity that had the lease, the 
21 mobile home park, but I didn't know, at the time 
22 I wasn't prepared to answer I knew what entity 
2 3  that was. But it does look like the Lazy J 
24 Mobile Home Ranch does have a lease on the 
25  subject property for the mobile home portion of 
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I the property. 
2 Q. I apologize, we took a break and I 
3 can't remember what I have or haven't asked y o ~ , 3  
4 so I may reask a couple questions. But just to 
5 make sure we are on the same page;itls your 
6 understanding that the Lazy J Mobile Ranch, In 
7 is the owner of the Lazy J parcel? 
8 A. No, that's not my understanding. I 
9 don't know who owns the Lazy J parcel. All I'm 
1 0  commenting on is the lease between the Lazy J 
1 1 Mobile Home Ranch and the part of the subject 
12 property it affects. I believe a previous family 
13 partnership created this lease prior to the -- 
14 prior to the creation of the current ownership. 
15 I think the current owners are successors in 
1 6  title to this property. 
17 Q. Where you see a use that occupies the 
1.8 Lazy J parcel and the subject parcel, do you 
1 9  assume that there are leases in favor of cross- 
20 leases or leases in favor of one property owner 
2 1 ~  over the other; how do you account for that in 
22 your opinion when you are appraising this 
2 3  property; what do you think the facts are; what 
24 did you assume for purposes of your opinion? 
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1 determination, would it matter if separate 
2 parcels were created but not through the legal 
subdivision process? 
4 A. I don't really know what you are asking 
5 me. You can create whatever parcel you want in 
.6 the state of  Idaho. So I don't know what you are 
7 asking me regarding to subdivision. 
8 Q. 1'11 give you a hypothetical. The day 
9 before the date of the take if the owners of the 
1 0  subject property were to have created 20 leases 
1 1 and sold this parcel in 20 different 
12 approximately 1-acre parcels to other people, 
13 would you consider each of those parcels as the 
1.4 larger parcel or how would that affect, if it 
1 5  would, your larger parcel determination? I may 
1 6  need to reask that, let me know if I do. 
1 7  A. You said they created 20. It's a 
18 hypothetical question, but you said they created 
19 20 leases? 
20 Q. Twenty lots. 
21 A. Twenty lots? 
22 Q. Yes. 
23 In other words, if the owner of the 
24 property gets deeds and divides their parcel into 
1 home occupation on the subject property for that 
2 use. 
3 Q. Whatever the lease may be, there is 
4 some sort of lease; is that your opinion? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Now, we've been talking about the 
7 larger parcel determination before our break. 1 
8 would like to continue on, at least for a time, 
9 on that issue. 
10. When you are looking at the way these 
11 parcels were created and the timing and how it 
12 was done, do you have any opinions as to whether 
13 the KLS&M property and the subject property wertfl3 
1 4  legally subdivided from each other? 
1 5  . A. Do I have an opinion if they were 
16 legally subdivided from each other? 
17' Q. Yes. 
18  A. No. 
1 9  Q. Did you make any assumptions of that 
20 nature when you formulated your opinion in this 
21 case? 
22 A. They are each legal parcels of record 
23 and as far as the legality of a subdivision, I 
24 don't have an opinion to that. 
25 Q. As far as your larger parcel 
1 them away to other people, would that affect your 
2 larger parcel determination on the next day, the 
3 date of the take? 
4 A. It may. 
5 Q. Now, if they didn't go through a 
6 subdivision process, in other words, those splits 
7 were not created through a subdivision or they' 
8 didn't avail themselves of the subdivision 
9 requirements to make those smaller divisions of 
1 0  their property, would that matter to you? 
11 A. It may not in the hypothetical you are 
12 describing because I believe you can survey and 
divide any parcel pretty much any way you want to 
14 in the state of Idaho. If you break, if you 
1 5  create what they call maybe an illegal 
1 6  subdivision parcel, it depends on what the county 
17 records are, the ones that are illegal you 
18  couldn't build a house on them. And since you 
1 9  are not putting houses on that parcel, it 
20 probably wouldn't have a big effect on it because 
21 you are going to go through the entitlement 
22 process to put the property to its highest and 
23 best use anyway and cure those issues. 
24 Q. So in other words, ifthat were screwed 
25  up, if the creating of the lots was done outside 
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and particularly the four parcels owned by the 
Williams extended family unit, it was clear to me 
that the larger parcel was not an individual 
property, that the mobile home park, the Lazy J 
Mobile Home Ranch, was operated as a single mtit 
across three properties. And YS percent of them 
were on parcels 19 and 41, and I concluded that 
was a larger parcel. And I concluded that parcels 
16 and 40 were a separate larger parcel. And at 
the advice of counsel, I use those two different 
units as larger parcels, but the compensation was 
allocated out to each different parcel separately. 
Q. As an appraiser how do you properly 
determine the larger parcel? 
A. It has to do with ownership, use, and 
particularly the proximity to each other. 
Q. Is there a definition of larger parcel 
that you use? 
A. Basically, the three components that I 
just gave you define a larger parcel. But it has 
to be somewhat flexible; it might not have all 
three -- ownership, unity of use, and contiguity 
--all, in every case. 
Q. And how do you use the three factors lo 
determine what the larger parcel consists of! 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Is this updating a specific page 
of the report? 
A. I'd have to look at the report, but 
there was a math error on -- here's the summary of 
it. It had to do with the summary ofthe 
remainder value, and explained the error. It was 
a thousand-dollar error, so the compensation would 
have been 326 instead of 327. 
Q. Okay. And when did you discover that? 
A. Saturday. 
Q. This past Saturday? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you have refreshed yourselfon your 
2003 report? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you believe that report was an 
accurate assessment of fair compensation as of 
July 30th, 20037 
A. With the correction to the 326, yes. 
Q. Okay. Why did you in your 2003 report 
appraise the Canyon Vista as a stand-alone 
property, and in your update combine it with 
parcel 1 Y? 
A. The more I was involved in the project, 
Page 14 
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A. You look at the property you are 
appraising. You look at the ownership, you look 
at the usc. 
Q. Do you look at the current use or the 
highest and best use? 
A. You have to look at both. Current use 
could be the highest and best use. 
Q. Let's deal with the ownership issue 
first. How did you analyze that and determine the 
larger parcel in doing your Canyon Vista 
appraisal? 
A. The original tract owned by the 
Williams family was about 82 acres. Originally, 
it was subdivided -- not subdivided. It was split 
into two properties: Lazy J, and J and M 
Investments. And in November of 2001, J and M 
Investments split their area into three tracts of 
land which are now known as parcels 41, 16, and 
40; for the project, not the joint legal 
descriptions. 
Q. When was the property originally split 
into Lazy J and J and M? 
A. I don't have a date on the Lazy J, 
which occurred before November of 2001. But the 
other split occurred on November 2nd, I believe, 
Page 1 6  
2001. 
Q. How do you know Lazy J was split off 
before 20017 
A. There was a reference in my 2002 
appraisals where -- no, that's not quite right. 
The original set of plans showed parcel 19 as 
Lazy J and the other three as parcel 16. So based 
on that, I assumed that Lazy J had been separated 
before the other three properties. They could 
have all occurred at once in November of 2001. 
But there is no record that I have, there is 
nothing in the title report that shows that. 
Q. That shows what? 
A. I'm sorry? 
Q. There's nothing in the title report 
that shows what? 
A. That it was split off earlier than 
that. 
Q. And is that why, throughout your 2007 
appraisal report, you reference all four as being 
split at the same time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When you read that report, you were 
under the impression that all four were split at 
the same time. 
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1 hasn't changed. 
2 Q. What did you conclude about the highest 
3 and best use before the taking of the Lazy J piece 
4 standing alone? 
5 A. Same conclusion. 
6 Q. What did you conclude about the KLSMN, 
7 or parcel 16 piece, standing alone? 
8 A. Same conclusion. 
9 Q How about BCM&W on the corner -- 
1 0  A. Same conclusion. 
11 Q. You need to let me finish my question 
1 2  for the record. 
13 What was your conclusion of the highest 
1 4  and best use BCM&W standing alone? 
1 5  A. Same conclusion. 
1 6  Q. So all four pieces in your view have 
17 the same highest and best use; correct? 
1 8  MR. MALLET: Object to the question. The 
1 9  form of the question is not clear whether you are 
20 asking him in the before or the after. 
2 1  MS. CUNNINGHAM: In the before. 
22 THE WITNESS: In the before, the highest and 
23 best use is to develop all four of them in one 
24 master plan, one C-1 PUD. 
25 / / I  
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1 BY MS. CUNNINGHAM: 
2 Q. So for highest and best use purposes, 
3 why wouldn't that point to the larger parcels 
4 being all four pieces then? 
5 A. Well, like I said, reanalyzing the 
6 property over the years that I have spent on this 
7 project, I reconsidered my original conclusions in 
8 that the property would have to be developed 
9 together to maximize the benefits to the 
1 0  ownership. And it was clear that the ownership 
11 stretched across three, at least three of the 
12 properties that were operated as the Lazy J. 
1 3  So I changed my opinion about the 
1 4  larger parcel. The highest and best use never 
1 5  changed. The broad highest and best use for 
1 6  redevelopment sometime in the future is commercial 
17  and residential. 
1 8  Q. You said that the three prongs of 
1 9  determining the larger parcel were ownership, use, 
20 and contiguity, meaning whether or not the 
2 1  properties are contiguous to one another; correct? 
22 A. Yes, correct. 
2 3 Q. So if we look at all four pieces, under 
24 your analysis they would have common ownership 
25 because they are all somehow tied into the family, 
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1 and that is all that's required; correct? In your 
2 view? 
3 A.' In my opinion, yes. 
4 Q. And all four of them have the same 
5 highest and best use; correct? In the before? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. And all four are contiguous; correct? 
8 A. Correct. 
9 Q. So why isn't the larger parcel all 
1 0  four? 
11 A. The larger parcel could he all four. 
1 2  Q. Yes, it could. Why isn't it? 
13 A. Well, I think it had to do with the 
1 4  fact that the parcel numbers were developed by the 
1 5  Highway Department, that the ownership required 
16 compensation to each of the four individuals and 
1 7  not as one lump sum, and that the value 
1 8  conclusions were the same for each larger parcel. 
1 9  So in effect, it was appraised as one larger 
20 parcel. The before value of each parcel is the 
21 same as the -- same as the after value. 
22 But you're right. In retrospect, it 
23 could have been appraised as one parcel. 
24 Q. Are you saying, in effect it was -- one 
25 larger parcel as all four because your values were 
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1 the same in the before, or similar; and your 
2 values were the same in the after in each separate 
3 appraisal? 
4 MR. MALLET: Object to the form. 
5 THE WITNESS: Well, I'll retract that. 
6 There's two larger parcels: One is improved, with 
7 95 percent of the mobile home park. The other 
8 larger parcel is mostly cropland. 
9 BY MS. CUNNINGHAM: 
1 0  Q. Would you agree that the current use is 
11 not as important as the highest and best use when 
1 2  you are appraising property for condemnation? 
13 A. Yes. 
1 4  Q. Would you agree that when you're 
15 determining the larger parcel, the highest and 
1 6  best use is what you need to look at as far as 
1 7  unity of use? 
1 8  A. Yes. 
1 9  Q. And that is more important than the 
20  current use in that context; correct? 
2 1  A. If it's in the changing market, yes. 
2 2 Q. And this is a changing market; correct? 
2 3 A. Yes, it is. 
24  Q. And it was in 2004? 
25 A. It was in 2004, yes. 
8 ( P a g e s  29 to 3 2 )  
Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho, (208) 345-3704 
www.etueker.net 
Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho, (208) 345-3704 
www.etucker.net EXHIBIT NO. 
State of Idaho v. Canyon VistaFamily 4/6/2007 
Page 5 
1 A. Six or seven. 
2 Q. How recently? 
3 A. I just finished one last week. 
4 Q. What would be the first condemnation 
5 report that you did, what point in your career? 
6 A. Probably three or four years ago. 
7 Q. So you've only been doing condemnation 
8 work for the last three or four years? 
9 A. Yes. 
1 0  Q. Have you ever done any condemnation 
11 work for property owners? 
1 2  A. Yes. 
13 Q. What percentage of your condemnation 
1 4  work's been for owners? 
1 5  A. I guess probably one out of six, so 
1 6  that would be, what, whatever percentage that 
1 7  works out to, a little less than 20 percent. 
1 8  Q. Out of the five that you've done for 
1 9  condemnors, would those all be for ITD? 
2 0 A. Yes. 
2 1  Q. And how did you come to start 
22  appraising for ITD in condemnation? 
23 A. I received a phone call, oh, it's been 
24 a couple, a number of years ago from a Scott 
25  Campbell. They were interested particularly at 
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1 that time for business valuations. 
2 Q. What pro.jects have you worked for ITD 
3 doing condemnation work? 
4 A. Let's see. As best I recall there was 
5 a mobile home park in Idaho Fails. There's 
6 been -- it was the Fearless Farris property there 
7 in Nampa. And there's been, let's see, three on 
8 this Twin Falls project. It seemed like there was 
9 another one somewhere, too, but those are the ones 
1 0  I can remember off the top of my head. 
11 Q. What other properties did you appraise 
12 in Twin Falls? 
13 A. Two of the parcels that were next to 
14 this one, the Lazy J. and then the KLS&M. 
1 5  Q. Did you ever do any work on the comer 
1 6  parcel BCM&W? 
17 A. No. 
1 8  Q. Before we begin today, are there any 
1 9  changes that you'd like to make to your March 7, 
20 2007 report in tbis matter? 
2 1  A. I jus! wanted to clarify perhaps the 
22 discussion in the cover letter dealing with the 
23 larger parcel. As I read through it last night, I 
24 realized that 1 didn't clarify what is mentioned 
25 later on in the report. 
Paul Hyde 
Page 7 
1 Q. Okay. I would agree. Why don't you 
2 tell me what you'd like to change in that regard. 
3 A. Just that I considered the larger 
4 parcel issue in this case, the main concern is the 
5 unity of ownership as to whether or not that 
6 exists and view that as a legal matter. And so I 
7 really considered the legal -- from the position 
8 just the one parcel, the Canyon Vista parcel, this 
9 parcel 41 is probably, as I mentioned later, is my 
1 0  larger parcel. However, as  you gathered through 
11 the report, I still considered all four parcels in 
1 2  highest and best use considerations. 
1 3  Q. Okay. If I understand you correctly, 
1 4  you're saying that the larger parcel that you've 
1 5  appraised and valued is specifically only parcel 
1 6  41; is that correct? 
1 7  A. Yes. 
1 8  Q. However, in your view, the property 
1 9  would be developed together all four for highest 
20 and best use purposes? 
2 1  A. Yes. 
22  Q. All right. And that's true in your 
2 3  view both before and after the taking; correct? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. When you say unity of ownership is a 
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1 legai issue, what do you mean by that from an 
2 appraisal standpoint? 
3 A. Well, in my investigation of the four 
4 named entities, there's clearly some common 
5 ownerships. And looking at the appraisal text, it 
6 talks about there are some cases that say that 
7 common ownership is sufficient and some that would 
8 argue that point. I'm not an attorney, so I'm not 
9 going to specify how that would work out. 
10 Q. Okay. Did you ask for any 
11 clarification on that issue from ITD's legal 
1 2  department? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. What did you learn? 
1 5  A. They really wanted me to just conclude 
1 6  on a value for this specific parcel. So it wasn't 
17 as big an issue. 
18  Q. So your value of $3 a foot before and 
1 9  after assumes that this property is sold as a 
2 0  stand-alone piece in the market? 
2 1 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Are you familiar with the process that 
23 ITD has for having a list of approved appraisers? 
24 A. Yes. 
2 5 Q. And have you made application to be on 
2 (Pages 5 t o  8 )  
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1 initial other than larger parcel because of the 
2 legal connotation. I wasn't meaning that, just 
3 meaning because of the bigger piece. And I 
4 realize I should have come up with different 
5 verbiage. 
6 MR. MALLET: Bigger parcel. 
7 THE WITNESS: Bigger parcel, would that 
8 work? The bigger combined parcel. I should have 
9 said like the combined fours parcels or something 
l o  like that would have been more clear. 
11 Q. BY MS. CUNNINGHAM: Right, to refer to 
1 2  your highest and best use concept. 
13  A. Exactly. 
1 4  Q. But when we get to our valuation 
1 5  concept, we're just dealing with this as a stand- 
16 alone? 
17 A. Yes. That's what I should have said. 
1 8  I wasn't thinking the larger parcel word as a 
19 legal connotation. 
25 Q. Let's take a little break. 
2 1  (Recess.) 
22 Q. BY MS. CUNNMGHAM: All right. Page 64 
23 is where we're going next. 
24 A. Okay. 
25 Q. Okay. The second paragraph down you've 
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1 mentioned that you've talked to both Mr. Mallet 
2 and JoAnn Butler about this issue of the trailer 
3 parks -- I mean the mobile home evictions or 1 
4 don't know if you want to call them evictions but 
5 redevelopment of the site. 
6 A. Yes. It sounds better; huh? 
7 Q. Yes. If I understand you correctly, 
8 you had a concern about whether or not you could 
9 redevelop the site given its current use; is that 
10 fair to say? 
11 A. Well, not whether you could but at 
12 least considering timing and costs and would that 
13 impact the properiy and how much. 
14 Q. And do you think that a six-month 
15 timeframe to transition the use would have any 
16 impact on value? 
17 A. I consider that in the value basically. 
18 In other words, I think I concluded I probably 
19 would have concluded at a little bit higher value 
20 had it not been for the mobile home park but not a 
21 significant amount. Now in other states where 
2 2  there's other issues, then it would have made a 
23 major difference. But Idaho, this is -- as far as 
24 we could determine this is it. 
25 Q. Okay. On page 65 you deal with the tax 
Paul Hyde 
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1 assessment. I'm wondering if you know whether or 
2 not the tax assessed value of the property is 
3 going up or down? 
4 A. I don't know. But generally it goes 
5 up, but I don't know for sure. 
6 Q. If it were going down, would that 
7 impact your view at all? 
8 A. No. If it were an income-producing 
9 property, it would, but in this case it wouldn'l. 
10 Q. On page 67 and a couple other places in 
11 the report under physical possible use you 
12 reference the relatively large size of the 
13 property, and given your other statements I was 
1 4  confused as to whether that meant the 20-acre or 
1 5  the 82-acre size. 
16 A. This is particularly now we're talking 
1 7  just about this would be the 20-acre piece. 
18 Q. So you consider that to be a relatively 
1 9  large size? 
2 0 A. Yeah. But as I've mentioned, you know, 
21 you'd make more money ifyou'd develop it as an 
22 80-acre site. 
23 Q. Along similar lines on page 68 when 
24 we're talking about the conclusion of highest and 
25 best use if leA vacant, again are we talking 
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1 about a subject development as a mixed use 20-acre 
2 or as an 82-acre? 
3 A. It's really both. Talking specifically 
4 at this point I'm valuing this specific piece, so 
5 it's the 20-acre piece. But I'm looking at that 
6 highest and best use for the entire parcel so the 
7 larger -- not larger parcel, the bigger piece. 
8 Q. Did you do an economic feasibility 
9 study? 
10 A. No. 
11 Q. Did you do a developmental approach as 
12 a check on highest and best use? 
13 A. No. 
14 Q. Okay. Now on page 74, I need some help 
15 understanding what you're saying here about the 
16 before and after camps. 
17  A. Okay. 
18 Q. You seem to be saying that it's okay to 
19 use comps for both the before and the after, the 
20 same comps, and I'm curious how that relates to 
21 disregarding project influence in condemnation. 
22 A. Well, in this case as I mentioned you 
23 ordinarily try and do others, but because of the 
24 long history of this project, 1 thought that that 
25 was basically so well known that it was basically 
26 (Pages 101 to 104) 
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1 A. 19 spaces were added at a later date. 
2 Q. Do you know roughly where those were, 
3 or where those are? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Where is that? 
6 A. That would be -- well, take 157 spaces 
7 and subtract 19, and they're between those two 
8 numbers. 
9 Q. I just mean, where are they located? 
10 Are those the ones on the property line in 
11 between? 
12 A. No. No. They would be on the north 
13 side of Canyon Vista. They would run along Pole13 
14 Line Road. 
15 Q. It's my understanding that in between 
1 6  Canyon Vista and the KLS & M parcel, there are 
1 7  row of trailers that are split by the property 
I 1 .  Is that your understanding? 
1 9  A. Yes. 
20  Q. And there may even be a couple that are 
21 over the property line; is that correct? 
22 A. That's correct. 
2 3  Q. And those were in existence or in place 
24  before the property line was created? 
25 PA. T h a , k e ~ ~ & .  Page 
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1 corporate shareholder for the Lazy J Corporation 
2 and as an employee of the corporation. First of 
3 all, you are a currently a shareholder in the 
4 Lazy J Corporation; are you not? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. When I say Lazy J Ranch, the full name 
7 is Lazy J Ranch, Inc.? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. And you are a shareholder in that 
1 0  entity? 
11 A. Yes, I am. 
1 2  Q. And you were at the time of the taking 
in this case, which was December 28th, 2004? 
1 4  A. Yes. 
1 5  Q. What are your responsibilities in the 
dl6 corporation as a corporate shareholder, if any? 
17 I think you were listed as secretary? 
1 8  A. I'm secretaryltreasurer now. My 
1 9  parents were always the officers, and the three 
20 of us were directors up until -- oh, I don't 
21 know -- four, or five, six years ago. I can't 
22 remember exactly what year. We thought it best 
2 3  that somebody be an officer. 
24 Q. Now, just for the record, you have a 
2 2 ~ 5  7 b * = M b * ?  Page 2 4  
1 Q. Okay. I was led to believe that you 
2 are the manager of the mobile home park; is that 
3 fair to say? 
4 A. That's what they call me. 
5 Q. Can you explain what your duties are. 
6 Why don't you explain to me what your position 
7 is, or what your duties are generally, basically. 
8 A. Basically, I am the manager. I oversee 
9 the employees we've got; the outside person, 
1 0  people who do our lawn mowing; my office help,lO 
? 1 which right now is my granddaughter. I collect 
1 2  rent. I pay the bills. I pay the employees and 
13 do the withholdings. 
14 Q. Now, is this your primary occupation? 
15 A. Yes. 
1 6  Q. Do you receive a wage? 
17 A. Yes. 
1 8  Q. Would you consider yourself an employee18 
1 9  of Lazy J Ranch Corporation? 
2 0  A. Yes. 
21 Q. Is that who your W-2 would show as you 
2 2  employer? 
23 A. Absolutely. 
24  Q. And one thing I'm curious about is the 
25 split between your responsibilities as a 
1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. And a sister, Christie Wills? 
3 A. Williams. 
4 Q. Excuse me, my apologies. 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. They are both shareholders in this 
7 corporation? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. And currently, your mother is the 
fourth shareholder in the Lazy J Corporation? 
I 1  A. She is the president. 
12 Q. So it looks like you said, until four 
1 3  or five years ago, it was you and your parents 
14 that were the directors; is that correct? 
15 A. No. My mother and my father were the 
16 officers. And my brother and sister and I were 
17 directors. 
Q. Directors; okay. What type of 
19 decisions as the secretary and treasurer can you 
20 make for the corporation, or do you make? 
21 A. Boy, what kind of decisions? 
22 Q. I have to ask. Can you give employees 
23 raises? You are the employee. 
24 A. I would like to. 
25 MR. COPPLE: R 
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1 were split, and the ownership interest of all 
2 these different entities. So I'm going to try to 
3 wade through that. 
4 A. Okay. 
5 Q. We've gone through the easy stuff, and 
6 it took a long time. I'm hoping that's not a 
7 hard venture of things to come. But let's go 
8 ahead and start by talking about how these 
9 properties were split-up originally. 
10 Originally, your mom and dad owned a 
11 very large piece of property that now consists of 
I 2  what we call the BCM & W, the KLS & M, the Canyonn2 
13  Vista, and the Lazy J parcel? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. So at one point, your mom and dad owned 
16 that piece of property? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. And the first split, it looks to me was 
19 in 1970, where they split off what we call the 
20 Lazy J parcel -- 
21 A. That's correct. 
22 Q. -- which is the coulee and east; 
23 correct? 
24 A. Correct. 
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I A. It's the corporation, and it's owned by 
2 my brother, my sister, and I, and my parents. 
3 Q. Now, it seemed like in 1970, there was 
4 a name change. It looked like it was Lazy J 
5 Mobile Home Park? 
6 A. That's correct. 
7 Q. But that's the same corporation? 
8 A. Absolutely. 
9 Q. Except the name change, the Lazy J 
10  Ranch, Inc. today is the same corporation? 
11 A. Yes. 
Q. In 1970, as far as I can see, the 
13 corporate records show that there were three 
14  shareholders in the corporation. And I showed it 
15 Emil Pike was one share, your mother was one, and 
1 6  your dad was one. Are you familiar with that at 
17 all? 
1 8  A. Kind of. I vaguely remember that when 
19 it was first set up as the corporation, he was 
20 their attorney, and he had to have a share or 
21 something. I don't remember any more than that. 
22 Q. So the lawyer drafted the documents and 
23 included himself in the deal, it looks like? 
24 MR. COPPLE: That was not uncustomary, 
2 5 & ~ 6 a u ~ ~ ~ 6 0 y 3 e r - i l ~  
I canals coulees in Twin Falls? 
2 A. No, I don't. Because supposedly, it's 
3 an incorrect name for them. 
4 Q. Is that a French word or -- 
5 A. It beats me. 
6 MR. MALLET: Do you mind if we take a 
7 recess, since I spilled water? 
8 MR. COPPLE: No. 
9 (A recess was had.) 
10 Q. (BY MR. MALLET) Now, this original 
I I division was in 1970, as far as you know? 
1 2  A. Yes. 
13 Q. And it left what we now call the Lazy J 
14 parcel. And then its adjacent eastern parcel had 
1 5  about 60 acres in it? 
16 A. That was my mom and dad's parcel that 
17 was left. 
18 MR. COPPLE: But that's not what he 
1 9  asked you. Was there about 60 acres in the 
2 0  parcel that was left? 
2 1 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
22 MR. MALLET: Thanks. 
2 3  Q. (BY MR. MALLET) At the time it was 
2 4  split, who owned the Lazy J property, if you 
2 5  know? 
1 That was the days before one-man companies. 
2 MR. MALLET: I didn't know that. I was 
3 wondering why it was that way. 
4 Q. (BY MR. MALLET) But basically, as far 
5 as you know, it was your mom and dad that ran the 
6 corporation. And your lawyer was only nominally 
7 included? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. So in 1970, we have a corporation with 
10  your mom and dad owning what we call the Lazy J 
11 parcel. It's been split off from the 60-acre 
1 2  parcel. At the time it was split off, it was 
1 3  owned by whom, if you know? 
14  A. J C and Margaret Williams. 
15 Q. Was that the J&M, Limited Partnership 
1 6  that owned that, by chance? 
1 7  A. No. 
1 8  Q. That came to be actually later; didn't 
1 9  it? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. So your mom and dad owned the 60 
22 individually, and then they owned the smaller 
2 3  parcel through the corporate entity in '70. 
24 A. The land is actually in the 
25 corporation. 
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1 Q. (BY MR. MALLET) So the property was 
2 transferred out of the J & M Family Investments, 
3 Limited Partnership -- it was transferred out, 
4 that would be the transfer in November of 2001, 
5 which split the 60-acre parcel? 
6 A. The 60 acres was transferred out. 
7 Q. That's correct. So we've gone from 
8 1970, where the 60 acres was held by your mom ailc~ 
9 dad? 
10 A. Right. 
I1 Q. ,And then we move to 1983, where it was 
12 transferred from your mom and dad to the J & M 
13 Family Limited Partnership? 
14 A. That's right. 
15 Q. And now I'm moving ahead to 2001, 
16 specifically, November, and now it looks like the 
17 limited partnership transferred title of that 60 
18 acres to -- 
19 A. Right. That's correct, to the three 
20 other entities. 
21 Q. Right. Okay. I have a copy of a 
22 quitclaim deed from the limited partnership to 
23 the Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership, and 
24 that appears to have been dated November Znd, 
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1 A. I imagine that's when it was gifted 
2 over to her entities. 
3 Q. Okay. And you would have a similar 
4 quitclaim deed -- 
5 A. Right. 
6 Q. --to your entity, which would he the 
7 KLS&M? 
8 A. Yes. Right. I know I'm talking over 
9 him. I'm sony. 
10 Q. Again, that's productive to do that in 
11 everyday conversation. It's just going to muddle 
1 2  our record up a little. 
13 A. Okay. 
1 4  Q. So my questioil was: You received a 
15 similar quitclaim deed that deeded the ICLS & M 
1 6  property into your entity? 
1 7  A. Yes. 
18  Q. And as far as you know, the 60 acres 
19 has stayed titled the same way, since this 
20 transfer in 2001 ; as far as you know, have all 
21 three of the parcels stayed in the same ownership21 
22 since that time? 
- 04/24/2007 
Page 59 
1 THE WITNESS: I don't know why you had 
2 me bring anything. You've got everything. 
3 Q. (BY MR. MALLET) Actually, I don't have 
4 everything that you've brought. I have quite a 
5 few items from your sister. She claimed not to 
6 have access to Lazy J. She punted to you, I 
7 guess, so ... 
8 A. That's probably true, though. 
9 Q. I figured it was. Since you were not 
10 only the manager, but the secretary of the 
11 corporation as well. So here we are. 
12 These partnerships, the limited 
13 partnerships that received title in 2001, your 
14 entity was the KLS & M partnership, the limited 
15 partnership? 
16 A. Yes. 
17  Q. And the general partner at that time 
18 was or is the KLS & M, LLC? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. And that has one member, which is you; 
21 correct? 
22 A. Correct. 
23 Q. At the time it received title, who were 
24 the limited partners, if you know, of that 
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1 A. In other words, the date of the change? 
2 Q. Correct, 2001? 
3 A. Myself, my sister, and my brother. 
4 Q. How about your mother? 
5 A. You know, they did have a little 
6 percentage, and they -- I believe, that was 
7 signed over right at the time of the change of 
8 the entity. 
9 Q. The reason I ask is, because it looks 
1 0  to me like on the Canyon Vista, instead of having 
11 an LLC, you have a corporation, which is the 
12 general partner, which is your sister, Christie? 
13 A. MIII-1u11m. 
1 4  Q. But the limited partners are -- as far 
15 as the documents I've seen, were originally your 
16 inom and dad, and then you, your sister, your 
1 7  brother. And that seemed like it was probably 
18 the case on the KLS & M as well; is that correct? 
19 A. I guess I lost you when you were 
20 talking about her corporation. What does that 
have to do with it? Okay. Start again. 
2 Q. Yes. If you don't understand, all you 
2 3  A. Yes. 23  have to do is ask me to repeat the question. 
24 MR. MALLET: She's going to wait. 1: A. Okay. Repeat it. 25  She's giving me a hard time, Don. Q. Instead of having an LLC as the general 
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1 Q. And your mom and dad, possibly? 
2 A. They had .3  something in the beginning, 
3 and then they gifted it out immediately. 
4 Q. Now, how was it that your 
5 grandchildren -- 
6 A. Mm-hmm. 
7 Q. -- and your daughter, how do they come 
8 to supplant your sister and your brother and your 
9 mom and dad as owners of the KLS & M, the limited 
10 partners? 
11 A. Okay. You are going to have to repeat 
12 that. 1 don't understand that. 
13 Q. You said originally, your brother, 
14 sister and your mom and dad, and possibly you 
15 were limited partners in the KLS & M, Limited 
7 6 Partnership? 
17 A. That's correct. 
18 Q. It looks like that's changed; hasn't 
19 it? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. How did that come to pass? Did 
22 somebody gift to your kids? 
23 A. No, sir. 
24 Q. Did they gift to you and gift to your 
~ E L - & ~ ~ F P ~  Page 
1 A. I also gifted to my children, and I 
2 also gifted to my brother's children. In return, 
3 he gifted to his children and gifted to my 
4 children. He gifted from his part in my entity 
5 to my children. 
6 Q. And you gifted from your part in his 
7 entity to his children? 
8 A. Yes, I did. 
9 Q. When did that happen? 
10 A. Right off the bat, I started gifting to 
1 I my children and my grandchildren. I think maybr4 
12 it was the next year I started gifting to his 
13 children. Then when he got grandchildren, I 
14 gifted to all of them. 
15 MR. COPPLE: We've been going an 
16 hour-and-a-half. Do you want take a break? 
17 MR. MALLET: Yes, let's do it. Let's 
18 take a real break. 
19 (A recess was had.) 
20 MR. MALLET: Back on the record. 
21 Q. (BY MR. MALLET) I think we've gone 
22 over the profits of the mobile home park, how 
23 they are split. I wanted to talk more about the 
24 rents. 
25 A. Okay. 
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1 Q. I had a bunch of questions related to 
2 some documents that your sister gave me. I have 
3 tabbed what she calls "Tax Report 2003." Have 
4 you ever seen that document? 
5 A. Yes, this is something she's made up. 
6 It's on her -- 
7 Q. That was my first question: If you've 
8 seen it, where did it come from? And it looks 
9 like you didn't generate that as your manager or 
10 secretarial duties? 
11 A. No, I didn't. 
12 Q. Now, this is the Canyon Vista Family, 
13 Limited Partnership record, at least it was 
14 represented to me, to be a record of that limited 
15 partnership? 
16 A. That's exactly what that is. 
17 Q. Are you currently a limited partner of 
18 that limited partnership? 
19 A. Yes, I am. 
20 Q. It shows that you received a 
21 disbursement, at least in 2003, of 18,000, almost 
22 $19,000? 
23 A. That very well could be. I don't know 
24 that that's accurate, but it sounds good. 
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1 MR. COPPLE: That's four years ago. 
2 Q. (BY MR. MALLET) In other words, you 
3 received a disbursement that year. You are just 
4 not sure if that's right to the dollar amount? 
5 A. Yes, exactly. 
6 Q. Okay. Now, this disbursement, this 
7 money would be -- it's not income from the Lazy J 
8 Mobile Home Park; is it? 
9 A. No, it's rent. 
10 Q. So the Canyon Vista Family, Limited 
1 Partnership receives a rent check, and that's 
12 supposedly how it got disbursed this year? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. And is that how it's still done today? 
15 A. Yes, I believe so. 
16 Q. And I can assume it was done that way 
$7  in 2404 as well? 
18 A. Yeah. Right now, she's getting more 
19 rent. 
20 Q. I'm talking about how the rent is 
21 split-up now. We all talk about that as being 
22 your sister's parcel, the Canyon Vista parcel? 
23 A. Correct. 
24 Q. But the partnership that owns it, you 
25 actually are a limited partner in that 
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1 partnership; correct? 
2 A. Right. 
3 Q. And as part of your rights as a limited 
4 partner, you receive what it looks like, an equal 
5 share of rents to your brother and sister? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. A lot of these old tax returns, I've 
8 got 2001 here tabbed, for example, it shows the 
9 profit sharing as just under 33 percent. Now, do 
1 0  you see that in this 2001 return? 
1 1 A. The profit sharing -- what am I looking 
12  at? This is Lazy J's? 
1 3  Q. No, this is the Canyon Vista Family, 
14 Limited Partnership's tax return. 
1 5  A. Okay. 
1 6  Q. And it's a 2001 return. And this is 
1 7  one for the limited partner named Linda Wills, 
18 which is you; right? 
1 9  A. Right. 
2 0  Q. And it shows that you have an equal 
21 share, 32.3 percent share in the limited 
22  partnership? 
2 3  A. Yes. 
2 4  Q. While that was true in 2001, was it 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Is it true as we sit here today? 
3 A. I believe so. 
4 Q. You had talked about your parents 
5 having what you believe is a small share. It 
6 looks like in 2001, J. C. Williams had a 1.55 
7 percent share. Do you see where it says that? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. And does that sound right? 
10  A. Yes. 
11 Q. And I see one to your mother. 
12  A. She would have been the same, uh-huh. 
1 3  Q. And at some point, as far as you know, 
14 has your mother divested herself from -- 
1 5  A. She gifted it off. 
16  Q. And we see some documents, tax 
17 documents for that Canyon Vista Family, Limited 
1 8  Partnership in 2003. This one relates to you? 
19  A. Okay. 
20 Q. And it shows you have a higher 
21 ownership now, it's 33.08 percent? 
22 A. Yes. 
2 3  Q. And I assume that that higher 
24 percentage would have been obtained through soma24 
25 sort of gifting or inheritance? 
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1 A. It could have come from Mom and Dad's 
2 share. 
3 Q. This is just something I wanted to ask 
4 you about. In 2004, it looks like -- and these 
5 are still the Canyon Vista Family, Limited 
6 Partnership returns. It looks like the 
7 partnership showed some income from the rental of 
8 the house. Do you see that? 
9 A. I don't see it, but I know they did, 
10  yes. 
11 Q. The house rental, it would be under 8, 
12 line B. 
1 3  A. Yes, right up here (indicating). 
14 Q. Yes. 
1 5  A. Uh-huh. 
16  Q. Now, the house is not part of the Lazy 
17 J Mobile Home Park, then? 
1 8  A. No. 
19 Q. It's separate? 
20 A. It's gone. 
21 Q. We're talking back before it was gone? 
22 A. Yes. Yes. Okay. 
23 Q. You, as the manager of the mobile home 
24 park, did you manage that house -- 
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1 Q. -- or how did that work? 
2 A. Christie owned that house. 
3 Q. While Christie had prepared those 
4 documents before, it looks like there is a 2004 
5 tax form for the Canyon Vista Family, Limited 
6 Partnership, and it looks like your distribution 
7 that year would have been 18,868. Does that 
8 sound accurate? 
9 A. That could be. I don't think they've 
10  changed anything, because I believe my own 
11 accountant. 
12  Q. Okay. I was going to say, unless 
1 3  somebody lied to the IRS, that probably is 
14 correct; isn't it? 
15  A. Yes. 
16  Q. On the KLS & M parcel, does the KLS & M 
17 Family, Limited Partnership receive any rental 
18 income? 
19  A. No. 
20 Q. So although some of the mobile homes 
21 are wholly or partly on that property, the rent 
22 distribution doesn't go at all to that entity? 
23 A. Un-huh, 
MR. COPPLE: Say no. 
25  THE WITNESS: No. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., CASE NO. CV 04-6336 
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN MCHUGH ) 
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C. 1 
MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL 1 
MILLER and JOHN X COMBO, DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, ) OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
1 MOTION TO BIFURCATE 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 
VS. 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED ) 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J. RANCH, ) 
INC. 1 
Defendants. 
COME NOW the Defendants, Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership and Lazy J 
Ranch, Inc., by and through its attorneys of record of the firm Davison, Coppie, Copple & Cox, 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO BIFURCATE - 1 
and hereby submit this Memorandum in Opposition to the PlaintifT's Motion to Bifurcate the trial 
to resolve the issue of the larger parcel in this matter prior to the presentation of the issue of just 
compensation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
After nearly two and a half years since the filing of this condemnation action, the State 
now contends tinat ihrough the discovery process and' recent exchange of pretrial motions that "it 
has become clear that there is a dispute between the parties regarding the 'larger parcel' issue in 
this case." PlaintiffS Brief in Support ofMotion, p. 2. 
Not only is this representation to the Court misleading and false in reflecting the State's 
understanding of this case and the other thee cases in which it now contends it desires to 
consolidate into one larger parcel, but the State's own actions firther indicate that it made a 
deliberate decision in separating the cases into four distinct parcels. 
Since at least October of 2001, the State has been klly aware that the family members 
intended to divide a 60 acre parcel into three distinct parcels for estate planning purposes. 
Despite having this knowledge and three years afterwards, the State filed four separate 
condemnation lawsuits against the properties, appraised each individual parcel as a separate 
parcel of property and ultimately resolved three of the four parcels short of trial. Not once did 
the State file with the Court that the three cases of State v. KLS&M (Case No. CV 04-6334, Fifth 
Judicial District, Twill Falls County, Idaho), State v. BCM&W (Case No. CV 04-6335, Fifth 
Judicial District, Twin Falls County, Idaho) and State v. Lazy J Ranch (Case No. CV 04-6337, 
Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County, Idaho) constitute one larger parcel for purposes of 
detennining just compensation. In each case, just compensation was settled for $380,000, 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO BIFURCATE - 2 
$817,500 and $150,000, respectively. In each of those cases, the property owners were required 
to disclose their opinions first and they always advocated each parcel was a separate and distinct 
piece of property. The State, too, in assessing just compensation appraised and valued the 
properties separately. 
It is only now, after the State recognizes that this case is going to trial, that the State 
attempts to utilize the settled three cases to mitigate the damages arising from the Pole Line Road 
project to the subject property, the fourth and final parcel. 
It is difficult to see how the State's efforts to inject this issue after taking inconsistent 
positions previously in the three other cases can be anything other than bad faith and one must 
question whether the intent of this motion is anything more than an attempt to delay the jury trial 
which has been set for nearly two years. 
Based upon the authority set forth herein, Defendants' respectfully request that this Court 
enter its Order denying the State's Motion to Bifurcate. 
n. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. The Other Three Parcels Were Cpndemned Separate& 
and Adiudicated and Should Not be Included in the Subiect Case. 
Previously, Defendants provided the Court with authority in Defendants' Motion in 
Limine to Exclude Evidence, Testimony and Argument regarding the Development of the subject 
Property with Adjacent Properties that held that res judicata and collateral estoppel applied when 
the government attempted to introduce valuation evidence of other parcels, which had been 
adjudicated previously, with the subject parcel of the snit. The Illinois court affirmed the trial 
court's decision to exclude the proposed valuation evidence. 
In Department of Transportation v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 707 N.E.2d 637 (1999), 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO BIFURCATE - 3 
the Appellate Court of Illinois was faced with the issue of whether valuation evidence of other 
parcels, which were condemned separately and adjudicated, should have be included with the 
property at issue under the larger parcel concept. The Court rejected the Transportation 
Department's arguments and explained its holding as follows: 
A prior judgment may preclude a subsequent action under both res judicata and 
collateral estoppel. (Citation omitted). The doctrine of res judicata provides that 
a final judgment on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties in that 
case and constitutes an absolute bar to a later action involving the same claim. 
(Citation omitted). The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when a party 
participates in two separate cases arising on different causes of actions, as here, 
and some controlling fact or question material to the determination of both cases 
has already been adjudicated against that party in a prior case. (Citation omitted). 
Housing Authority, (citation omitted), involved a dispute over the ownership of a 
parcel of land. However, the court in that case found that the ownership of the 
parcel had already been determined long ago in a 1932 federal condemnation case 
The court in Housing Authority thus determined that the two cases were 
substantially the same. (Citation omitted). 
Here, the ownership and valuation of the other parcels has already been 
adjudicated. As to the East Parcel, the circuit court in that case entered an order 
on February 28,2989, that Marco Muscarello was the owner. The final judgment 
order was entered in that case on June 19, 1997. The notice of appeal for the 
instant case was filed on September 30, 1997, but no appeal was taken from the 
final judgment in the East Parcel case. A just compensation award was paid to 
Marco Muscarello, as trustee. (Citation omitted). 
As to West Parcel I, the circuit COUI3 in that case entered final judgment order on 
May 22, 1990, for a just compensation award to Gershon Hanllner as the owner of 
the property. . . . 
The remainder damages as to these parcels have already been determined and 
awarded to the appropriate parties. IDOT cannot now argue that the remainder 
damages of any of the parcels have decreased due to a subsequent acquisition to 
these properties. The issue of who held title to the other parcels, as well as the 
valuation of those parcels, was properly determined by the circuit courts as of the 
date of filing of the complaints to condemn. 
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Although there is no Idaho appellate case directly on point, Idaho courts have adopted and 
applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel which is clearly applicable to situations and 
circumstances now raised by the State. The Chicago Title court's application of collateral 
estoppel is consistent with the elements of judicial estoppel adopted by the Idaho appellate 
courts. 
In Robertson Suppk Inc. v. Nicholls, 131 Idaho 99,952 P.2d 914 (1998), the Idaho Court 
of Appeals explained the judicial estoppel doctrine as follows: 
The Idaho Supreme Court considered and adopted the doctrine of judicial estoppel 
in Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 87,277 P.2d 561 (1954). In Loomis, the Court 
stated: 
It is quite generally held that where a litigant, by means of such 
sworn statements, obtains a judgment, advantage or consideration 
from one party, he will not thereafter, by repudiating such 
allegations and by means of inconsistent and contrary allegations 
or testimony, be permitted to obtain a recovery or a right against 
another party, arising out of the same transaction or subject matter. 
Id., 76 Idaho at 93-94,277 P.2d at 565. Essentially, this doctrine prevents a party 
from assuming a position in one proceeding and then talcing an inconsistent 
position in a subsequent proceeding. (Citation omitted). There are very important 
policies underlying the judicial estoppel doctrine. One purpose of the doctrine is 
to protect the integrity of the judicial system, by protecting the orderly 
administration of justice and having regard for the dignity of judicial proceedings. 
(Citation omitted). The doctrine is also intended to prevent parties from playing 
fast and loose with the courts. (Citation omitted). 
Id., 13 1 Idaho at 10 1. 
In Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242,92 P.3d 492 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the application ofjudicial estoppel. 
The application ofjudicial esloppel is one of discretion. In McKay v. Owens, 130 
Idaho 148, 152,937 P.2d 1222, 1226 (1997), the Court referred to the Risserto v. 
Plumbers and Steamfitters Local, which applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel 
and stated the doctrine and the policies behind it: 
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Judicial estoppel, sometimes also known as the doctrine of 
preclusion of inconsistent positions, precludes a party from gaining 
an advantage by taking one position, and then seeking a second 
advantage by taking an incompatible position. 
(Citation omitted). There are also important policies behind judicial estoppel. In 
Risetto, the Ninth Circuit stated that: 
The policies underlying preclusion of inconsistent positions are 
general considerations of the orderly administration of justice and 
regard for the dignity of judicial proceedings. . . Judicial estoppel is 
intended to protect against a litigant playing fast and losses with 
the courts. . . Because it is intended to protect the dignity of the 
judicial process, it is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at 
its discretion. (Citations omitted). 
Id., 140 Idaho at 252. 
Other Idaho cases which considered the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel, include Smith v. 
U.S.R. l! Properties, LLC, 141 Idaho 795, 118 P.3d 127 (2005) and A&JConstruction Co., Inc. 
v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682,116 P.3d 12 (2005). 
The State attempts to disguise its motion to bifurcate as an issue of law on its face by 
neglecting to advise this Court of its own voluntary actions in the other cases which now become 
part of the issue raised before this Court. The State postures as if it has treated each individual 
case on its own merits and that what transpired in the other cases is irrelevant in the instant case, 
despite now attempting to raise the issue of the larger parcel in this case. The State is now trying 
to back door Canyon Vista, by incorporating other parcels which may have constituted the larger 
parcel, but the State elected to proceed in a different manner with them. 
The State cites Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203 (1978) and State ex rel Flandro v. Seddon, 
94 Idaho 940 (1 972) for the proposition that the larger parcel is a question of law to be resolved 
by the court. In neither Rueth nor Flandro was the court faced with the issue of whether other 
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properties which had been previously adjudicated could be incorporated into a larger parcel issue 
on a pending case that had yet to be adjudicated. Even if the State's proposition that the larger 
parcel is an issue of law is correct, which we do not disagree, it is remarkable that the issue can 
now be heard after judgments have been entered on the other cases and the time for appeal in 
those cases has expired and three weeks prior to the trial in this matter. This radical shift in 
positions comes after significant time and expense has been spent preparing for trial and if 
granted would substantially prejudice the Defendants. 
B. If The Court Finds The Larger Parcel to Include Adiacent Pro~erties 
Are the Judgments Previouslv Entered Void. 
Assuming the Court decides that the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel and/or 
judicial estoppel do not apply and that the larger parcel in this case consists of one or more 
adjacent parcels for purposes of just compensation in this case, the issue then becomes are the 
judgments entered against the other properties void. The entire premise for seeking a larger 
parcel ruling is the State's attempt to mitigate the damages incurred to Canyon Vista's property 
as a result of the Pole Line Road project. The State's theory is that if the adjacent properties 
which have direct access to Pole Line are included, then canyon Vista would then have 
reasonable access to Pole Line Road, albeit not directly from its physical boundaries but way of 
the larger parcel concept. 
Defendants disagree and dispute that the State's proposed theory would render Canyon 
Vista's property with reasonable access to Pole Line Road. However, what has not been 
contemplated by the State is that if this were the case, do the damages the other adjacent 
properties may incur to provide Canyon Vista's property with access which were never 
contemplated in the judgments entered by the Court in those cases, open the door for Lazy J. 
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Ranch, KLS&M andlor BCM&W to seek new damages. 
The State cannot use the judgments previously entered against the adjacent properties as a 
shield and then subsequently utilize those properties to cure the subject property under the cloak 
of the judgmeilts without any further recourse by those owners. The State's proposed theory in 
this case goes directly against the doctrines referenced herein that have been established since the 
inception of the law. Finality would not exist in the condemnation world if government agencies 
were permitted to use adjudicated cases to its advantage to cure other properties whose case is 
pending. 
Should the Court be inclined to allow for evidence which includes the adjacent properties 
that have been adjudicated as part of the larger parcel, then Defendants request a ruling on the 
new issue raised of whether the judgments previously entered by this Court no longer have the 
effect of res judicata. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the case law and arguments provided herein, Defendants' respectfully request 
the Court entered its Order denying the State's Motion to Bifurcate and find that the State is 
estopped from asserting an inconsistent position. 
In the alternative, should the State's Motion to Bifurcate be granted, then Defendants' 
respectfully request a ruling from this Court that the judgments previously entered in the three 
other cases be set aside and the cases be set for trial. 
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DATED this @day of May, 2007. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the - of May, 2007, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served upon the following: 
Joseph Mallet __ U.S. MAIL 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
33 11 West State Street 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129 
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E DON COPPLE - ISB # 1085 
HEATHER A. CUNNINGHAM - ISB # 5480 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX 
Attorneys at Law 
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza 
199 North Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 600 
Post Office Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-3658 
Facsimile: (208) 386-9428 
9' DEPUTY 
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Attorneys for Defendants 
Canyon Vista Famiiy Limited Partnership 
and Lazy J. Ranch, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF TIHE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., ) CASE NO. CV 04-6336 
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN MCI-IUGH ) 
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C. 
MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL 
MILLER and JOHN X COMBO, 1 DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, ) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
BIFURCATE 
Plaintiff, 1 
VS. 
1 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED ) 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J. RANCH, ) 
INC. 1 
Defendants. 1 
COME NOW the Defendants, Canyon Vista Fanily Limited Partnership and Lazy J. 
Ranch, Inc., by and through its attorneys of record of the firm Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox, 
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and hereby submit its objection to Plaintiffs Motion to Bifurcate the trial on the grounds and for 
the reasons that: 
1 )  Plaintiff is judicially estopped from asserting the larger parcel issue in this case; 
2) The doctrine of res judicata applies to State v. KLS&M (Case No. CV 04-6334, 
Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County, Idaho), State v. BCM&W (Case No. CV 
04-6335, Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County, Idaho) and State v. Lazy J. 
Ranch (Case No. CV 04-6337, Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County, Idaho) 
on the larger parcel issue; and 
3) Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from asserting the larger parcel issue in this case. 
This Objection is made and based on the records and files herein, and the authorities cited 
in Defendants' Brief in Opposition to the Plaintiffs Motion to Bifurcate. 
/S DATED this - day of May, 2007. 
.A . 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1 day of May, 2007, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served upon the following: 
Joseph Mallet U.S. MAIL 
Deputy Attorney General Hand Delivery 
Idaho Transportation Department J Facsimile Transmission 
3 3 11 West State Street 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129 
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